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SUMMARY OF THE THESIS
This thesis is concerned with understanding the changing
dynamic in the relationship between the financial sector
and the capitalist state. The thesis examines the
changing form of this relationship in South Africa in the
three decades that preceded the formation of the
Government of National Unity in April 1994.
Arguing that the political, ideological and economic
forms expressed by the state are the surface appearances
of deeper social processes arising from the production
and reproduction of capitalist social relations, the
thesis attempts to show how the contradictory tendencies
of capital accumulation in South Africa increasingly took
the form of a monetary crisis. In responding to the
crisis after 1976, the apartheid state sought to
depoliticise economic relations by restructuring the
monetary basis of the state. The thesis analyses the
proposals of the De Kock Commission appointed to inquire
into the monetary system and monetary policy and shows
how class struggle conditioned the attempt by the state
to restructure the financial system. While the state
pursued a legislative programme to restructure the
financial system, deepening economic and political
pressures, made it difficult to pursue such a programme
in isolation from the pressures to restructure the
relations of power and domination embodied in the
apartheid state. The thesis traces the development of
this contradiction during the course of the 1980's and
its resolution in the formation of the Government of
National Unity in 1994. The restructuring of the state in
the 1990's and the emergence of a new popular government
has made it possible to take the process of financial
restructuring further. This is because the institutional
restructuring of the 'post-apartheid' state has been
confined within the liberal state form. The liberal state
form allows the subordination of the state and civil
society to the abstract rule of money and law. The thesis
examines the implications for social relations of the
continuity in the apartheid and post-apartheid forms of
restructuring of the administrative, legal, fiscal,
monetary and financial aparatuses.
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1INTRODUCTION:
Money and the restructuring of the South African state
The focus of this enquiry is the study of the
relationship between the financial sector and the
capitalist state and the changing forms of this
relationship in South Africa in the three decades that
preceded the formation of the Government of National
Unity after South Africa's first democratic elections in
April 1994. The study will attempt to outline the
implications for social relations of the administrative
and regulatory framework of the financial sector in a
restructured South African state.
Adopting an approach which theorises the capitalist
state as an institutional form of the 'capital-
2relation', the form and function of the apartheid state
is traced through the dynamic of the capital-relation,
viz the relationship between capital and labour. The
particular institutional forms of regulation and
administration characteristic of the apartheid state has
been developed within the framework of national and
global forms of capital accumulation. The study will
attempt to show that the contradictory tendencies of
capital accumulation - which became increasingly
manifested as a financial crisis - and which intensified
the class struggle between capital and labour,
necessited a strategic realignment by capital and the
state. This realignment has been expressed
institutionally in the restructuring of the apartheid
state.
This thesis is concerned with understanding the social
processes that underly the restructuring of the South
African state from the late sixties to the early 1990's.
Such a study is fundamental to an understanding of the
social transformations which have occured over the last
2 to 3 decades and which is manifested in the changing
form of the SA state. It is the contention of the thesis
that the political, ideological and economic forms are
the phenomenal forms of appearance of deeper social
processes arising from the production and reproduction
of capitalist social relations. This is a dynamic and
contradictory social process in which the changing
dynamic of the capital relation, i.e. the relationship
3between capital and labour, is fundamental and holds the
key to a scientific understanding of the social form of
the South African state. The unfolding of this process,
both historically and logically, in the latter half of
this century, has revealed the contradictory basis of
capitalist production and the necessity, in attempting
to overcome crisis, to constantly restructure the
relations between capital, the working class and the
state through changes in the social relations of
production and the institutional form of the state. I
want to show that the dynamic of these transformations
manifests two counter-tendencies. On the one hand, the
effort to restructure social relations in order to
reassert the command of capital over labour, and on the
other hand, labour's struggle to socialise production.
Theorising the capitalist state in this way has
important implications for the analysis of the South
African state. Most analyses of the South African state
have emphasised the institutional and political-legal
forms of domination which have characterised social
relations in South Africa. In so doing, the starting
point of analysis has tended to be the apartheid form of
the state rather than the social determination of the
state form as it has emerged historically in changing
and specific conditions of class struggle. Emphasis is
placed rather on the differential access to state power
and economic resources resulting from the
institutionalised separation of the population into
4legally regulated 'racial' groups. This politicist
(over-emphasis of the 'political' and the separation of
the 'political' from other social forms without
adequately theorising the relationships between the
forms) analysis is characteristic of liberal, neo-
liberal and neo-marxist analyses of the South African
state.
The liberal view of the South African state sees the
state primarily as a structure of racial domination
within the political sphere. It is the institutional
expression of an essentially irrational political order
based on racial prejudice. In contrast, the economy,
which is seen as outside the political sphere, is seen
as rational, 'colour-blind' and in conflict with the
political system. The relationship between the state and
the economy is one in which two tendencies are
manifested: on the one hand,
"the South African economy of the 1960's has been
decisively shaped, and perhaps determined...by an
overpowering pursuit of ideas, or ideology...The polity
has always sought its ideal and ideology - the White
man's supremacy. The network of economic development had
to follow accordingly" (Horwitz, 1967:10 - 11). "The white
power structure is taken here to refer to the
interlocking system of white dominated institutions
whose actions, directly and indirectly, determine the
access to power and available opportunities, and the
distribution of resources" (Spro-cas Commission,
51972:33). On the other hand, however, so the liberal
argument goes, the rational forces of the economy will
in the long run assert themselves and subvert the racial
structure and its intervention in the economy: "...South
African capitalism has now reached the point at which
social and political reforms are a pre-requisite for
further growth within the capitalist mode of production,
and moreover, that the South African state perceives
this and proposes to change its strategies to ensure, as
far as it is able, the perpetuation of capitalism rather
than that of White supremacy" (J.Nattrass, 1981:28).
In rejecting the view that apartheid should simply be
seen in terms of racial oppression arising from the
racist ideology of the South African ruling class, the
neo-marxists, argue that "an understanding of race
relations must be rooted in a conception of the specific
relations of production of South African
capitalism"(0 1 Meara, 1982:363). Neo-marxism saw the
state as an instrument of class rule, used to maintain
and develop the capitalist mode of production and the
distribution of the surplus between the various class
fractions. From this neo-marxism draws the conclusion
that apartheid represents the hegemony of a particular
fraction of the dominant class engaged in struggle with
other fractions within the power bloc. Apartheid
represents the victory of 'national' capital
(agriculture and manufacture) over 'imperialist' capital
(mining): "State power is a unity, requiring
6organisational direction to be effective. Thus there is
always a struggle within the power bloc to assume this
organisational role, and thereby ensure the primacy of
this class/fraction's particular interests" (Davis et
a/,1976:5 cited in Wolpe, 1989).
The neo-liberal approach responds to some of the neo-
marxist criticism of the liberal analyses and presents a
subtler argument but continues to theorise the economic
and the political separately and independently, ditching
the idea of a conflict between irrational (political)
and rational (economic) in favour of a version of the
fractionalist approach to theorising the apartheid
state: "Until recently, much of the argument about South
Africa has been couched in terms of whether economic
forces, usually described as 'rational' , would prevail
over 'irrational' political and ideological forces such
as race prejudice and Afrikaner nationalism. However,
the issue is now widely perceived as being a political
struggle between different sets of economic interests,
rather than a battle between archaic political and
progressive economic forces" (Lipton, 1986:5).
All these approaches have in common a theoretical
perspective that takes for granted a separation of
political from economic relations. To varying degrees
these approaches are permeated by a structural-
functionalist model of social reality which either
emphasises the political in its analysis of the
7apartheid state or reduce all to an economistic
explanation. The liberals treat the apartheid state in
purely political terms and separate it from the economy,
while the neo-marxists relying on this separation, only
bring them together in a reductionist manner,
characterising the state immediately i.e without
mediation, with the interests of capital. Liberal, neo-
liberal and neo-marxist analyses has not been able to
adequately conceptualise the South African state in all
its complexity showing the complementarity of political
and economic forms and their inter-connections with the
underlying social relations forged by capitalism.
An alternative perspective, and the one adopted in this
thesis, relies on a methodological approach which
conceptualises social processes as the product of
historically determined conditions which embrace a
"rich totality of many determinations and relations"
(Marx, 1981:100)
Following this approach, the starting point is to
analyse what appear to be the central concrete social
phenomena and to 'de-construct' them into the simplest
determinations. Using these simple determinations, one
can attempt to build up, logically and historically,a
conception of social processes in all their totality in
order to approximate the many determinations and
relations that make up concrete social phenomena.
8"The concrete is concrete because it is the
concentration of many determinations" (Marx, 1981:101).
The objective of this thesis therefore is to study the
social determinations and interconnections between money
capital and the South African state. These are complex
social forms, which in a society of generalised
commodity production presupposes the commodity form and
the social relations embodied by and arising from this
social form. The increasingly complex determinations of
the money form, law and the state are forms assumed by
the capital relation arising from the commodity form.
Starting with the analysis of the commodity form,
Chapter One examines the relationship between the
commodity form and money and the implication of this
relationship for the social determination of the
capitalist state.
Chapter Two examines the implications of this analysis
of the capitalist state for the theorisation of the
South African state. Left analysis of the South African
state has relied predominantly on the neo-marxist
theorisation of the capitalist state derived from
Althusser and Poulantzas. In its analysis of the
apartheid state's response to crisis, in the 1970's and
1980's, a similar reliance was placed on Aglietta's
regulation theory' for its analysis of the apartheid
state's reform strategies. Neo-marxism emphasises the
9separation of the 'economic' from the 'political' in its
analyses. It has played an important role in the
formulation of the economic policy of the ANC. Showing
the inadequacies of this approach the chapter argues for
a different interpretation of the apartheid state's
reform strategies based on an approach that analyses the
political and the economic as different forms of the
same social process. What is important is how the power
of capital and the power of the state is mediated
through the social power of money.
In Chapter Three, I begin an exploration of the
historical development of South African capitalism and
the conditions shaping the contradictions and crisis of
capital accumulation. Using as a starting point the
economic boom of the 1960's and the reasons for its
demise, I analyse the structural imbalance in the
domestic economy which derives from the predominance of
primary production. The expansion of manufacturing in
the sixties did not eliminate the trade-dependent
character of the domestic economy nor did it steer South
Africa significantly away from its role in the world
economy as a primary producer. Rather, the expansion of
manufacturing created other counter-tendencies. It
intensified the class struggle between capital and
labour at the point of production and between the state
and the rapidly rising reserve army of labour displaced
by the introduction of modern technology and the
restructuring of the labour process. The contradictions
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of capital accumulation became increasingly expressed in
the form of a monetary crisis. In responding to the
crisis the state sought to address its monetary form.
Chapter Four analyses the monetary form of the crisis
within the domestic and international context and the
effect of class struggle on the ability of the apartheid
state to respond to this crisis. As the boom reached its
limits in the early seventies, so growing economic
pressures led to rising inflation, deficits in the
balance of payments and a growing shortage of skilled
labour. These economic pressures cannot be understood in
isolation from more fundamental social processes.
Furthermore the structural imbalances in the domestic
economy reflected the limited and dependent character of
manufacturing as well as the vulnerability of the
economy to the international money and capital markets.
These structural features which precipitated the
seventies recession was exacerbated by the 1973/4 crisis
in the world economy and the mass uprisings of 1976.
The impact of the mass uprising of 1976 on capital and
the state is explored in Chapter Five. Internal
political and industrial conflict, fuelled by domestic
and global recessionary conditions, set the crisis
facing the apartheid state to a new level. While working
class pressure for economic and political reform
intensified, state and capital were pinning their hopes
on resolving the political crisis through economic
11
growth by restructuring manufacturing. This was the
basis of state and capital's reform agenda. The
condition for restructuring manufacturing however was
the modernisation of the administrative and regulatory
systems that coordinate economic activity and make
possible an efficient labour market. The first
comprehensive set of reforms introduced by the apartheid
state made possible the creation of an industrial
relations system that extended trade union rights to
black workers and eased restrictions on their movement.
Restructuring manufacturing also impacts on South
Africa's relationship to the world economy. Continual
financial crises, including capital flight, chronic
balance of payments deficits and instability in the
domestic banking system, necessitated reform of the
financial system.
Chapter Six assesses the Interim Report of the De Kock
Commission of Inquiry into the monetary system and
monetary policy, published in 1978. By restructuring the
financial system and introducing monetary reforms, it
was hoped that pressure on the domestic economy and the
foreign exchanges would be reduced by facilitating
integration with the world economy. Internally, the
Commission's task was to formulate strategy for the
depoliticisation of economic relations. The rapid
unfolding of political and economic developments,
however, forced the Commission to respond to the
immediate pressures arising from the foreign exchange
12
markets. The efforts to restructure the financial system
continued to be constrained by the need to respond to
immediate pressures. As a result, restructuring at this
time remained largely pragmatic and the process of
strategic restructuring of the financial system had to
charter a more difficult course the outcome of which
could not be pre-determined as it was conditioned by the
changing dynamic of class struggle.
Chapters Seven and Eight explores the issues arising
from the tendencies and counter-tendencies which shaped
the transformations of the financial sector from 1986 to
1992. Chapter Seven assesses the significance of the
Second Interim and Final Reports of the De Kock
Commission. Chapter Eight explores financial
restructuring in the context of the restructuring of the
form of the South African state.
Chapter Nine analyses the financial and banking
strategies of the Government of National Unity and their
relationship to the reconstruction and development
objectives of the state.
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CHAPTER ONE
Money capital and the determination of the
capitalist state
The commodity form and money
The expenditure of labour and its appropriation by
capital is the foundation upon which alienated labour
exists in capitalist society. Capitalist private
property is a particular form of alienated labour in
which the products of labour are appropriated by private
owners. The commodity form and the process of commodity
exchange rests upon alienated labour. In demonstrating
that the labour theory of value in political economy
presupposes alienated labour and the existence of
particular social forms in a particular society, Marx
concluded that the theory of value of political economy
and the economic categories assumed by it are socially
14
determined and the product of a specific form of
society. Value arises from alienated labour in which
social production is regulated through the production
and exchange of commodities.
Commodities, although products of the individual
producer, do not serve immediately the use-value needs
of the direct producers. Human needs are satisfied
indirectly. For the capitalist, the use-value of the
commodity rests upon its ability within a commodity-
producing society to be exchanged as a value. Needs are
satisfied indirectly, through the alienated form of the
production of values. Consequently, "The exchange of
commodities as values is correspondingly a specific
social form of the regulation of the division of labour
in society and the value of the commodity expresses the
social relations between producers within that division
of labour"(Clarke,1983;67-8).
As a consequence of the way commodities are produced and
the way their value are realised only by exchange, the
social determination of their value is not immediately
apparent and therefore appears to arise from some
inherent property within the commodity. This illusionary
power of commodities is the basis for the fetishisation
of commodities and the propensity for political economy
to naturalise capitalist social relations and view these
purely abstractly, as relations between abstract
'private' individuals whereas, in reality, "The
15
individual act of production and appropriation
...presupposes a social division of labour expressed in
the total process of production and exchange of
commodities"(Clarke, 1983:71). Private property is
itself a form of the social relations of commodity
production. The owner of private property is concerned
primarily with the value embodied in commodities rather
than with its physical properties. The value embodied in
commodities is created during the course of the labour
process in which the activities of various concrete
labours combine in production. In a society with
generalised commodity production, the labourers engaged
in commodity production are alienated from the products
they create despite the fact that their labours have
created value. That is to say, that the commodities
produced by workers, the direct producers, are not
intended for the immediate satisfaction of their needs.
Rather, they satisfy the immediate needs of the class of
capitalists who are able, through the circulation and
exchange of commodities to realise and accumulate the
value that they had appropriated from the direct
producers. For the capitalists, commodity production is
only meaningful for the potential that value can be
realised in the exchange process.
What follows from this is that different forms of
property express different forms of social relation. In
the historical development of commodity production new
social relations and consequently new forms of property
16
come into being. The process of commodity exchange for
example gave rise to the money form - a special
commodity acting as a unit of value in exchange.
Money as a social relation
The money form emerges with the development of
generalised commodity production, in which commodities
are exchanged to realise their value. Commodities
acquire their value through the various concrete labours
engaged in producing commodities, acquiring a social
form in which concrete labours are abstracted and
homogenised thus reducing the value of all commodities
produced in society to a measure of abstract labour in
which value is measured by the amount of socially-
necessary labour-time required for its production:
"Socially necessary labour-time is the labour-time
required to produce any use-value under the conditions
of production normal for a given society and with the
average degree of skill and intensity of labour
prevalent in that society"(Marx,1979:129). Consequently,
"Regarded as exchange-values all commodities are merely
definite quantities of congealed labour-time"
(Marx, 1981:30)
The homogenisation of labour has important implications
for exchange-value and the emergence of the money form.
With labour abstracted and equalised "Every commodity
considered as exchange-value becomes a measure of the
17
value of all other commodities."(Marx,1981;46) In
exchange, the product of specific individual concrete
labour is realised as the product of social labour. In
order to express concretely the exchange-value of a
particular commodity or group of commodities,
commodities as 'materialised universal labour-time',
find, in the exchange process, a commodity - a
'universal equivalent'. The commodity set aside in this
way acquires a universal use-value (that of being the
bearer of exchange-value) in addition to its own
particular use-value as a commodity. This use-value "is
itself a determinate form, i.e., it arises from the
specific role which this commodity plays as a result of
the universal action exerted on it by the other
commodities in the exchange process." (Marx,1981;47)
The contradictory determinations of the money-form
Money is the commodity universally recognised in the
exchange process as representing the exchange-value of
commodities. The emergence of money presupposes a
developed division of labour, particular production
relations and relations of exchange in society: "The
exchange of commodities is the process in which the
social metabolism...simultaneously gives rise to
definite social relations of production, into which
individuals enter in the course of this metabolism. As
they develop, the interrelations of commodities
crystallise into distinct aspects of the universal
18
equivalent, and thus the exchange process becomes at the
same time the process of formation of money. This
process as a whole, which comprises several processes,
constitutes circulation (Marx,1981:51-2). Circulation is
the social process by which commodities change their
form, oscillating between the commodity-form and the
money-form, as it is sold and bought by commodity-
owners and money-owners. Each circuit completed by one
commodity is inextricably link to the circuits of other
commodities. The circulation of commodities in its
simplest circuit, C-M-C, requires two contradictory
social processes: the commodity-owner parting with
commodities, becomes a seller; purchasing commodities
requires a buyer. "While the same commodity is
successively passing through the two inverted
transmutations, from a commodity into money and from
money into another commodity, the owner of the commodity
successively changes his role from seller to buyer.
Being a seller and being a buyer are therefore not fixed
roles, but constantly attach themselves to different
persons in the course of the circulation of
commodities"(Marx,1979:206). In each circuit the
commodity is subject to contradictory determinations: at
one moment it is a 'non-use-value' to its owner; at
another moment, it is a use-value. The same holds true
for money: it changes from money as crystallised value
to the equivalent form of the commodity.
19
Marx shows how this process of the circulation of
commodities in society has immediate social significance
in the transformation of human labour as a social
process. The circulation of commodities (the product of
human labour) develop a network of social connections
'beyond the control of the human agents' (Marx, 1979:207,
emphasis added). At any moment in the circulation,
whenever a commodity leaves the circuit, it leaves
behind a 'precipitate' in the form of money;
'Circulation sweats money from every
pore'(Marx,1979:208, emphasis added). This has important
implications for the reproduction of the circulation
process. The circulation of a commodity is useless if it
cannot be sold by its owner, in other words, if it is
not bought by the owner of money. While no commodity can
be sold without a purchase, there is no direct
compulsion for the seller to purchase. The sale and
purchase, occuring simultaneously, while it may be a
partial process considering circulation as a whole, is
at the same time an independent process in itself'. But
although independent, the two processes also complement
each other. Herein lies a contradiction in the
circulation process, the origins of which stem from the
contradictory determinations of the commodity form
itself: "These two processes lack internal independence
because they complement each other. Hence if the
assertion of their external independence proceeds to a
certain critical point, their unity makes itself
violently felt by producing - a crisis.There is an
20
antithesis, immanent in the commodity, between use-value
and value, between private labour which must
simultaneously manifest itself as directly social
labour, and a particular concrete kind of labour which
simultaneously counts as merely abstract universal
labour, between the conversion of things into persons
and the conversion of persons into things; the
antithetical phases of the metamorphosis of the
commodity are the developed forms of motion of this
immanent contradiction" (Marx, 1979:209, emphasis added).
The determination of the contradictions of capitalist
society and its propensity to crisis exist in the
circulation of commodities which in turn mirrors the
contradictory determinations of the commodity form. In
the circulation of commodities we see also the social
power of money. As a result of the circulation of
commodities, the transformation of commodities to money
in the circuit "appears not to have been mediated by its
(the commodities')own change of form, but rather by the
function of money as means of circulation...Hence
although the movement of money is merely the expression
of the circulation of commodities, the situation appears
to be the reverse of this, namely the circulation of
commodities seems to be the result of the movement of
money" (Marx,1979:211-2).
21
The determination of monetary crisis
With the development of circulation, circumstances make
possible the elapse of time before the alienation of a
commodity is realised in its price. In this case, the
seller turns creditor and the buyer, debtor. In this
situation money becomes the 'means of payment'. The
seller sells a commodity to a buyer who buys as a
representative of money' (future money). In this case
"The means of payment enters circulation, but only after
the commodity has already left it. The money no longer
mediates the process. It brings it to an end by emerging
independently, as the absolute form of existence of
exchange-value, in other words the universal commodity.
The seller turned his commodity into money in order to
satisfy some need; the hoarder in order to preserve the
monetary form of his commodity, and the indebted
purchaser in order to be able to pay" (Marx, 1979:234
emphasis added). The seller's commodity enters
circulation and realizes its price only in the form of a
legal title to money. (This pre-supposes the prior
existence of a social connection - a social relationship
existing independently but arising within and existing
through the circulation process.) With the historical
development of this process on an extended scale,
institutions arose (clearing-houses) to centralise means
of payments. When payments balance each other money
serves a nominal function as money of account - as a
measure of value. However the contradictory basis of
22
money functioning as means of payment arises when actual
payment is made. At this point money does not serve the
function as a means of circulation, but as the
independent embodiment of the value of social labour.
This contradiction is the basis of a monetary crisis
when the mechanism is disturbed. Then "money suddenly
and immediately changes over from its merely nominal
shape, money of account, into hard cash....The use-value
of commodities become valueless, and their value
vanishes in the face of their own form of value....In
crisis, the antithesis between commodities and their
value-form, money, is raised to the level of an absolute
contradiction"(Marx,1979:236).
The circuit of capital and the power of money
The process of the circulation of commodities is the
historical basis for the emergence of capital. Money, an
economic form produced by this process is the initial
form of appearance of capital. Alongside the direct form
of the circulation of commodities, C-M-C, we find
another form, M-C-M'. The basis for the transformation
of money into capital. Selling in order to buy (the
first circuit) ultimately end in consumption - the
satisfaction of a need. In the second circuit however,
buying in order to sell, the circuit begins and ends
with doney (exchange-value). The objective of the
process is to augment the value initially advanced. The
process of valorizing the initial value, converts it
23
into capital which makes possible the renewal of the
circuit.
The possibility of limitless movement of capital in this
circuit has important social implications:
On the one hand, "As the conscious bearer of this
movement, the possessor of money becomes a
capitalist...the valorization of value - is his
subjective purpose, and it is only in so far as the
appropriation of ever more wealth in the abstract is the
sole driving force behind his operations that he
functions as a capitalist"(Marx, 1979:254). On the other
hand, "Value therefore now becomes value in process,
money in process, and, as such, capital"(Ibid:256). This
circuit is the basic formula for capital in the sphere
of circulation, not only for money-capital but also for
industrial and interest-bearing capital. But, Marx shows
that surplus-value does not arise simply from the
circulation process but happens with the appropriation
by capitalist of the surplus-value derived from the
labour-process. The consumption in the production
process of labour-power by the capitalist is the basis
of value in capitalist society. All three circuits of
capital, money, productive and commodity capital, form a
unity that makes possible the reproduction and the
transformation of capital:
"As a whole, then, the capital is simultaneously
present, and spatially co-existent, in its various
phases. But each part is constantly passing from one
24
phase or functional form into another, and thus
functions in all of them in turn. The forms are
therefore fluid forms and their simultaneity is mediated
by their succession....The total social capital always
possesses this continuity and its process always
contains the unity of the three circuits"
(Marx, 178:184)
The credit-system and interest-bearing capital
The growth of credit money arises from the function of
money as a means of payment. As the credit system
expands, so does the use of money as means of
payment."When the production of commodities has attained
a certain level and extent, the function of money as
means of payment begins to spread out beyond the sphere
of circulation of commodities. It becomes the universal
material of contracts" (Marx,1979:238). The power of
money in the circulation process reinforces and is
reinforced by legal and political forms
institutionalised in the law and enforced by the state.
The process of fetishisation is taken further in
interest-bearing capital. In the form of interest-
bearing capital, M-M', capital appears immediately in
its money form unmediated by the production and
circulation processes. The accumulation of money capital
in the form of loan capital is another feature of the
credit system in which the concentration of money-
lending in banking institutions enables the
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accumulation of loanable capital, as a form separate
from genuine capital' (Marx,1981:634). The credit system
makes possible the allocation and coordination of money
capital enhancing the social power of money and in this
way increasing the power of capital over society: "When
concentrated in the hands of the capitalists...money
therefore comes to express the power of capitalist
property outside of and external to any specific process
of commodity production. Money capital, when mobilized
through the credit system, can operate as the common
capital of the capitalist class" (Marx, cited in
Harvey, 1982:284)
Marx himself did not develop the analysis of credit.
This task was taken up by Rudolf Hilferding. He studied
the theorisation of the credit system and its
relationship to the capitalist state.' Hilferding's
contribution is to conceptualise the process of
concentration and centralisation developing within
capitalism out of which cartels and trusts emerged, and
which brought bank and industrial capital into a closer
relationship. Drawing from Marx's analyses of
industrial, commercial and bank capital, he argues that
the functions the banks perform in respect of money,
credit and fictitious (equity) capital form the basis of
banking capital's power over industrial capital. Capital
credit (bank lending), possible through the transfer by
Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital: a study of the
latest phase of capitalist development, RKP, 1981.
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banks of money capital between capitalists, reinforced
this power of the banks. So do 'promoters' profits',
paid to banks for their role in raising equity.
Hilfeiding sees the concentration of banking as a
consequence of the development of capitalist industry.
The former, in turn, provides the impetus for capitalist
concentration in cartels and trusts. This
interrelationship has important consequence: " From the
outset the effect of advanced cartelisation is that the
banks also amalgamate and expand in order not to become
dependent upon the cartel or trust. In this way
cartelization itself requires the amalgamation of the
banks, and conversely, amalgamation of the banks
requires cartelization"(Hilferding,1981:223).
The formation of cartels presupposes the existence of
banks large enough to provide the credits required for
current payments and productive investment. But the
cartel provides a further impetus for closer industry-
bank relationship. Cartelisation within an industry
tends towards the elimination of competition. The
resultant increase in the rate of profit increases the
capital available for 'promoter's profit'.
"Cartelization also means greater security and
uniformity in the earnings of the cartelized enterpries.
The dangers of competition...are eliminated and this
leads to an increase in the share price of these
enterprises, which involves further promoter's profit
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when new shares are issued. Furthermore the security of
the capital invested in these enterprises is
significantly increased. This permits a further
expansion of industrial credit by the banks, which can
then acquire a larger share in industrial profits. As a
result of cartelization, therefore, the relations
between the banks and industry become still closer, and
at the same time the banks acquire an increasing control
over the capital invested in industry" (Hilferding,
1981:224).
The traditional sources of money for the banks were
usually derived from the resouces of the non-productive
class and the capital reserve of industrial and
commercial capitalists. Over time the development of
credit enabled industry to tap both sources for its
productive needs. Hilferding observed that the
industrial capitalists were employing resources far in
excesa of those owned by the industrial capitalists
themselves, viz, from the non-productive classes. "The
control of these funds which are indispensible to
industry, rests with the banks, and consequently, with
the development of capitalism and the machinery of
credit, the dependence of industry upon the banks
increases"(Ibid:224). The banks are able to attract such
funds through the payment of interest.
With the increase of available funds, its employment in
speculation and commerce began to decline in favour of
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transformation into industrial capital. For, "Without
the continuous expansion of credit for production, the
availability of funds for deposit would have declined
long ago, as would the rate of interest on bank
deposits"(Ibid:224). "The dependence of industry on the
banks is therefore a consequence of property
relationships. An ever-increasing part of the capital of
industry does not belong to the industrialists who use
it. They are able to dispose over capital only through
the banks, which represent the owners. On the other
side, the banks have to invest an ever-increasing part
of their capital in industry, and in this way they
become to a greater and greater extent industrial
capitalists. I call bank capital, that is, capital in
money form which is actually transformed in this way
into industrial capital, finance capital. So far as its
owners are concerned, it always retains the money form;
it is invested by them in the form of money capital,
interest-bearing capital, and can always be withdrawn by
them as money capital. But in reality the greater part
of the capital so invested with the banks is transformed
into industrial, productive capital (means of production
and labour power) and is invested in the productive
process. An ever-increasing proportion of the capital
used in industry is finance capital, capital at the
disposition of the banks which is used by the
industrialists" (Ibid:225).Hilferding saw finance
capital reaching its peak with the emergence of monopoly
capitalism. With increasing concentration of capital,
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"the owners of the fictitious capital which gives power
over the banks, and the owners of the capital which
gives power over industry, becomes increasingly the same
people...As capital ...becomes finance capital, so the
magnate of capital, the finance capitalist, increasingly
concentrates his control over the whole national capital
by means of his domination of bank capital" (Ibid:225).
Finance capital set new conditions that transform the
form and character of the capitalist state.
"Cartelization, by unifying economic power, increases
its political effectiveness. At the same time it
coordinates the political interests of capital and
enables the whole weight of economic power to be exerted
directly on the state. By uniting all capitalist
interests it confronts the state as a far more cohesive
body than was the fragmented industrial capital of the
era of free competition"(Ibid:338). In order to maintain
its interests, finance capital "needs a politically
powerful state which does not have to take account of
the conflicting interests of other states in its
commercial policy. It needs also a strong state which
will ensure respect for the interests of finance capital
abroad, and use its political power to extort
advantageous supply contracts and trade agreements from
smaller states; a state which can intervene in every
corner of the globe and transform the whole world into a
sphere of investment for its own finance capital"
(Ibid:334) "Finance capital, in its maturity, is the
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highest stage of the concentration of economic and
political power in the hands of the capitalist
oligarchy" (Ibid:370).
Hilferding fails to ground his analysis of 'finance
capital' in production and take account of the fact that
bank capital ultimately depends on productive capital
for its profits. As de Brunhoff(1976:54) explains, "the
form of production takes precedence over the form of
exchange, and that of capital over that of money. But
the monetary relation 'immanent' in the capitalist
relation preserves its nature and its specific role.
Capital must return to a monetary form for the initial
exchange M-C to be able to take place and reproduce
itself." Financial capital as money-capital provides the
financing of capitalist operations and remains a part of
total capital. Its function, "consists exclusively in
performing these operations for the entire class of
industrial, and commercial capitalists" (Marx, cited by
De Brunhoff,1976:75). Hilferding's concept of finance
capital, according to de Brunhoff, "confuses
centralisation and control of capital with mastery over
financial circulation. This latter...is necesarily bound
up with monetary circulation as a whole, as is credit
with means of payment. It is therefore valuable to
distinguish between..capitalist commodity circulation,
[on the one hand] and that of finance capital [on the
other] - before discussing the strategic position of the
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banking system at the interface of the two" (de
Brunhoff,1978:55-6).
Both elements are incorporated in bank capital and their
development inter-connect. Interest-bearing capital,
being loaned to industry, is directly linked to
productive capital in which it finds its limits.
Fictitious capital overcomes this limitation. Laurence
Harris defines it as, "financial assets created by the
capitalisation of an income stream where the asset does
not have a counterpart in an equivalent sum of
productive capital" (Harris, 1988:21).	 4.
Bank loans to states and bonds (issued by sovereign
state) are both forms of fictitious capital. The
importance of this for Harris is that the "state, does
not, on the whole, use them to finance the production of
commodities for profit (although of course, the state's
spending can indirectly support the profits of some
sectors of private industry); the corollory is that the
interest banks can receive on such bonds is not paid
directly from the uncertain profits of productive
enterprise. Instead the interest paid by the state to
its creditors is ultimately financed by the state's
powers of taxation"(Ibid:22). The banks' ownership of
this capital is therefore separated from the changing
fortunes of industrial capital. Banks therefore enjoy a
high degree of independence from production. To Marx,
however, this remains illusory for banking profits as a
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whole are dependent on the production of surplus
value(Ibid:22). According to Marx, "ultimately
industrial capital is seen as determining what happens
to finance capital, but each is a distinct and separate
form of capital"(Ibid:24). To Harris, there appears to
be a contradiction between finance capital and the
concept of fictitious capital: "While the latter
is...characterised by its relative independence from
productive capital, finance-capital appears completely
tied... For Marx, the tendency of finance was to become
increasingly abstract and free rather than specific and
tied, whereas finance capital appears to be quite the
opposite" (Ibid:25). With the internationalised
financial system, Harris believes, contra Hilferding,
that "the tendency to dissociate bank's operations from
industry's is the rule and their direct linking is the
exception" (Ibid:28). Harris, however, adds a rider: "as
bankers have found in the 1980's the problem is that
even fictitious capital cannot avoid its ultimate
dependence on the productivity of industry; when the
accumulation of productive capital is dislocated even
state debt is risky, and bank's capital can indeed
become immobilized by the crisis at times" (Ibid:30).
The constitution of the capitalist state
The state in capitalist society emerges from the
contradictory relation which arose historically from the
separation of the immediate producers from the means of
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production, the fundamental premise upon which the
capitalist mode of production is based. For the
capitalist state to be able to reproduce itself it has
to 'constitute itself as the social form determining the
conditions of life'(Bonefeld,1992:106) in capitalist
society. This was an intensive and bloody struggle in
which, through the combined impact of coercion and the
transformation of property relations through new forms
of formal regulation and administration enshrined in the
law, and maintained by the state, new forms of social
relations of production were constituted. As Pashukanis
observes, "At the same time, therefore, that the product
of labour becomes a commodity and a bearer of value, man
acquires the capacity to be a legal subject and a bearer
of rights" (Pashukanis, 1978:112). The generalisation of
the commodity form of production and exchange and the
establishment of abstract legal subjects made possible
the reproduction of social relations in forms which
pre-suppose alienated labour and private property and in
which value and law is intimately connected, reproducing
the economic and legal forms of capitalist social
relations. "Legal fetishism complements commodity
fetishism" Pashukanis,1978:117).
The social form of the capitalist state rests on the
contradictory relation between exchange and production
in a society of generalised commodity production based
on alienated labour. The production of surplus-value
depends on the appropriation of alienated labour. The
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labour appropriated is reduced to its social form as
abstract labour. Abstract labour, the substance of
value, presupposes on the one hand, generalised
production and exchange of commodities for the purpose
of expanding value and on the other, the imposition of a
social force that would maintain the command of capital
over labour by attempting to ensure that the
reproduction of social relations remains subordinated to
the reproduction of capital." The capitalist mode of
production is [distinguished] by the integration of the
value form with abstract labour, and of the labour
process with the valorisation of capital, as the
appropriation and distribution of surplus labour is
alienated through the exchange of commodities" (Clarke,
1989:136) "The category of abstract labour attains
generality in capitalist society as command over labour
within the circuit of capital as a whole"
(Bonefeld,1993a;101). Capitalist social relations can
only assume pre-eminence within society on the basis of
the command of capital over labour. The forms assumed by
these social relations embody and are itself defined by
the antagonism between capital and labour. These forms
are 'generally the way in which contradictions are
reconciled'(Marx,1983:106), and include social forms
expressing 'economic' relations: the value form and the
money form; as well as state forms. These forms are
expressions of the antagonistic relations between
capital and labour, i.e., they are the expressions of
class •relations in capitalist society. "The notion of
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the primacy of class antagonism [implies that social
structures] exist only as modes of existence of class
antagonism and hence as social process, and..as
historical results of the working of class antagonism
and hence as historical premises for class struggle. As
such, structures exist as things qua reification of
human relations. Historically achieved structures of the
capitalist state...are structures imposed upon capital
and the state through the historical development of
class struggle which compelled the state to reconstruct
the way in which labour is contained within the context
of the expanded reproduction of value"
(Bonefeld,1993:114).
It is the class relation in capitalist society that
'suffuses the circuit' (Clarke,1980:10) of capital and
therefore reproduces the antagonistic relations in and
through the circuit. What follows from this, as Clarke
(1978) demonstrates, is the conceptualisation of class
relations as preceding the political, economic and
ideological forms through which they are manifested,
even though class relations do not exist independently
of such forms. This conceptualisation enables the
complexity of the relation between the economic and the
political, 'their interconnection as complementary forms
of the fundamental class relation' to be analysed
without resorting to the pluralism of bourgeois social
theory. The foundations for theorising the capitalist
state, lies "neither in the specificity of the
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political, nor in the dominance of the economic, but in
the historical materialist category of the capital
relatilon" (Holloway and Picciotto, 1991:112). The
category of the capital relation is not derived
logically from the capitalist mode of production, but is
a category refering to a real, historically determined
set of relations which constitute a moment in the class
struggle between capital and labour and which sets the
limits for the development of the form and function of
the capitalist state.
With the notion of the 'capital relation' as the
starting point, the question arises, "What is it, then,
about class domination in capitalist society (i.e. the
capital relation) that generates the 'fantastic form' of
the state, that makes the state assume a form apparently
separated from the immediate process of
production?" (Holloway and Picciotto,1991:113) The
formation of the capitalist state coincides with the
establishment of generalised commodity production and
its continued reproduction. Commodity production i.e.
production for exchange, rests on the separation of
production and consumption mediated through the exchange
process. The separation of production and consumption
transforms the individual into abstract legal and
economic subjects whose relationship to society is
determined by a system of private property. In a
commodity producing society, abstract legal individuals
relate to private property and the process of exchange
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on the basis of formal equality. Formal equality
however, contradicts the actual process of capitalist
production which is based not on equality but on the
command of capital over labour and the appropriation of
the surplus-value created in the labour process. "The
immediate contradiction of this process...consists of
the continual undermining of the appearance of equality
of exchange in the sphere of circulation by the
inequality in the sphere of production (Holloway and
Picciotto,1991:128).
The state arrogates to itself certain functions as a
result of the historical development of the class
struggle. The process of the dismantling of pre-
capitalist social forms which made possible the
generalisation of the integration of the value form with
abstract labour as the substance of value and the
constitution of a labour process is inextricably linked
with the valorisation of capital in which, "the
appropriation and distribution of surplus labour is
achieved through the exchange of commodities"
(Clarke,1989:136). It is as a consequence of these
processes that the capitalist state emerges and is
reproduced as a moment of the class struggle, for class
domination is mediated through the process of commodity
exchange. A social force (class domination) resulting
from class antagonism is abstracted from the immediate
process of production, from particular capitals,
constituting the political and economic as specific
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forms of domination. These forms of domination achieve
institutional expression in the state.
Because class domination is mediated through the process
of commodity exchange, and therefore mirrors the
fetishised form of commodity relations, the state
appears as an apparantly independent social force. "The
reproduction of social relations in fetishised form,
i.e. in a 'fantastic form' which conceals their reality
as relations of class domination, is an essential part
of the reproduction of that domination" (Holloway and
Picciotto, 1991:114) and an essential condition for the
existence of the capitalist state. The autonomy of the
state is both real and illusory; while it conceals the
reality of capitalist social relations, the reproduction
of these relations and the state itself depends on the
maintenance of the illusion: "The autonomisation of the
state, which forms part of, and is a necessity for the
accumulation of capital, involves not only the necessity
of separate political institutions, but also a constant
class practice involving the structural and ideological
separation and fetishisation of economics and politics
and of the private and the public. The survival of the
political institutions and hence of capital depends on
the success of that struggle in maintaining this
separation, by channeling the conflicts arising from the
real nature of capitalist society into the fetishised
forms of the bourgeois political process" (Holloway and
Picciotto, 1991:115).
39
Forms of domination and forms of class struggle
Money, law and the state are 'differentiated and
complementary' forms of the power of capital. They
express the contradictory character of the capitalist
mode of production rather than the functional
integration of the capitalist state. Class struggle is
not confined within these forms because, "The forms of
capitalist domination are themselves the object of class
struggle, as capital and the working class confront them
as barriers to their own social reproduction...their
development is the outcome of a history of class
struggle in and against the institutional forms of the
capitalist mode of production, whose historical
resolution is always provisional"(Clarke,1988:16).
Money, for Marx, did not serve merely as a means of
circulation, but was also (in its developed form) the
independent form of value. "The subordination of social
production to the power of money gave rise to
antagonistic social relations of production in which the
power of money confronted the direct producers in the
form of capital, and in which social production was
subordinated to the reproduction of capital. Money and
the law were consequently the social forms through which
civil society and the state were subordinated to the
power of capital"(Clarke,1988:18).
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The power of money
"The power of money does not derive from the
institutional forms in which it appears. The power of
money is the power of command over commodities and, in a
capitalist society, over labour-power as a commodity. It
is consequently the most abstract embodiment of the
social power of property. ...The subordination of civil
society and the state to the autonomous power of
money...is the permanent expression of the subordination
of the economic, social and political reproduction of
capitalist society to the reproduction of the social
power of capital" (Clarke, 1988:9).
-
The determination of state form
The liberal state form was constituted on the basis of
the separation of the state from civil society. It
emerged out of the crisis which occurred with the
subversion of the political and ideological forms of the
pre-capitalist state as a consequence of the penetration
of capital and the rule of money over social production.
The way the crisis was resolved was to reconstitute the
state "on the basis of the radical separation of the
state from civil society and of the social power of
money from the political power of the
state"(Clarke,1988:17). The presuppositions of classical
political economy accorded with outward manifestations
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of the emerging state forms and gave it the necessary
ideological and political form and legitimacy. The
market, regulated by the law of property, was deemed as
the means by which general interests could subsume
particular interests. The forms of regulation and
administration instituted by the capitalist state would
seek to confine the particular interests to the rule of
money and the law.
'Fractions' of capital and the state
The particular interests of individual capitalists are
conditioned by the process in which the state seeks to
contain the contradiction between capital and labour by
the imposition of law and the power of money. The
relationship between general interests and particular
interests is particularly pertinent in relation to the
debates concerning fractions of capital.
-
Marxist theorisation in Britain on the relationship
between the state and capital in the late sixties and
early seventies revolved around the relationship between
the landed aristocracy, industrial capital and financial
capital. During the 19th century, according to Perry
Anderson, the landed aristocracy absorbed the
industrial bourgeoisie and asserted its own
'traditionalist' ideology on to the ruling bloc. With
the rise of British imperialist expansion, the argument
goes, the aristocracy and the commercial and financial
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elites (particularly from the City of London) forged a
consensus which resulted in a new social bloc on the
basis of City hegemony. The consequences within the
ruling class of the hegemony of landed, financial and
commercial fractions of capital, historically in this
order, resulted in the subordination of industrial
capital. The case for aristocratic hegemony was based on
W.D. Rubinstein's analysis of inherited wealth and the
ideological survival of traditionalist values. Anderson
also employed the moral argument concerning the 'earned'
and 'unearned' income of the industrial bourgeoisie and
the aristocracy as sign of the conflict between the two.
David Nichols argues that Anderson's argument of
aristocratic hegemony, "leads him towards a
characterisation of the British state as in essence
unchanged since the seventeenth century - thereby
glossing over important moments of adjustment and
restructuring...and the growth in the state coercive and
ideological mechanisms" (Barker and Nicholls,1988:49).
Nicholls notes that the industrial bourgeoisie's
political programme was essentially centred on
parliamentary reform and did not challenge existing
capitalist relations of production. Prior
commercialisation of agriculture and the political
domination of the landed aristocracy laid the basis for
capital accumulation and industrialisation. This in
itself fundamentally circumscribed possible conflict
between the aristocracy and the industrial bourgeoisie.
Thus it was that "the reform programme [of the
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industrial bourgeoisie] was always congruent with and
not antagonistic to capitalist relations of production.
In this sense, therefore, the political struggles of the
aristocracy and the bourgeoisie were never fundamental
and, indeed, their contestation served to mask the real
sources of power and to enlist the working class behind
the middle-class radical programme" (Barker and
Nicholls,1988:51).
Hobsbawm's explanation of the decline of British
industry, was another influential argument that informed
analyses of the City-industry divide and the continued
hegemony of the aristocracy. Hobsbawm argued that the
absorption of British entrepreneurs into the aristocracy
was not a cause of the decline of industry, but rather
the consequence of industrial decline brought about by
foreign competitiveness towards the end of the 19th
century through the lack of renewal of an increasingly
obsolete industrial base. Instead of dealing directly
with this problem, the crisis facing British industry
was averted by capital export, international trade and
lending. This thesis provided a left explanation for the
decline of industry and the rise of the City. The City's
hegemony, represented institutionally within the state
through the Bank of England and its relationship to the
Treasury, enabled the imperialist interests of British
economic policy - in particular the forging of an
international role for sterling in the world economy and
the promotion of the City of London as an international
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financial entrepot. It is the City's role in the
furtherance of British imperialist interests that
provides the key explanation for the hegemony of the
City and the consequent decline of British industry,
leading Anderson to declare, "the City is now...the most
sectionally decisive single determinant of the shape of
the economy"(Anderson,1966:14).
The debate soon shifted however with Geoffrey Ingham's
study (Ingham,1984). Anderson abandoned his earlier
position to adopt the analysis suggested by Ingham.
Ingham argues that "the key to understanding British
economic development lies in the recognition of the
essentially commercial (and not simply financial)
character of the City"(Ingham,1984:5). The City's main
role lies in the 'intermediation' of financial
'
relationships, a role that is essentially commercial.
Accordingly, "British society as a whole is not
'retarded' or 'advanced' but constitutes a unique case
of one in which international commercial capitalism has
been dominant, and has had a determinant impact on its
class and institutional structures"(Ingham,1884:6). To
Ingham, Marx underestimated the importance of British
commerce, consequently failing to see "the increasing
independence of Britain's non-productive forms of
capital from domestic production (Ingham,1984:8). In the
process the emerging financial system "became highly and
unusually centralised under a Bank of England control
whose interests were international, fiscal and narrowly
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monetary. The banking system became geared to the
stabilization of sterling above all else. This involved
continual short-term adjustments in monetary policy,
which, arguably, have clashed with the longer term
financial requirements of modern industry. Consequently,
when the nineteenth century liberal world economic order
began to disintegrate and Britain faced intense
competition in industrial production, the kind of
resporise envisaged by Hilferding and advocated by others
could not take place. Economic exigency might have
dictated a second wave of industrialisation based on
protection, state sponsored and bank-based 'finance
capital', but the state system, the dominant class and
the financial sector of the economy had become locked
into quite another trajectory. Their interests were now
defind as the 'national' ones - that is to say, this
part of British capitalism was truly hegemonic. And the
City plutocracy and their clients were insulated, in
their accumulation of wealth, from any domestic
recess-ion or incipient decline. Many of their successors
remain similarly immune from such parochial issues"
(Ingham,1984:10). By the end of the 19th century, the
City, Bank of England and Treasury formed an
interdependent nexus, under the overall dominance of the
City. According to Ingham, "It was at this point that
the City - industry 'split' emerged at the financial
and, later, the political level, when the scale and
complexity of mass production industry required greater
quantities and qualitatively different types of finance
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than the system was either able or willing to provide.
This was not due to the paucity of available investment
funds, but, rather, because of ...the gradual
subordination of the overall financial system to the
City, and the role of sterling as an international
currency"(Ingham,1984:143). The institutionalisation of
short-term lending and commercial trading on the
secondary capital market, both features which emerged
with the development of the financial system, were
barriers to a closer finance-industry relationship.
Rejecting both Anderson and Ingham's accounts, Clarke
(1990) sees the City-industry divide as "an expression
of the contradiction inherent in the capitalist mode of
production between the tendency of capital to develop
the forces of production without limit, and the need to
confine production within the limits of capital"
(Clarke,1990:2). Anderson and Ingham's accounts rely on
sociological explanations based on the privileges of the
financial aristocracy, or on an institutional framework
based on the independence of the state and the autonomy
of the Treasury and the Bank of England. Both accounts
search for explanations based on the surface
manifestations rather than analysing the social process
responsible for these surface forms.
In his analysis of capitalism, Marx makes an important
distinction between 'capital-in-general' (total social
capital) and 'particular capital'. Paradoxically, while
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the former represents the total social capital involved
in the production and realisation of surplus-value, it
only exists as particular capitals competing with each
other.. "The interdependence of capitals does not appear
immediately in the particular relations of purchase and
sale into which the individual capitalist enters, for
each particular relation is one of a conflict of
interests, in which each individual capitalist seeks to
realise his interests at the expense of other
capitalists"(Clarke,1990:5). But the interest of the
individual capitalist finds a barrier in the general
interests of capital. This is represented by the market
which seeks to resolve this contradiction by confining
capital accumulation in particular branches of
production to the limits of the social requirements for
'
the commodities produced. Through the enforcement of the
laws of capitalist property and the rule of money, the
state ensures the reproduction of a process of
accumulation confined within the form of the production
and realisation of surplus value.
Limits are imposed on the individual capitalist through
the cost and availibility of credit. The credit system
and the development of state money ensures that "the
subordination of capital to the rule of money is
mediated through the state"(Clarke,1990:6). But
competitive pressure generates a counter-tendency for
accumulation without limits. As a result, over-
accumulation (i.e. the over-production of commodities in
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particular branches of production) leads to inflationary
pressure. With reduced opportunities for productive
capital, surplus money capital tends towards speculative
ventures. Monetary constraint i.e. restrictions on
credit, increased interest rates, etc., is expressed in
the conflict between productive and money capital. It is
this conflict which is theorised by Andersen and Ingham.
•
Their accounts, however, do not succeed in unravelling
the underlying social processes which generate the
conflict between productive and money capitals in the
first place.
The contradiction that arises between these two forms of
capital is an expression of the contradiction inherent
in the social form of capitalist production, viz, the
contradiction between the tendency to develop the
productive forces without limit on the one hand and the
limitations imposed by the social form of capitalist
production, i.e. production for profit. "It is
ultimately through the monetary policies of the state,
mediated through the banking system, that the
'interests' of capital-in-general are imposed on
particular capitals as the expansion of production is
confined within the limits of its capitalist social
form" (Clarke,1990:7). Rather than expressing
particular 'fractional' interests, the relationship
between the different forms of capital is one of
interdependence as 'differentiated functional forms of
capital'.
Money capital and the form of the capitalist state
For Hilferding, the emergence of finance capital set new
conditions which transformed the form and character of
the capitalist state. In concentrating capital's
economic and political power, finance capital not only
facilitates capital's political interests, but also
enables the unified power of capital to confront the
state and transform it according to capital's Own
interest. Ingham(1984) saw in the development of
capitalism in Britain a 'unique case' in which the
dominance of international commercial capitalism, has
had a determined impact on its class and institutional
structures', resulting in the formation of a City-Bank
of England-Treasury nexus, under the overall dominance
of the City.'(Ingham,1984) According to Jessop, "The
most important general aspect of the form of the
capitalist state is its particularisation (its
institutional separation from the circuit of capital)"
(Clarke,1991:169).
All three positions have in common a conception of the
state, separated and distinct from the functional forms
of capital. It is a conception in which economic forms
influence, direct or transform the state according to
its requirements, from without. This concept of the
externality of the state is in accord with the concept
of the 'particularity' of the state as a political
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institution. 2 However, developments in the 60's and 70's
(the increasing internationalisation of capital, the
growth of the welfare state and the emergence to power
of social democracy in Germany and Britain contradicted
these positions. The state cannot be identified directly
with monopoly capital, nor the nation-state with the
interest of 'national capital'. The state could neither
be reduced to an instrument of the capitalist class nor
can it be neutral in the course of the class struggle.
It should be seen, rather as an 'arena of class
struggle'(Clarke,1991:195).
As Clarke argues, Marx's analysis of the self-
reproduction of the capital relation, regulated through
the market, implies that, "the state is not, in the
strictest sense necessary to capitalist social
reproduction. The necessity of the state is...the
historical necessity, emerging from the development of
the class struggle, for a collective instrument of class
domination"(Clarke,1991:188). The way in which the state
safeguards the general interests of capital, in the
first instance, is through ensuring the continued
functioning of the market. This is done by enforcing
capitalist property laws and the power of money. The
2 The theory of state monopoly capital and the social
democratic theory of the state share these
presuppositions. The former saw the state directly
taking on the functions of capital, while the latter
stressed the autonomy of the state as a political
institution.
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separation of the state from civil society with the
emergence of capitalism was part of the transformation
of property relations associated with this process. What
distinguishes the relationship between the state and
civil society is a relationship of complementarity
"based' on the mutual subordination of state and civil
society to the money power of capital, expressed in
the - independence' of the institutional forms through
which this mutual subordination is mediated, the
judiciary and the central bank"(Clarke,1990:9). It is
this subordination of the state and civil society to the
money power of capital which constitutes the basis of
the process through which the state is reproduced as a
capitalist state.
Ingham and Anderson concentrate on fractional struggles
to secure particular forms from the state, but do not
analyse the fundamental form and function of the state
that constrain this fractional struggle. They thus look
at the role of the state in the redistribution of
surplus value, but ignore the relation between the
distribution of surplus value and its production and
distribution, and the forms through which the latter
constrain the former.
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CHAPTER TWO
Shifting paradigms; shifting politics:
Neo-marxist theorisation of the South African state and
its effect on policy
The emergence of the 'revisionist' school of South
African historiography, political economy and sociology
and the involvement of key participants of this school
in the political, trade union and community
organisations in the seventies and eighties, have left a
legacy that still remains a considerable influence
amongst left intellectuals. This applies particularly
to the formulators of policy within the COSATU-ANC-SACP
alliance.
The political strategy of the alliance, to emphasise in
the first instance the 'national democratic revolution'
and the vanguard role played by the ANC in this, has
meant that the theoretical class struggle within the
alliance has tended, fundamentally, to favour a
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bourgeois rather than a proletarian orientation even
though the rhetoric of the alliance is couched in terms
that appear favourable to the proletariat. An effect of
this has been that marxist concepts used in political
discourse are stripped of all their original and
essential nuances and applied in a reified fashion,
stripped of their flesh and blood, i.e., their
connection to concrete reality. In this form, these
concepts no longer carry their liberatory potential but
serve instead to further increase the influence of
bourgeois ideology in the mass movement. The employment
of 'ma'rxist' categories in a bourgeois manner may serve
the political purpose of marrying the 'right' and 'left-
wing' of the alliance. It enables the alliance, which
enjoys the deep and widespread support of a mass
movement with strong proletarian traditions, to move
towards the right by using marxian concepts
rhetorically, without major disaffection from those
proletarian forces already within its sphere of
influence.
One of the arguments to be developed in this chapter, is
that the neo-marxism of Althusser and Poulantzas
generally, and in its particular application in South
Africa, has left a legacy visible today in the economic
and political policies of the ANC-COSATU-SACP alliance,
which remains closer to the liberal paradigm than the
radicalism of the neo-marxist critique had suggested.
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The implications of this will be explored further below.
First I want to outline the general principles upon
which neo-marxism rests.
Neo-marxism arose as a response to what was regarded as
economistic' and 'reductionist' accounts of
segregation/apartheid and its relationship to the
development of South African capitalism. Mindful of the
liberal critique of existing marxist accounts, South
African neo-marxism employed the theoretical categories
of Althusserian and Poulantzian marxism, to provide an
alternative to what was regarded as inadequate accounts
on the left. In existing left accounts, the rise of SA
capitalism and segregation/apartheid was derived
essentially from the contradictions between capital and
labour, based on a notion of the 'ultra-exploitation' of
black labour. According to Kaplan, this account, "has
been largely incorrect, and this has resulted from an
inadequate conceptual framework. Crucial in this regard,
is the lack of differentiation made between the
different classes of capitalists...By concentrating
exclusively on the question of labour and particularly,
by ignoring the question of surplus allocation and
reinvestment (the critical magnitudes in the process of
economic development), this radical literature has
conceived of the problem incorrectly" (Kaplan,1974:1).
The neo-marxist critique of existing left accounts, on
the other hand, was based on an analysis of the changing
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form of the SA state, derived from differentations
within the capitalist class itself. Instead of seeing
the capitalist class as one unified bloc, neo-marxism
saw "the secondary contradictions between the different
fractions of the dominant classes" (R.Davies et al,
1976:4) as critical in understanding the changing 'form'
of the state. Neo-marxism acknowledges that a
'principle contradiction' exists between 'dominant and
dominated classes' but argues that the 'secondary
contradictions' "have an important effect upon the whole
trajectory of capitalist development in South Africa."
Thus the pre-occupation, in neo-marxist analysis, with
contradictions within the dominant classes.
Neo-marxism supported the left critique of liberalism by
recognising that fundamental social processes are the
key to understanding the emergence of segregation and
apartheid. But by treating the political struggles
within the dominant classes as central to the analysis,
neo-marxism reproduced the central concerns of the
liberal analysis. The difference with the liberal
consensus, however, is that these struggles are seen as
resulting from the existence of 'class fractions' within
the state, these fractions having different interests
derived from the different roles each performs in the
expanded reproduction of capital. To the neo-marxists
this 'political class struggle' decides which fraction
achieves hegemony. The resultant form of the state, is
then a reflection of the interests (political
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ideological, economic) of the hegemonic class fraction.
The emergence of the PACT government in the 1920's,
then, "was essentially a conflict between fractions of
capital over the redistribution of the surplus gained
from the exploitation of black gold miners" (Morris,
1982:47). The consequence of this approach is that it
leads directly into the liberal argument that sees the
apartheid state as a site of struggle between
,progressive' and 'reactionary' capitalists rather than
reflecting the relationship of capital and labour at a
given moment in the class struggle (Clarke). This can be
discerned in the way neo-marxism analyses the SA state
and the reform process.
ASPECTS OF NEO-MARXIST THEORISATION
Classes, social classes and fractions
A distinction is made between 'classes', constituted at
the level of production, and 'social classes' which are
classes situated within political and ideological
relations:
"Classes are constituted principally at the level of
production, but to constitute them as social classes it
is necessary to situate them with respect to the social
division of labour as a whole, which includes in
addition political and ideological relations" (Davies et
al, 1976:5). Following Poulantzas, the neo-marxists
argue that
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"class position does not flow automatically from a class
determination. We thus specify social classes by
reference to both the structural level (class
determination) and their position in a particular
conjuncture (class position)" (Davies et al, 1976:5).
The implication of this is that classes are fractured
unities. Within the dominant capitalist class in South
Africa, 'fractions' exist, defined by particular
interests derived from 'differing roles in the expanded
reproduction of capital'. The state keeps the fractions
together and ensures relations of exploitation, through
political and ideological domination. To ensure that
their Particular interests hold sway, each fraction
strives for hegemony i.e. to assume state power. This
'class struggle' holds the key to changes in the form of
the state:
"Differences in the form of the state are determined
firstly, by changes in the composition of the power bloc
and its allied and supportive classes, and secondly, by
changes related to which class/fraction is hegemonic.
The latter, we argue, is critical to any analysis of the
South African state" (Davies et al, 1976:5). Thus, in
the context of South Africa, neo-marxism suggests that
the se'condary contradiction becomes primary in the
determination of the form of the state and which
fraction is hegemonic.
Class and 'race'
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The neo-marxists rejected the view that apartheid should
simply be understood in terms of racial oppression
arising from the racial ideology of certain white groups
in SA society. They also rejected the view that SA
capitalism is inherently rational and colour-blind
(O'Meara). The argument is that, "Racial policy has been
a crucial agent of both development and distribution.
Thus an understanding of race relations in South Africa
must be rooted in a conception of the specific relations
of production of South African capitalism, and the
manner in which racial laws and policies both affect and
actively operate to disguise the nature of these
relations. Variations in racial policy must be seen as
flowing from changes in the structure of production and
the alignment of class forces in social formation"
(O'Meara, 1982:363). The concern is how racial policies
cover up the real relationships and social processes. 1
1 This is a variation of the approach adopted by
Legassick, who, upon observing that apartheid ideology
cloaks the 'realities of domination and inequality, goes
further in his analysis: "Yet apartheid must be seen
also at the level of reality, which means examining the
ways in which the policies it institutes flow from and
react back on the structures of production and power,
i.e., on an examination of the specific forms taken by
capitalist production and the capitalist productive
cycle in South Africa."(Legassick,1982;p.469)
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Capitalism and apartheid
The neo-marxists departed from the point of view that,
"continued capital intensification, and the pursuit of
separate development, have been, and continue to be,
quite compatible" (Legassick,1982:499), to assert that
apartheid signifies the hegemony of a particular
fraction of the dominant class engaged in ongoing
struggles with other class fractions within the power
bloc. The marxist revival in academic studies,
represented by Legassick, O'Meara, van Onselen, etc.,
demonstrated that segregationist/apartheid policies
suited the interests of the capitalists as a whole. This
position, implying that SA capitalism was not of a
special type, therefore opened up the question of the
nature of capital accumulation in SA and its
relationship to the state. The neo-marxists,
'backtracked' from the direction taken by this inquiry,
seeing apartheid instead as the particular policy of one
fraction of capital.
To the neo-marxists, apartheid represents the victory of
'national capital' (agriculture and manufacturing) over
'imperialist capital' (mining). The struggle was fought
over a policy of protectionism. National capital was not
very competitive on the world market and therefore
tended to favour restrictions on foreign trade in order
to maintain an internal market with prices above the
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world average. Mining capital favoured a free trade
policy in order to keep prices in the internal market to
a minimum. This contradiction was exacerbated after the
first world war with the fall of the premium price of
gold. Industrial and agricultural commodity prices also
declined sharply. With the resultant intensification of
competitive pressure on the national economy,
protectionist calls became stronger. With the slump in
the gold price, mining capital insisted on cost
reduction. Its hegemony meant that the prevailing state
policy remained in favour of free trade. As a result,
the neo-marxists argue, national capital became
increasingly alienated from mining capital. This led to
a series of party political realignments.
The attempts by the mine bosses to cut white mine-
workers' wages in 1922 set the conditions for an
alliance between national capital and the new petty-
bourgeois' (after Poulantzas). With this alliance
consolidated into an electoral pact between the
Nationalist Party and the Labour Party, national capital
achieved hegemony in 1924. According to Davies, this was
"a logical outcome of the development of South African
capitalism, which had thrown up local white settlers
with interests independent of those of the international
capitalists. It is this class alliance which remains the
key to understanding the South African system today"
(Davies,1973:42).
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Using the theoretical concept of class fractions, the
neo-marxists trace the development of the SA state up to
1948 when the Nationalist Party won the general
election. This event is regarded as the moment when the
class forces represented by the Nationalist Party
(agricultural capital, 'new' petty-bourgeoisie and the
white wage-earners) capture state power. These class
forces were committed to the hegemony of 'national'
capital and therefore set about their strategic
objective. According to this viewpoint, "apartheid
represented primarily an attempt to restructure
relations of exploitation to cope with agriculture's
labour crisis, and to establish a system of
(e)stablished (sic) urban labour which would threaten
neither farm labour supplies nor compete with the petty
bourge.oisie or white labour" (Davies et al, 1976:27).
The analysis found, however, that, "The dominant
contradiction between the exploited and exploiting
classes...served to unite capitals in their need to
maintain their position of dominance. But the
imperialist/nationalist division served to divide and
disorganise the power bloc in their attempts to do so.
Simultaneously, the policies of the Nationalist Party
which served to deepen the interpretations (sic) of
capitals after 1948, created the conditions for the
assumptions of hegemony by monopoly capital after 1960.
This had the dual effect of both sharpening the
contradiction and struggle between capital and labour,
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and reducing the conflict within the power bloc"
(Davies, et al, 1976:29).
The apartheid state
Neo-marxism saw the state as an instrument of class
rule, used to maintain and develop the capitalist mode
of production and the distribution of the surplus
between the various class fractions. Thus, the argument,
that "Apartheid has consisted (from the point of view of
capital) in the direct intervention of the state in the
reorganisation of the social basis of the production
process"(Morris,1982:49). But in the fractional
conflicts within capital, the state's function of
distributing the surplus, in itself, is seen to have
played a decisive role in determining the outcome of
these contestations for hegemony: "...the state has
through a variety of fiscal and monetary
measures...acted to redistribute the surplus thus
created, away from the 'foreign' dominated mining sector
towards the 'indigenous' sectors of mining and
agriculture" (Kaplan,1974:7). It is in the sphere of
distribution, as distinct from production, within which
neo-marxism sees the 'political instance' defined and
which makes it possible to distinguish between fractions
of a class. Morris explains that "in introducing the
political instance we must make it clear that we are
doing so in the realm of consumption rather than
production. In other words in the region of the
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redistribution of surplus rather than in the creation
and direct appropriation of it." (Morris, 1974:6)
Notwithstanding the admission that the power bloc was
acting in unison, facing a common threat in the struggle
between capital and labour, the essential character of
the apartheid state in the 1960's was still seen in
fractional terms, i.e. this time, as the hegemony of
monopoly capital. The focus of analysis is centered on
distribution rather than the production and
appropriation of surplus value. It is this that makes
the neo-marxist analysis social-democratic.
Analysing the reform process
The debates which raged in the seventies were given
added resonance by the unfolding of events in South
Africa. The rise of an independent workers' movement,
the 1976 uprising and the introduction of reforms by the
apartheid state, all contributed to drawing the
attention of neo-marxism to analysing this crisis and
the reform process.
Despite the change in focus, neo-marxism continued to
adopt the same theoretical approach as it had done in
the seventies. A solution to the accumulation crisis is
sought through progressive elements within the ruling
class determining a new accumulation strategy.
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Morris and Padayachee (1988) encapsulate the perspective
that informs neo-marxist thinking on the reform process
in South Africa. The paper argues that an economic and
political crisis exists in South Africa, caused
essentially by "a variety of contradictions and
conflicts within capital and between the state and the
popular classes". In order to resolve this crisis, "a
major restructuring by the state was required and a new
social structure of accumulation had to emerge".2
Apartheid policy, the basis of a social structure of
accumulation, could not sustain further accumulation and
guarantee political stability. Further, the paper argues
that the new social structure of accumulation is not
pre-determined, but is shaped by the configuration of
class forces, different class forces 'within the state,
and the constraints of 'historical policies and
strategies'. Both dominant and popular class
organisations have a double limitation: ideology, on the
one hand, and the structural limitations posed by 'past
strategies and practicesion the other.
Within this perspective then, Morris and Padayachee
separate their analysis into two parts: firstly, the
socio-economic' aspects of the reform process and,
secondly, the 'social and political' aspects.
2 Morris & Padayachee (1988) 10.1
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The previous social structure of accumulation, they
argue, was based on a system of 'differentiated
reproduction and exploitation of labour power'. This
entailed "maintaining a migrant unskilled black labour
force with subsistence roots in the reserves (or later
bantustans), partially reproduced via a socio-
economic/politico-ideological structure of pre-
capitalist social relations" (Ibid:2), tight control of
a smaller, fully proletarianised black labour force in
the townships, a system of state intervention and
control of labour (influx control) and the
differentiated reproduction of the fully proletarianised
white, coloured and asian workers.
According to the analysis this system worked
successfully until, in the early 1970's, capitalism
experienced a structural crisis. The structural crisis
was a consequence of the following:
1. "Monopoly capitalism had come to dominate industrial
capital with concomitantly more sophisticated
requirements from the state controlled system of
reproducing labour power" (Ibid:3); and
2. The dissolution of pre-capitalist subsistence
relations in the bantustans, which meant that " the
state could no longer attempt to secure the social
reproduction of this section of the working class by
displacement of the social welfare costs of reproduction
onto rurally-based pre-capitalist subsistence
societies."(Ibid:3)
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The crisis within the social structure of accumulation
resulted in pressures for "restructuring of the socio-
economic basis of reproducing labour power of black
workers" (Ibid:3). With the combination of these
'structural tensions' and the struggles of 1976, "
Capital and the state were starkly confronted with the
realisation that their policy towards the popular
classes had resulted in an overt unification along
colour lines rather than a political division along
class •ines." This realisation, according to Morris and
Padayachee, "was very quickly recognised as a serious
and dangerous problem for the dominant classes and hence
a new discourse of limited 'reform' began to be
seriously articulated by 1979", the purpose being to
maximise division within the popular classes. The
reforms were part of a new monetarist approach which
encouraged a free market, the opening up of SA to the
world economy and the reduction of state expenditure.
"In effect", argue the authors, " the state was not so
much removing itself from the political economy as
changing its role." But the reforms of 1979-1983/4 did
not meet with much success due to the adverse impact of
the world economy, "structural changes in the socio-
economic pattern of industrial and labour reproduction",
and resistance in the townships.
Consequently, "The state's reform initiative to
depoliticise collective consumption in the townships
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produced its direct opposite - the massive
politicisation of struggles over township collective
consumption. The result was that, by the early 1980's, a
new initiative was building up as state planners took
cognisance of the structural and conjunctural tendencies
occuring in society" (Ibid:9).
Instead of strengthening the rural urban divide, the new
aim is to "reorganise the class structure of black
society by encouraging class differentiation on a new
social and geographic basis. The reproduction of
differentiated labour power is to take place wholly
within the confines of capitalist society and through a
state-directed process of urbanisation" (Ibid:10).
Popular resistance to the reform process led to a shift
in state strategy: " The state temporarily abandoned the
'democratisation' elements in its reform program and
initiated a series of repressive interventions to
restore stability, if not normality" (Ibid:16). This
shift in state policy had its effect on capital as well.
According to Morris & Padayachee, "The more conservative
sections of monopoly capital, responding to the success
of the state's stabilisation strategy and the
corresponding inability of the organisations of the
popular classes to demonstrate that they are a viable
alternative, have gained political control over the
corporate organisations of capital" (Ibid:21). This is
significant for Morris and Padayachee in that for them
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it explains the turn towards greater repressive measures
and more decisive intervention by the state in order to
ensure the restructuring of the economy and the
sustaining of economic growth for selective
redistribution (as a means to resolve the crisis
confronting the state). Analysing the state's response
as a whole, the authors conclude that:
"The reform process has been characterised by the South
African State demonstrating a surprising ability to
engage in social, administrative and ideological
experimentation" (Ibid:23)
While Morris and Padayachee (1988) analysed the reform
process over the period up to the early 1980's, Gelb
(1990) and Kaplinski (1990) look towards a future 'post-
apartheid' era and, in analysing the crisis facing South
Africa, suggest ways in which the crisis could be
resolved. With slight variations all three share the
same theoretical assumptions and perspective on the
social crisis.
Gelb (1990) argues that the key to the resolution of the
economic crisis' facing the South African economy, is
the choice of a 'growth model':
"South African capitalism reached a turning-point in the
mid-1970's reflected in both the decline of the long-run
growth rate of the GNP, as well as the more unstable and
volatile shorter-run cyclical fluctuations since that
time, 'as compared with the period following World War
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II. These changes in the pattern of GNP growth have been
linked to the failure of the 'growth model' - the
combinations of patterns of production, distribution and
consumption, in other words, the form of capitalist
growth - which had characterised the post-war period of
relatively sustained economic expansion" (Gelb, 1990:26)
The failure of the growth model, arising out of the
rising costs of imports, the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system of fixed exchange rates and the rise in the
real wage levels of African workers, led to stagnation
and declining investment and productivity.
According to Gelb(1990:29), the reform process since the
1970's has essentially served the purpose of propping
up the 'racial Fordist growth model'. "The ending of
apartheid", Gelb believes, "would finally make it
possible - but not necessary - for a new growth model to
emerge in the future" Two possible options emerge from
this analysis (both within the growth-redistribution
framework). On the one hand, a neo-liberal export
oriented growth model, involving privatisation and
reduced state interventions in the economy, and an
alternative strategy, supported by Gelb, which attempts
to "achieve growth through the more extensive and more
rapid redistribution of incomes and wealth" (Ibid:35),
in which the state would play a critical role in
'shaping the activities of economic agents'.
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In formulating a policy for a 'post-apartheid South
Africa, Kaplinski (1990) also sees the choice of a
growth model' as critical in getting out of the current
crisis3 which he sees essentially as a decline in
economic growth after the 1970's as a result of "the
relative failure of the manufacturing sector" and the
fact that "political conditions for apartheid
accumulation failed to work effectively" (Ibid:43). As
an alternative, he proposes a new growth model: growth
through redistribution, which, he argues, "reassures
capital that a post-apartheid state places growth
centrally on the agenda; it reassures the masses that a
post-apartheid state places redistribution centrally on
the agenda; it distinguishes apartheid accumulation
(which depended upon inequity and which was increasingly
unable to ensure growth) with post-apartheid
accumulation in which growth can occur only if prior
redistribution takes place" (Ibid:46). Accompanying the
growth model outlined by Kaplinski, is the commitment to
a 'mixed economy' and to planning in which "the state
becomes a dynamic facilitator and a 'knowledge-broker"
in a process involving all significant parties such as
organised labour, capital and research institutions.4
3 Kaplinski (1990) p.43 : "It is clear that the recent
failure of the South African economy can in large part
be explained by the very choice of this growth model."
4 Ibid p.47
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These ideas have been recently brought together by the
Economics Trends Research Group, representing the first
phase of a research project commissioned by COSATU.
Here, the political implications of this approach are
-
brought out more clearly. Criticising the popular
movement for overestimating its own potential, Morriss
argues that the ANC and UDF, "placed inordinate stress
on an insurrectionary strategy, even though it often
contradicted other strategies designed to split the
ruling bloc and win over significant sectors of the
white population to the political ideals of a non-
racial, democratic and unitary state." This strategy,
continues Morris, "served instead to unite the ruling
bloc firmly behind a state promising the restoration of
law and order" (Gelb,1991:49). As a result, not only did
the st'ate crush the insurrectionism of the 1980's, "it
had also successfully eliminated insurrectionary
conceptions from the discourse of the popular forces,
substantially weakened their organisational strength and
placed the trade union movement on the defensive"
(Gelb,1991:53; my emphasis). Morris believes that the
dominant classes have responded to the crisis "more
rapidly and flexibly" than the dominated. "The former
have finally, after a decade of experimentation,
formulated the basics of an accumulation stategy and
hegemonic project to resolve the national question and
s Morris,M. 'State, capital and growth: the political 
economy of the national question', in S.Gelb(Ed), 1991.
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restore growth on terms most favourable to themselves.
The onus now rests heavily on the organisations of the
dominated classes, in particular the African National
Congress, to respond flexibly to the new political
conditions"
(Gelb,1991:56).
As a departure from insurrectionism towards the
perceived requirement of greater flexibility, the neo-
marxist reform theorists offer an alternative economic
strategy to address the economic and political crisis.
Morris summarises this alternative as follows:
" Economic growth would be stimulated through the
redistribution of productive capacity towards the more
marginalised sectors of the population. This would
entail a systematic political commitment to welfare
policies, redistributive mechanisms and urban-rural
reconstruction, such as residential infrastructure,
housing, electrification and telecommunication
programmes." (Gelb,1991;p.58)
ANC-COSATU-SACP perspective on social transformation in
South Africa
Having outlined above the varieties of neo-marxist
thinking in South Africa, one may now consider how it
has shaped the thinking within organisations in the mass
movement as well as to what extent neo-marxism is
embodied in the policy formulations of the alliance.
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The formal establishment of the Tripartite alliance in
1990 was the culmination of a process, accelerated since
the Durban strikes of 1973, which saw the regeneration
of the militant tradition crushed at Sharpeville in 1961
and the increasing of popular support for the ANC-SACP
alliance. The formation of POSATU in 1979 had asserted
working class traditions of organisation in the mass
movement. The birth of COSATU in 1985 took that
tradition further, but fashioned it towards closer
accord with the ANC-SACP tradition. And now each
constituent organisation, despite the internal debate
and ideological struggle that may be occurring in each,
is identifying itself strategically and tactically with
liberal reform and reconstruction of the political
system, rather than the social transformation of the
capitalist order in South Africa. 'Reconstruction'
rather than 'insurrection' has become the dominant
feature of the policies being formulated by the
Tripartite alliance today. This does not mean however
that the socialist project has failed or has been
removed from the agenda. Proletarian political forces
inside and outside the alliance will, no doubt, continue
efforts to propel the mass movement towards socialist
objectives. But, in the immediate phase of the reform
process, economic restructuring is separated from
socialist transformation. COSATU's formulation, of 'a
mixed economy with a socialist orientation', is an
attempt to ensure that whatever reforms take place
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should not impede a process of transformation towards
socialism in the future. However, if this is to be
regarded as a serious objective, and not merely
sociaIist-sounding rhetoric, then the ideological
content embodied in current economic and political
policies need to be subjected to the scrutiny of marxist
theory, in the same way that the organisational practice
of the alliance is constantly being subjected to the
'test' of concrete struggle, in order to ensure that its
organisational achievements remain in line with its
declared objectives.
COSATU's Economic Policy Conference in July 1991
committed the organisation to an active intervention in
the formulation of state economic policy. It is reported
that
participants saw current policies of restructuring by
the state and capital as attempts to maintain the status
quo. Employers, it was further argued, "are motivated by
a short-term view of profitability rather than any long-
term perspective of development.(...) By contrast,
COSATU seeks an economic framework that emphasises
growth through redistribution and which links immediate
policies with the struggle for socialism" (Joffe,
1991:42). 6 The thinking underlying this approach is
6 Avril Joffe reports further that "Many delegates were
concerned that the goal of socialism should not lose out
to a revitalised, more efficient form of capitalism
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summarised in a policy document (COSATU,1991). The SA
economy, according to this document, is facing a
structural crisis arising as a result of:
1.apartheid limiting expansion
2.1ack of investment in the productive sector
3.reliance on raw material exports
4.reliance on imported heavy machinery
5.low quality and competitiveness of manufactured goods
6.failure of existing agricultural policy
This structural crisis necessitates restructuring of the
economy. COSATU believes that "The working class must
develop an economic policy which provides for a
democratically run economy and which ensures that:
a) the economy grows and jobs are created;
b) the standard of living of the working class is
increased;
c) the basic needs of the people are met;
d) the economy is able to compete internationally;
e) the inequalities caused by apartheid are addressed;
f) we have a mixed economy with a socialist orientation,
and containing private, public and co-operative
sectors"(COSATU,1991:39).
where the benefits of economic and industrial
restructuring are engaged only by a few - even if it
includes the organised working class. Some felt that
COSATU's involvement in negotiating on these issues
would be more likely to result in social democracy than
socialism."(Joffe,A. 1991; p.44)
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While the notion of a 'mixed' economy is mirrored in ANC
policy as well, the idea that such an economy should
have a 'socialist orientation' is absent from recent ANC
policy statements. The ANC also sees the key solution to
the 'structural crisis' as the choice of a 'growth
path'. Echoing the theoretical framework set by the neo-
marxists, growth through redistribution' becomes the
favoured growth path. According to Tito Mboweni, Head of
the ANC's Department of Economy and Planning, "GTR
(Growth Through Redistribution) challenges the very
foundations of neo-classical economics. In this growth
path, accumulation depends upon the redistribution of
resources - redistribution is not viewed as an optional
extra but as a requirement of growth." (Mboweni,
1991:69)
'Growth through redistribution' is seen as the economic
policy necessary for the development of, and the
resolution of the crisis in the SA economy. It is seen
to constitute the desired growth path to be implemented
by a 'post-apartheid' state, in which the "non-racial
and democratic state would follow an economic strategy
that aims to achieve economic growth through a process
of increasing equality in the distribution of incomes,
wealth and economic power."' This 'non-racial democratic'
7 ANC/COSATU, 'Recommendations of post-apartheid economic
policy', in Transformation Vol.12, 1990; p.2.
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state would be brought about through a process of
negotiating a political settlement within the framework
of a political process which assumes that "a conjuncture
of circumstances exists which...could create the
possibility to end apartheid through negotiations." 8 The
constitutional framework proposed by the ANC for the new
state, will enable it "to determine the general context
in which economic life takes place and define and limit
the rights and obligations attaching to the ownership
and use of productive capacity". 8 Their objective is
therefore to dismantle the institutional basis of
apartheid and, at the same time, develop state
institutions on a new constitutional basis, strong
enough to make possible reforms of the capitalist order
of such a nature that stable regulation of capitalist
accumulation becomes possible and the social crisis
created by the apartheid state can be averted. In short,
as one analyst puts it, regulation theory is being used
"to explain how a transition to a managed capitalism may
be feasible through an African National Congress -
COSATU economic programme" (Bond, 1990: 29 - my
emphasis).
8 OAU, 'Declaration of the OAU Ad-hoc Committee on
Southern Africa on the question of South Africa',
Harare., August 1989. In 'Discussion Papers for the
Conference for a Democratic Future', issued by the MDM,
1989; unnumbered pages.
9 ANC, 1989, 'Constitutional Guidelines for a democratic
South Africa', mimeo.
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Towards acritical analysis of neo-marxist thought in
South Africa
Neo-marxism's primary theoretical contributions have
been on the analysis of the SA state (fractional
analysis) and on the reform process (regulation theory).
The purpose of this critique is to assess neo-marxist
thought, as articulated and formulated by SA neo-
marxists. While much of the theory is derivative of
French or North American neo-marxism, to confine one's
critique simply to the chief sources assumes that the
interpretation and application of the theory follows the
original theory without any distortion. This I do not
believe is the case, for reasons that will be elaborated
below. Also, SA neo-marxists are presenting their
contributions for consideration by left intellectuals
and the mass movement. It is this body of intellectual
work, and not the theoretical sources from which they
are derived, that resonate in the intellectual
discourse, strategic planning and policy formulations.
It is this that constitutes SA neo-marxism and,
consequently, the object of this analysis.
The irrational core of neo-marxism, rests firstly, on
the erroneous interpretation of what constitutes
capitalist social relations, secondly, on the assumption
that economic growth is a politically neutral process
and thirdly, that the state is an instrument of capital.
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Each in turn, has its own consequence for SA neo-
marxism.
capitalist social relations of production
In 'Wage, Labour and Capital', Marx argues that, "The
relations of production in their totality constitute
what are called the social relations, society, and,
specifically, a society at a definite stage of
historical development..." This led Marx to the
conclusion that, "Capital, also, is a social relation of
production. It is a bourgeois production relation, a
production relation of bourgeois society."
(Marx,1973;p160) 1° The notion that capital is a social
relation, implies that it is part of a totality, which,
as a whole, constitutes capitalist social relations. It
is impossible to analyse capitalist relations of
exploitation and the relations of domination without
this conception of the totality of capitalist social
relations. Political and ideological relations
-
constitute part of the relations of production - in the
same way as economic relations - because they constitute
lo Cf also Marx (1984) p.814: "...capital is not a thing,
but rather a definite social production
relation,belonging to a definite historical formation of
society, which is manifested in a thing and lends this
thing a specific social character."
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the different forms of social relations within which
production takes place (Clarke).
The Poulantzian theory of social structure departs
fundamentally from this perspective. Instead of a
concept of social relations in the marxian sense, we
have a theory of social structure, a theory of the state
and a theory of social class; each of which provides a
theoretical framework for a functional analysis, at
different levels, of a 'social formation'. This leads to
a pluralistic analysis which employs conceptions of
, economics', 'politics' and 'ideology' without their
fundamental interconnections, as provided in the concept
of social relations. In this sense Poulantzian neo-
marxism profoundly debases an important characteristic
of the marxian analysis.
economic growth
SA regulation theorists place emphasis on the choice of
a growth model as a means for getting the SA economy out
of the crisis. This, and the absence of a class approach
to the question of economic growth, not only implies,
but is treated as if, the choice of the growth model is
a neutral issue which can simply be resolved in a
technical way. In adopting such an approach, neo-marxism
finds itself reproducing the arguments of the neo-
classical economists, a position fundamentally at odds
with a marxian approach to capitalist accumulation.
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Capitalist growth presupposes the existence of a working
class, possessing nothing but their capacity to labour,
and the existence of a capitalist class able to exploit
this capacity and thereby accumulate surplus-value. This
-presupposition will apply to any 'growth model' under
capitalism. Neo-marxism echoes the neo-classical
economists who argued that an increase in capital is in
the interest of both capitalist and worker, for an
increase in capital means an increase of the working
class and an improvement in their material conditions.
This is the basic assumption underlying neo-marxism's
technical treatment of the concept of a 'growth model'.
But Marx has shown that the interests of workers and
capital are only the same in the sense that "capital and
wage labour are two sides of one and the same
relation.. .A noticeable increase in wages presupposes a
rapid growth of productive capital" (Marx,1973:163).
But, Marx notes, since both wages and profit come from
the exploitation of the worker, "Profit rises to the
extent that wages fall" and that "Even the most
favourable situation for the working class, the most
rapid possible growth of capital, however much it may
improve the material existence of the worker, does not
remove the antagonism between his interests and the
interests of the bourgeoisie, the interests of the
capitalists. Profit and wages remain as before in
inverse proportion" (Marx,1973:166,167). The regulation
theorists focus on distribution implies that if there is
a bigger cake, capital and labour can both be better
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off. But the production of surplus value is a dynamic
process of intensification of exploitation by the
transformation of production relations. This does not
simply mean investment and the introduction of new
technology, but redundancy and the intensification of
labour. If some workers gain in this, it is always at
the expense of others.
The state as an instrument of capital
The theory of monopoly capital makes use of a
conception of the state as the instrument of monopoly
capital in the period of imperialism. This has
encouraged a perspective on political transformation
that, sees the working class leading a coalition of
democratic forces in order to "free the state from this
control and use it as an instrument in the transition to
socialism."(Clarke,1977:2) But the capitalist state
cannot be a neutral instrument in the transition towards
socialism, nor is it simply an instrument of capital.
This economic reductionism, that is a feature of neo-
marxist thinking in South Africa, is based on the idea
that the state is the locus in which particular
capitalist interests are represented and in which they
struggle for hegemony. It is the basis of the
fractionalist struggle for state power. But instead of
the state being located within the capitalist process of
the production and accumulation of surplus-value, neo-
marxism sees the state as the key determinant of this
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process of valorisation. This has important implications
for the process of transition. The state, rather than
the class struggle between capital and labour, becomes
the key determinant of social transformation.
4.1 Class and state
In an effort to provide an alternative to economic
determinism, neo-marxism differentiates between
'classes' and 'social classes': the former constituted
at the- level of production, and the latter, arising out
of the social division of labour as a whole, including
political and ideological relations. The assumption is
that the concept of classes in the capitalist relations
of production
does not embody (apart from productive relations,
narrowly defined) political and ideological relations.
'Social classes', furthermore, are defined principally
by these political and ideological relations arising out
of the division of labour in society. But classes are
distinguished in the first instance from other social
groups, by being constituted on the basis of the
capitalist social form of production and the production
and appropriation of surplus value. Capitalism, rests
upon the class-relation between capital and wage labour
in which every capitalist is a 'shareholder in the total
social enterprise' (Marx). As capitalist production and
accumulation continues, so, inevitably, the social power
of capital grows. The class relation between labour and
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capital is the basis of the particular forms of
economic, political and ideological relations assumed by
the social relations of production.
What is important in Marx's analysis of social class is
the method he employed to unravel its social
significance. Marx's analysis is constantly informed by
an awareness of concrete reality, historically
determined and in a constant process of movement and
development. Social class arises out of this dynamic
process and is constantly being defined by this process.
Class can only be defined in its motion. With the
capitalist mode of production, classes are not only
defined by social processes in motion, but also define
themselves in dynamic relationship with each other:
"Labour produces the conditions of its production in the
form of capital, and capital produces labour, i.e. as
wage-labour, as the means towards its realization as
capital. flu What this means, is that class cannot be seen
merely as a coming together of individuals, but as a
result of the social relations of production under
capitalism as a whole. The capitalist relations of
production create both the capitalist and the wage-
labourer. The latter defines the former in a dynamic
procesg, the reproduction of which depends on the
constant re-creation of wage-labourers and their
regulation by capital. The social classes that Marx
11 Marx,K. (1979) pp.1061-2.
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identifies emerge out of this process, are peculiar to
it, and cannot be defined outside of it. This is
illustrated in the 'Poverty of Philosophy", where Marx
makes an important point about his analysis of property
which can also be applied to his analysis of social
class:- "In each historical epoch, property has developed
differently and under a set of entirely different social
relations. Thus to define bourgeois property is nothing
else than to give an exposition of all the social
relations of bourgeois production. To try to give a
definition of property as an independent relation, a
category apart, an abstract and eternal idea, can be
nothing but an illusion of metaphysics and
„jurisprudence. 12
The production of surplus-value, which is the function
of capital, occurs because society has reached a
definite, historically-evolved stage that makes this
possible. Thus the process of value-creation and capital
accumulation cannot be divorced from a particular set of
historically evolved social relations, in particular,
class relations: "...the capitalist process of
production proceeds under definite material conditions,
which are however, simultaneously the bearers of
definite social relations entered into by individuals in
12 Quoted by Hal Draper in Karl Marx's theory of
revolution, v.1 Monthly Review Press, New York & London,
1977 p.16.
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the process of reproducing their life. These conditions,
like these relations, are on the one hand prerequisites,
on the other hand results and creations of the
capitalist process of production; they are produced and
reproduced by it" (Marx, 1984:818-9). Furthermore, "The
so-called distribution relations, then, correspond to
and arise from historically determined specific social
forms of the process of production and mutual relations
entered into by men in the reproduction process of human
_
life" (Ibid:861). Capitalist production and
distribution, resting on the exploitation of labour and
the accumulation of surplus-value by capitalists, is the
basis of the social relations of production in all its
forms - economic, political and ideological. In
separating the economic from the political and
ideological, and production from its distribution, neo-
marxism departs from a fundamental aspect of the marxian
analysis of capital.
The state
Marx emphasised in Capital that, "it is always the
direct relationship of the owners of the conditions of
production to the direct producers...which reveals the
innermost secret, the hidden basis of the entire social
structure, and with it the political form of the
relations of sovereignty and dependence, in short, the
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corresponding specific form of the state." 13
 In
devaluing the importance of the contradictory relation
between capital and labour, it becomes important for
neo-marxism to find the theoretical basis for the form
of the state in the struggles between the fractions of
capital for hegemony within the state. These struggles
appear to be primarily limited to the
political/ideological levels. With the absence of a
concept of 'total social capital', neo-marxism is not
able adequately to explain the fractional interests of
particular capitals and the extent to which such
interests may be satisfied, for there is no concept of
'
capital-in-general' separate from the state itself. The
state, then, becomes important in the neo-marxist
analysis for in the absence of a concept of total social
capital, it becomes the only social institution able to
represent capital-in-general, the unity of the
individual capitalists in society.
The marxian concept of total social capital is crucial
to its analysis of the capitalist state, the social
n Ibid, p.791. To avoid reductionism, Marx qualifies
this statement: "This does not prevent the same economic
basis...due to inumerable different empirical
circumstances, natural environment, racial relations,
external historical influences, etc. from sharing
infinite variations and gradations in appearance, which
can be ascertained only by analysis of the empirically
given circumstances." (pp.791-2)
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relations between capital and labour and the
relationship between particular capitalists. At the end
of the day, the individual capitalist is only really
concerned over the extent of the surplus-value generated
in relation to the total capital advanced. While the
source of this excess value lies in the immediate
process of production, its realisation is shaped in the
process of circulation by the market and through
competition with other capitalists. This led Marx to the
conclusion that: "The value of every commodity - thus
also of the commodities making up the capital - is
determined not by the necessary labour-time contained in
it, but by the social labour-time required for its
reproduction" (Marx, 1984:141).
social labour-time is an important component of his
theory'of social class. The capitalists, he argues, "do
not secure the surplus-value, and consequently the
profit, created in their own sphere by the production of
these commodities. What they secure is only as much
surplus-value, and hence profits, as falls, when
uniformly distributed, to the share of every aliquot
part of the total social capital from the total social
surplus-value, or profit, produced in a given time by
Consequently, Marx shows, there is a tendency for the
rates of profit in the various branches of production to
be equalised by competition to a single average rate of
profit.
" Marx's concept of
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the social capital in all spheres of production"
(Marx, 1984:158)
With a given rate of exploitation, the total surplus-
value generated in a given sphere of production becomes
more important for its contribution to the aggregate
average profit of social capital, and therefore to the
capitalist class in general, than for the individual
capitalist. "In this form", argues Marx, "capital
becomes conscious of itself as a social power in which
every capitalist participates proportionally to his
share in the total social capital" (Marx,1984:195). In
this way, it can be said that the individual capitalist
and the capitalist class as a whole, participates
directly in the exploitation of the working class as a
whole. What is important, is that this is done not
merely for the sake of class solidarity (the
identification among capitalists that they share a
common interest) but also for direct economic reasons -
since the very existence of the individual capitalist
and the social class to which he belongs, depends on the
generation of profit through the exploitation of the
working class as a whole.
Capitalist production as a whole then, for its
continuous reproduction, generates its own universal
drive to create the conditions for expanding the
capitalist mode of production and to revolutionize the
means of production in its drive to constantly increase
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the rate of profit. The individual capitalist, in order
to compete with other individual capitalists for a
greater piece of the pie i.e. the total social profit,
has to constantly improve the productivity of its
labour, for on this depends the rate of profit and,
subsequently, the share of the total surplus profit.
This, to Marx explains why "capitalists form a veritable
freemason society vis-a-vis the whole working-class,
while there is little love lost between them in
competition among themselves." (Marx,1984;p.198)
Notwithstanding inter-capitalist rivalry, Marx made it
clear that this unity itself rests on a more fundamental
social process, that of the contradiction between
capital and labour, the social basis of the unity the
capitalists share amongst themselves in relation to the
exploitation of the working class.
The limits of capital
It is not the state "which organises capitalist
exchanges and provides the real framework of cohesion in
which commercial encounters can take place", as
-
Poulantzas believed (Poulantzas,1973:53). The basis for
this is provided by capital itself. Under capitalism,
the wages of the labourer are limited by the value of
his/her labour power; the profits of the capitalist, by
the extent to which surplus value can be extracted on
his/her (the workers') labour. These are the real limits
of capital and what determines the total social product.
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It is a feature of the neo-marxist conception of the
state,. that the state plays a principle role in the
determination of value. Thus, intercapitalist
competition is seen to play a central role in the
determination of state power. The separation of social
class from production is followed by the separation of
the production of surplus value from its distribution.
The former takes place in the 'economy' and the latter,
at the 'political' level, through the 'state'. This
approach, is however, unable to explain the processes
that restrict the ability of the state to intervene in
the process of capital accumulation in favour of a
particular fractional interest.
The form and the policies of the state are seen
essentially as the result of the struggle between
fractions of capital rather than the struggle between
capital and labour. This is why, in neo-marxist
discourse, the working class tends to be treated as the
object of state policies, while the state itself (in
relation to the working class) is regarded as all-
powerful with almost limitless resources.
Neo-marxism and the development of SA capitalism
-
What then are the consequences of the neo-marxist
account of the development of capitalism in South
Africa?
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Firstly, with fractional analysis, the emergence of the
apartheid state is explained historically and
analytically not as the consequence of a process of
class struggle between capital and labour, but rather as
the consequence of the struggles between fractions of
-
capital. Secondly, the lack of a marxian concept of
social relations, has resulted in the separation of the
economic crisis from the political crisis. This means
that a resolution of the economic crisis, is treated as
a technical and politically neutral problem, which need
only be resolved with the "correct" economic policies.
Finally, neo-marxism, presenting itself as an
alternative to the liberal accounts of apartheid,
ultimately amounts to an explanation of the rise of
apartheid not fundamentally different from these liberal
accounts:"Because they base themselves at the level of
appeat'ances, because their analysis does not penetrate
the political level to reveal it as the political form
of more fundamental class relations, the fractionalist
accounts quite unconsciously, but also quite inevitably,
came to reproduce the standard liberal accounts of the
development of Apartheid with which the contributions of
Wolpe, Legassick and Williams originally broke"
(Clarke,1978:51).
Crisis and reform
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Fractionalist analysis continues to be employed by neo-
marxism to provide a theoretical explanation for the
intensification of the economic and political crisis
that came to a head in the late seventies, and the
reforms introduced by the apartheid state. Thus, the
assertion by Morris and Padayachee (1988:1) that the
crisis in South Africa arose from, "a variety of
contradictions and conflicts within capital and between
the state and popular classes". The theoretical
explanation for the crisis of apartheid, is treated in
the same manner as the neo-marxists dealt with the
origins and development of apartheid. It is important to
note first of all, that the 'variety of contradictions
and conflicts' are given equal weight. Secondly, they
are divided into only two aspects: contradictions and
conflicts
1.within the state; and
2.between the state and the popular classes.
The former follows from the neo-marxist emphasis on
inter-capitalist, 'fractional' struggles for hegemony of
the state. The second arises out of the neo-marxist
tendency to over-politicisation. The state is the arena
of political struggle. The relationship of the popular
classes and the state, is limited to the 'political'.
Finally, and very significantly, the contradictions
between capital and labour, as in earlier neo-marxist
accounts, are absent from the analysis.
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Neo-marxism adopted the Poulantzian variant of
structural analysis to encompass Aglietta's concept of
social structure of accumulation'. As Aglietta puts it,
the study of capitalist regulation, "is the study of the
transformation of social relations as it creates new
forms that are both economic and non-economic, that are
organized in structures and themselves reproduce a
determinant structure, the mode of production"
(Aglietta, 1979:16). 15 Unlike the SA neo-marxists,
Aglietta's analysis sought to put class struggle at the
centre of his theoretical concerns. He intended
regulation theory to "elucidate the general lesson of
historical materialism: the development of the forces of
production under the effect of the class struggle, the
transformation of the conditions of this struggle and
the forms in which it is embodied under the effect of
that development" (Aglietta, 1979:16). However,
regulation theory as such has tended towards structural
functionalism (Lipietz) and, in the case of the SA
regulationists, to undervalue the importance of the
class struggle between capital and labour. The class
forces that shape the 'social structure of accumulation'
according to Morris and Padayachee (1988) are the 'class
forces within the state'. By this is meant those
fractions of capital vying for hegemonic control of the
15 Aglietta was a student of Poulantzas and part of the
project to 'operationalise' Poulantzian theory.
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power bloc. The working class appears to play no direct
role in this process.
The scenario being sketched is of state and capital
'free' to do what they choose without any limitations or
constraints. Every 'structural' re-adjustment appears to
be the result of a unilateral decision taken voluntarily
and changeable at will. The historical actions taken by
the working class against capital and the state, are
treated merely as matters to be 'taken into
consideration' when making strategic adjustments. Thus
"by the early 1980's, the new (reform) initiative was
building up as state planners took cogniscence of the
structural and conjunctural tendencies occuring in
society" (Morris and Padayachee, 1988:9). The state's
"surprising ability to engage in social, administrative
and ideological experimentation", in the wake of popular
resistance, is the explanation provided by the authors
for the reform process.
The reform agenda is determined by the state, which is
regarded by neo-marxism as the locus of the 'political
instance'. It is here where different fractions of
capital are engaged in class struggle to determine the
form of the state and, in a situation of crisis, or
'turning-point', the dominant fraction determines the
nature of the re-adjustment and the choice of the growth
model in order to 'regulate' the system for another
period of stable capitalist accumulation. So the key
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concern still remains the contestations of class
fractions for this determines the character, pace and
agenda of the reform process.
The application of fractional analysis to the reform
process, in combination with the separation of
politics' from 'economics', have produced a technicist
analysis of economic aspects of the social crisis in SA.
It is _this theoretical orientation that has made it
possible for neo-marxist reform theorists to argue that
the economic crisis in SA can be resolved by the simple
choice of a correct 'growth model'.
The choice of an alternative growth model also comes at
a particular historical moment (or, as the
regulationists prefer, a turning-point) when, "the
capitalist economy cannot continue to develop in the
same form and along the same path as before. The
existing growth model.. .has begun to decay, and a
resumption of sustained accumulation requires the
emergence of a new growth model"
(Gelb,1991: 2). A growth model is defined as a
combination of patterns of production, distribution and
consumption', yet neo-marxism offers no clear
perspective on the relationship between the three, and
subsequently provides an inadequate theoretical analysis
of the reform process.
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Both Gelb(1990) and Kaplinski(1990) argue for a growth
model based on the redistribution of incomes and wealth
in contrast to an export-orientated growth model. The
preferred model for the neo-marxists, 'growth through
redistribution', is seen as the growth path likely to be
more successful in achieving growth, that is, with a
greater ability to resolve the economic crisis by
regulating the economy and ensuring future capital
accumulation.
The key issue here is that the crisis is defined as a
'turnipg-point' which requires a new mode of regulation,
in contrast to the marxist notion of 'crisis' as a
permanent feature of the capitalist mode of production
based on the irreconcilability of the contradictions
between capital and labour, demanding a revolutionary
transformation of capitalist social relations. In
contrast, the neo-marxist growth model is unashamedly
capitalist in its orientation and seeks a reformist
solution to the crisis facing SA capitalism. In this
sense, there are no fundamental differences between the
two growth models. The differences are of degree, rather
than substance. The fact that neo-marxism presents them
as alternatives, can only imply that an anti-capitalist
solution to the crisis is not regarded as an option.
Indeed, 'growth through redistribution' has correctly
been defined by a critic as a policy of 'managed
capitalism', employing labour-intensive production
methods with "a new investment programme directed by the
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state and aimed at producing mass consumption goods for
a local market of low- and middle-income people"
(Bond,1991:31-32). With its emphasis on both growth and
redistribution, the neo-marxist accumulation strategy
hopes to appeal to both capital and the masses. By
distinguishing capital accumulation under apartheid with
a post-apartheid accumulation strategy, without a theory
of the transformation of social relations, serves to
reinforce bourgeois social relations, reproduces a
technicist approach to the 'economy' and serves the
rhetorical purpose of presenting the growth model to the
masses as a real alternative.
What the neo-marxists ignore is that the state, as an
institutional form of social relations in society, is
subordinate to capital because the social relations
within which the state exists are themselves defined by
capital. Consequently, 'politics' and 'economics' are
different forms of the same social relations. The state,
therefore, "cannot deal separately with the economic and
political crises that it confronts for they are two
forms of the same crisis" (Clarke, 1978:72). If a crisis
occurs in the accumulation of surplus-value, the state
cannot remain aloof for it is itself an object of
struggle. For this reason, the obstacles in the way of
capitalist accumulation in South Africa, cannot simply
be treated as an 'economic' crisis, (that can be
resolved' through a new 'growth model') but rather, it
is
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a social crisis, a crisis of the struggle over the
reproduction of capitalist relations of production,
which includes inseparably a political struggle over the
institutional form and the policies and practices of the
state" (Clarke, 1990/91:464 - my emphasis).
The crisis in South Africa has its roots in an imbalance
between the different departments of social
reproduction.
As I see it, a key deficiency of the ANC/COSATU economic
policy for a post-apartheid South Africa is that the
policies do not take sufficient account of the
consequences of the relative backwardness of South
African production in all branches of production. For a
time production was sustained by the natural advantages,
viz, minerals and agriculture. Mining and agriculture
dictated the form of integration into the world economy,
but could not sustain relatively backward manufacture
for ever. The crisis was exacerbated by worker
resistance and sanctions. Low productivity led to low
wages and inflation. The crisis demanded the
restructuring of manufacture in accordance with global
integration, mediated by the financial sector.
Neo-marxism acknowledges the connection between the SA
crisis and that of the crisis of world capitalism, but
tends to focus on local i.e. national conditions, for
they argue, this shapes the particular way in which the
crisis unfolds. Gelb (1987:46) argues that, " the form
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of the crisis - the precise process of its development,
its differential impact, depth and length - are a
consequence of local patterns of accumulation and policy
processes". The logic of this approach, and,
subsequently, the whole focus of the ANC/COSATU economic
planning, is the emphasis on the role of the state in
resolving the economic and political crisis. "There
seems to be no other way", writes Gelb, "in which a
quite fundamental shift of direction in economic
development could be brought about except by using the
capacities of the state as a counterweight to the
reluctant and extremely powerful private economic
agents" (Gelb, 1990:34, emphasis added).
The heavy dependence of the SA economy on the mining
industry has led to attempts to diversify the economic
base in order to reduce this dependence and strengthen
the resilience of the economy to the fluctuations in
world trade. With the rapid proletarianisation of the
black population, manufacturing also served the purpose
of social control. Accompanying the growth of
manufacturing was the integration of a system of racial
16 See also, ANC/COSATU 'Recommendations on Post-
apartheid Economic Policy': "Within the context of a
mixed economy the democratic non-racial state would
assume the leading role in the reconstruction of the
economy in order to facilitate the realisation of its
developmental objectives." in Transformation no.12 June
1990 p.3.
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diffei.entiation in the workplace. The integration and
development of the apartheid system depended on
manufacturing facilitating the process of social control
and discipline of the working class. The particular
process of class domination that SA is notorious for and
which suited the capitalist class in general, created
the seeds of the crisis which the ruling class is now
being confronted with. Years of repression have forged a
particularly combative working class, with strong
proletarian traditions of organisation and militant
action, able to strip away the illusions of the
bourgeois wage form, and see the problems they face
within a particular factory, for example, as not a
problem solely with their own bosses, but a result of a
I
whole system of oppression and exploitation. Apartheid
has ensured that every feature of the social relations
of production, despite the ideology of 'free
enterprise', was so permeated with the features of
ruling class oppression, that workers were not so easily
able, as perhaps their European or American counterparts
were, to separate 'bread' from 'politics'. Every
workplace has become a frontier where the struggle
between capital and labour is fought out, though
unevenly and often localised, but fought out
nevertheless, in all its ramifications.
The domination of the labour-intensive extractive
industry in the economy and the deliberate system of
under-education of the black population have created a
102
situation, where, upon discovering in the 1960's that it
could no longer compete on the world market on the basis
of cheap labour, SA was not able to embark on a
programme of capital intensification rapidly enough in
order to enter, on a competitive basis, the world market
in manufactured goods. This was a consequence of 1. its
under-skilled wage-labour, 2. the growing organisation
and militancy of the working class in response to the
introduction of new technology and the redundancies that
accompanied it and 3. the relative shortage of capital
in the face of the demands of mining and agriculture and
infrastructural developments.
Restructuring social relations in manufacturing
production, in order to increase the rate of
exploitation, inevitably provokes the intensification of
class struggle in its political form. It is for this
reason, according to Clarke(1978:71), that "The
fundamental economic crisis is not, however, a monetary
crisis but is a crisis in the social relations of
production". The question is whether these social
relations are capable of being changed significantly to
resolve the social crisis. To the regulationists this is
largely a matter of finding the correct growth path for
a return to a high rate of accumulation." But,
17 Gelb,S. 'Democratising economic growth: crisis and
growth models for the future', in Transformation no 12
June 1990 pp.32-33
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fundamentally, the social crisis will remain unresolved
until it becomes possible through the democratic self-
organisation of the working class and its allies to find
a socialist alternative to oppression and exploitation
in South Africa.
The essential political contribution of neo-marxism to
the political struggle in SA is to provide a bridge to
link reformist and revolutionary tendencies in the mass
movement. In the process, neo-marxism has blurred the
distinction between the two and therefore made it
possible, in a situation of intense class struggle, for
social democratic ideology , with its emphasis on class,
collaboration, to penetrate into the political
programmes and policy-making processes of left political
organisations in South Africa.
The social basis for this has been on the agenda of
capital for some time. Given the crisis of apartheid
South Africa, "Capital simply wants to save capitalism
and the broad perception within the ranks of big
business is that in order to achieve this objective,
capital must not only distance itself from apartheid, it
must also take active steps to undermine it. This
provides the common ground between monopoly capital and
the traditional participants in the anti-apartheid
struggle" (Lewis,1986:86).
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Stripped of its gloss, the neo-marxist solution to the
social crisis through a 'growth through redistribution'
model amounts to one of the many capitalist solutions
for post-apartheid South Africa. Yet the left proponents
of regulation theory are regarded as participants in a
left discourse for a socialist alternative to the
crisis-ridden political economy of apartheid South
Africa. It is clearly imperative therefore, to
disentangle capitalist from socialist solutions to the
SA crisis. A necessary part of this process is the
critique of neo-marxism itself.
The South African crisis and the restructuring of the
state
Historically, South African domestic capital had
developed a highly interventionist and distributive
state. This had been possible because of the natural
advantages of mining and agriculture, cheap labour and
its integration into the world economy.
Despite the predominance of the primary sector, South
Africa was forced to develop its manufacturing base.
'Poor whites' displaced by agriculture and a rising
urban population of black workers, put pressure on the
state to develop manufacture.
In order to initiate such a development, the
intervention of the state was critical. As a result,
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manufacturing and infrastructural development was
heavily subsidised, directly and indirectly, by the
state.
The structural imbalances at the root of the SA crisis
are the outcome of specific class developments. At
first, from 1950 to the early 1960's, manufacture
developed very successfully within the interventionist
framework. But the economy faced deepening crisis as its
favourable global position was undermined and the
demands of black workers escalated. At first the state
responded on the basis of its form, i.e. by intervening
and spending more to overcome immediate pressures. But
this only deepened both the economic and political
crisis. Responding to the crisis required a fundamental
restructuring in the relationship between capital and
the state in order to subject both the state and
individual capitals to the rule of capital and thereby
depoliticise economic policy. This involved the
liberalisation and restructuring of the financial
institutions and the development of more abstract
instruments of control. One of the tasks of the De Kock
Commission into the monetary system and monetary policy
was to formulate such instruments. But tensions arose in
government between the need to respond to immediate
pressure in order to stabilise economic and political
conditions and the need for fundamental restructuring.
Restructuring of the financial system can subject
capital and state to the rule of capital, but cannot
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determine their response. If capital does not invest and
the state does not cut its spending, the crisis deepens.
The determining moment at every stage is not the
economic or financial developments as such, but class
struggle.
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CHAPTER THREE
The post-Sharpville boom and its limitations:
South Africa as a primary producer.
The rapid industrial expansion which occurred in South
Africa in the 1960's was a seminal period in its
history. Its significance lies, on the one hand, in
manifesting the economic and political developments
which preceded it and which defined the qualitative and
quantitative character of the boom and, on the other
hand, in revealing, during the course of its demise in
the early seventies, the nature of the crisis of capital
accumulation in South Africa.
The historical forms of capital accumulation as it
evolved in South Africa, were the consequences primarily
of colonial conquest and subjugation. Under British
colonial rule specifically, the social framework was
laid to reinforce a system of production and
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accumulation orientated towards a dependent relationship
with the colonial power in which SA supplied Britain
with primary products and imported British manufactured
goods. It is this colonial relationship which has also
shaped SA's location within the global system of
capitalist accumulation. South Africa's role as a
supplier of primary products was specifically reinforced
by the availability of abundant supplies of mineral
deposits, particularly gold, coal and diamonds which
could be mined economically.
The mining industry, particularly the production and
distribution of gold, ensured SA a particular place in
the global economy. This predominance of mining in the
economy has meant that capitalist production in SA is
marked by a particular relationship between the branches
of production, in which the predominance of primary
production in the economy has resulted in a structural
imbalance in the departments of production in which the
production of the means of production (Capital goods
production) remains uneven and relatively undeveloped.
This structural imbalance has continued despite the
expansion of manufacture particularly in the 1960's and
it remained a fundamental source of the crisis of
capital accumulation, imposing structural limits on the
attempts at financial restructuring in the late 1970's
and 1980's, revealed through rising inflation and a
chronic balance of payments deficit. The monetary form
of this crisis and the attempts at financial
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restructuring by the state to overcome the problems
arising from this structural imbalance, is analysed more
closely in chapters 5 to 9 below. The purpose of this
chapter is threefold: firstly, to trace the path of the
development of capitalism in SA which led to the
manufacturing boom in the sixties; secondly, to analyse
the nature of the boom; and thirdly, to consider the
ways in which the boom revealed the financial crisis
facing capitalism in South Africa.
1. The development of manufacturing in South Africa
The development of the manufacturing sector is crucial
to our understanding of the crisis in social relations
of production which became manifest particularly from
the late sixties onwards. In a recent study of the
manufacturing sector (Black, 1991) the central
importance of this sector for understanding the crisis
in South Africa was demonstrated. ' Black argues that
"Not only is manufacturing responsible for major
contributions in terms of output and employment, but it
provided a key expansionary stimulus for the economy
during much of the post-war period" (Black, 1991:156)
The key to the development of manufacturing lies in the
predominance of mining in the South African economy. The
expansion of mining, particularly in the 1930's,
provided the need for a market for manufactured goods at
first to service the particular needs of the mining
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industry. The emergence of a manufacturing sector linked
to mining soon gained importance throughout the economy
and stimulated a wider, more nationally integrated
manufacturing industry.
These developments occurred at a time when the post-war
international economy was growing rapidly and commodity
prices were rising, favourable conditions for the SA
economy, dominated by primary exports.
The SA state had already followed a systematic policy
in favour of industrialisation from the 1920's. One
pillar of this policy was tariff protection to stimulate
import substitution. Another was the establishment of
parastatal corporations (Iscor, Eskom and Sasol) and, as
the Industrial Development Corporation, in joint
ventures with private capital. Furthermore, the
'civilised labour policy' which allowed more favourable
conditions for white workers, was an intrinsic part of
the state industrial policy. This initiative by the
state to provide a legal and political framework for
the development of an internal manufacturing industry
has played an important role in the way the industry
developed. It had particular implications for the
changing relationships of state, labour and capital.
State industrial strategy in the beginning was aimed at
unifying a divided manufacturing base.
According to Mabin(1989:81), what was distinctive of
manufacturing in its early phase, was
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"The unintegrated structure of different sectors of
early South African industry...the absence of national 
integration. Each sector was relatively isolated and
differences in industrial speciality, labour force
recruitment sources, wage rates and cost structures were
very substantial." The struggle to unify the industry
was boosted when the price of gold rose in response to
SA abandoning the gold standard in 1933. The rise in the
gold price made possible further expansion of the mining
industry. Mining expansion in turn boosted engineering
production. By 1937, according to Freund(1989) local
production of steel comprised a third of total
consumption. Further expansion during the second world
war included significant development in the production
of consumer goods. As a consequence, engineering
production acquired a central importance in the
industrial structure. This, in turn promoted the
industrial integration of the national economy - despite
its predominance in the Witwatersrand industrial zone.
Rising profitability in the 1930's attracted the
investment of the mining finance houses and foreign
investors enabling an increase in the scale of
production with a proportionate increase in industrial
workers and the differentiation of the workers in terms
of skills. By the end of the war, more than half of the
industrial workers were black males in an industry which
historically had employed mainly white workers and
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despite the near doubling of white workers from 1933
(Freund, 1989)
This transformation in the racial composition of the
industrial working class had important implications for
capital, labour and the state. The declining ability of
the reserves to subsidise some of the costs for the
reproduction of unskilled black labour-power to work in
the mining industry created a structural crisis which
propelled the state into direct involvement in its
reproduction. In this respect, the regulation and
administration of labour - primarily black labour - was
crucial. The system of the job colour bar which ensured
a racial division of the working class, served to keep
the value of labour-power as low as possible. This was
important for the economic exploitation of the mining
deposits: "The geology of the Witwatersrand mines, with
low-grade ore, thinly and unevenly spread along a wide
surface and at great depth, required elaborate,
expensive structures for deep-level mining...and meant
that much drilling and blasting had to be done by hand.
They therefore required huge amounts of both capital and
labour" (Lipton,1986:111).
The system of segregation, then, was important to
sustain the profitibility of the mining industry. But it
also had a wider significance in ensuring the hegemony
of capitalist social relations at all levels of South
African society.
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The struggle to impose capitalist social relations in a
planned, systematic manner was a feature of state policy
during the Smuts government and continued to be a part
of state policy with the ascendency of the Nationalist
Party to power in 1948. The argument of the Board of
Trade and Industries in 1945, that "The extension of
manufacturing industry can be stimulated through a
reduction in the high cost structure through increased
mechanisation so as to derive the full benefit of the
large resources of comparatively low-paid non-European
labour" (Legassick,1982:473), was largely supported by
the newly elected Nationalist government after 1948.
Furthermore, the imposition of racially allocated work
roles (the job colour bar) was, on the whole, applied
flexibly to serve the changing needs of production.
Apartheid policy continued to extend forms of regulation
of labour to serve the specific (and changing) interests
of capital. The regulation of labour-power is achieved
by the imposition of political controls over the working
class which strive to ensure the continued supply of
labour of the quantity and quality required for the
specific needs of the various branches of production.
In the case of manufacturing, the regulation of labour-
power to serve this industry required specific political
conditions different from that required in the mining
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industry - an issue much deliberated upon by a
contemporary commission:
"Can we develop our industries when we have the position
that the native only works for a few months and then
returns to the reserves for a couple of years? No the
native must be trained for his work in industry, and to
become an efficient industrial worker he must be a
permanent industrial worker. On that account he must
live near his place of employment." But this also poses
new political dangers for the state: "Unless handled
with a great foresight and skill these masses of
detribalized Natives can very easily develop into a
menace rather than a constructive factor in
industry...the whole problem calls for vision and
statesmanlike guidance" (Ibid:478).
These remarks reveal an insight into the potential
dangers for capital and the state of the
proletarianisation of the disenfranchised black
population.
The growing insignificance of white unskilled workers
and the rise in the employment of black semi-skilled
workers in the manufacturing sector was a feature of the
significant transformations which had taken place in
capitalist production in SA in the forties and fifties
and which were to expose, in the sixties, the
contradictory character of capital accumulation in SA.
"Industry saw its future in consolidation and capital
investment in integrated, expanded and in some respects
115
deskilled, mass production and there could be little
doubt that most of the relevant 'semi-skilled' workforce
would necessarily be African" (Freund,1989:102). "It is
easy to think that industry was concerned simply with
the question of the African's cheapness; it was not.
More to the point was the sheer inadequacy of the size
of the white labour force to power substantial growth
and capital's capacity to restructure labour processes
so as to bring blacks in without actually confronting
white wrath or fears" (Ibid:102-3). Freund's analysis of
the historical development of manufacture came to the
conclusion that, "When the state...attempted actually to
shape the character of the labour force in line with
segregation policies...it was not so successful and
indeed in the end, the state accepted the logic of
capital in secondary industry in shaping specific
economic measures" (Ibid,104) However, the 'logic of
capital' is rooted in the social relations of production
as a whole, encompassing economic and political aspects
in contradictory unity and not merely in the 'economic'
as Freund's analysis suggests. It was in response to
growing class struggle that the Nationalist government
sought to impose through the exercise of state power its
particular kind of centralised authority. In this
respect, the expansion of manufacturing enterprises and
the movement towards national integration of
manufacturing capital played an important role in
asserting the command of capital and the state over an
increasingly proletarianised population.
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2. Manufacture to the rescue of apartheid ?
The industrial boom saw major developments in
manufacturing and financial capital. Manufacturing
output increased by 70% in five years (R1 billion in
1960 to R1.7 billion in 1965). Transformations in the
monetary and banking system were a necesssary
consequence of this process of industrial expansion. The
boom intensified demands for black labour. Levels of
employment and productivity rose with increasing
capital-intensity made possible by the importation of
machinery and equipment. Although the wages of black
workers rose only minimally, the economy expanded
rapidly throughout the sixties. With increased local
production of durable consumer goods, manufacturing
output reached high levels. Using Reserve Bank
statistics, Black (1991:157) provides the following
illustration of the growth in manufacturing from 1946 to
1975:
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Table 1: Gross domestic product and manufacturing growth
Average rate of growth per annum
Output(%)	 Employment(%)	 Total
GDP (%)
1946-1950 9.1 6.6 4.7
1950-1955 7.5 3.0 4.8
1955-1960 4.5 0.9 4.0
1960-1965 9.9 6.8 6.0
1965-1970 7.4 3.2 5.4
1970-1975 6.0 4.1 4.0
The industrial boom in the early sixties came in the
wake of the political defeat of the black working class
and the suppression of the trade union movement. This
defeat of the mass movement cleared the way for the
restructuring and modernisation of capital accumulation
in order to overcome the contradictions and crisies
arising from the social relations of production on which
Verwoedian segregation policies depended.
The growth in manufacturing was necessary to diversify
the industrial base and reduce the dependence on primary
production, which is very vulnerable to movements in
world trade prices. The mining industry in particular,
mindful of the limited life-expectancy of the extractive
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industry, the rising cost of imported heavy industrial
machinery and the inability of the local manufacturing
industry to service these needs, invested in manufacture
and other non-mining sectors. The inflow of foreign
capital after Sharpville, encouraged by mining capital's
investment in manufacture, played an important role in
financing this development.
To the apartheid state, the growth of manufacturing was
important as a means of social control. It enabled the
extension and rationalisation of the system of
regimentation and control of the black working class in
industries outside of mining and agriculture. It made
possible the modernisation of the system of labour
control at a time when the black population became
increasingly proletarianised. By ensuring the
subordination of these workers under the command of
capital, the state was also securing its domination over
the proletariat. This was necessary in order to
facilitate the effective production of surplus value by
the coordination and allocation of the available labour
power between industrial sectors. Labour control under
apartheid is "a diversified system of control designed
to allocate labour to the various sectors on terms that
were consistent with the level of development of the
productive forces, which was very uneven between
sectors, and as a system that could clearly
differentiate between those workers on whom the
discipline of (wage)-labour could be imposed and those
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who would be more directly and immediately subject to
state control" (Clarke,1978:69) This strategy of labour
control, aimed at intensifying capital accumulation and
the expansion of manufacturing, was made easier by the
political defeat of the black working class after
Sharpville. Industrial expansion could then occur under
conditions in which the working class posed no
significant barrier to the strategies employed by
capital and the state.
Verwoedian segregation policies were based on a constant
supply of unskilled contract labour drawn from the
reserves. This labour supply was particularly suited to
the requirements of mining and agriculture. But the
development of manufacturing industry - a feature of the
post-Sharpville boom - required more stable, skilled
and available labour drawn from the metropolitan areas.
The industrial boom saw a dramatic increase in
productivity and levels of employment (the employment of
black workers, in particular) in manufacturing. Towards
the second half of the decade, the installation of
large-scale capital equipment was the main source of
this increase in productivity - a feature that was to
reveal the contradictory nature of the sixties boom:
"While the capital-intensive character of the boom was
made possible through the importation of machinery and
equipment, there was no corresponding rise in the value
of exports and consequently a large deficit built up on
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the balance of payments, which eventually forced the
state to slow the economy down" (Innes,1984:190) The
rising deficit on the balance of payments forced the SA
economy into recession. The growing movement of trade
union resistance, accompanied by recessionary conditions
in the world economy, ensured the prolongation of the
recession in SA throughout most of the seventies.
Manufacture and the organisation of labour
The sixties boom revealed the limitations of capital
accumulation in SA. The success of the strategic shift
towards manufacture depended on a rise in manufacturing
exports instead of it remaining a liability on the
balance of payments. This did not happen. Instead
manufacturing remained stagnant, becoming, instead,
increasingly vulnerable to foreign competition in the
domestic market. SA remained uncompetitive in the world
market for manufactured goods. Despite the efforts to
control labour, South African labour remained relatively
more expensive with lower productivity. Consequently, it
was thought that international competitivity would be
improved with increased capital intensitivity and a more
skilled workforce. But, this step created its own
counter-tendencies, as Clarke confirms: "the very
process of the introduction of modern technology created
the conditions under which the 'indiscipline' of the
working class would begin to manifest itself in an
organised form, for the introduction of the new
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technology meant changes in the imposition of the rule
of capital at the point of production, on the one hand,
and the creation of large-scale redundency, on the
other" (Clarke,1972:70) These counter-tendencies came
into conflict with the 'barriers' of state policy.
The Verwoedian response to these pressures was limited
to labour control measures conforming to the grand
designs of apartheid: colour bar, influx control,
bantustan strategy and the decentralisation of labour
intensive industries to areas outside the main
metropolitan centres and near the bantustans,
traditional sources of cheap and available labour. While
the process of proletarianisation could not be reversed,
everything needed to be done to keep black workers out
of the metropolitan centres. The metropolitan areas
would be reserved for capital-intensive production, less
dependent on black (unskilled) labour. But the
manufacturing boom intensified the demand for black
labour at all skill levels. The fixed capital stock
between 1946 and 1970 at constant prices rose from
R204million to R938million, almost doubling the capital-
labour ratio, increasing the need for skilled and semi-
skilled workers. At the same time, the supply of
available white skilled labour did not rise accordingly
(Lipton).
A slight concession was made to the colour bar, making
its application more flexible by fragmenting and
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reclassifying certain jobs traditionally reserved for
white workers. At the same time a concerted effort was
initiated to attract skilled (white) workers from
Europe. Rising demand for skilled and semi-skilled
workers raised labour costs while the priviledged
conditions of white skilled workers had a negative
effect on productivity. On the other hand, barriers to
the advance of black workers continued to remain a
disincentive to the intensification of work: "The lack
of competition for white workers led to slackness on the
job, high turnover and absenteeism, while the barrier to
job advance was a disincentive to hard work, motivation
and commitment among blacks. Inadequate education, poor
living conditions and insecurity contributed to low
black efficiency" (Lipton,1986:145) As the boom
intensified the shortage of skilled labour, so,
increasingly, capital mobilised against state policy on
labour control, seeing it as a barrier to the expansion
of production and capital accumulation.' Increasing
capital-intensity also put great pressure on the need to
expand the domestic market: "The higher the proportion
of fixed or capital costs to total costs the sharper the
fall in costs per unit - and in South Africa it is the
capital intensive industries which have to be most
' This opposition culminated in 1970 with capital
opposing the 1970 Bantu Laws Amendment Act which aimed
to extend job reservation. Increasing opposition
eventually resulted in 1973 with a shift in policy
allowing black workers to do skilled work in white
areas.
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expanded if the surge towards industrial activity is to
be maintained" (Torchia,1988:424). While capital, in
particular manufacturing capital, continued to agitate
for reform in labour policy, popular mobilisation
against the apartheid state and the growing signs of
worker militancy and organisation was a constant
reminder to state and capital of the likelihood of
impending crisis and the urgency of maintaining the
initiative less it gets taken in the streets and
factories.
State response to working class pressure
The Verwoedian response to pressure from below was
limited to rationalising and extending state control of
labour. This, it was assumed, would be in the interest
of capital. But controlling and regimenting labour
necessitated an extensive bureaucratic organisation
which proved too cumbersome and inflexible. Although big
corporations were able to compensate for this by setting
up alternative labour recruitment and distribution
networks within their own corporations, political
pressure against these controls was a powerful component
of mass resistance, and consequently, featured strongly
in the relationship between capital and labour at the
point of production. In this way, the burgeoning trade
union movement was able to shape state-capital relations
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by forcing capital to confront the state's strategies
with respect to the controls imposed on black labour. In
this way also, labour was defining their interests 'in-
and-against' the state, thus placing further limitations
on the strategies and tactics of the apartheid state.
While it became increasingly clear that further
continuation of the Verwoedian strategy would not
resolve the problem, the state remained cautious of any
reform that would threaten the basis of its own power.
Thus the Riekert Commission's observation that while the
labour control measures had had a negative effect on
economic activity, "the price to be paid for (the
abolition of labour control) in terms of direct and
indirect social costs would be too high"
(Lipton,1986:152).
Section 3 of the 1967 Physical Planning Act enforced a
policy of industrial decentralisation. Within certain
industries relying on labour-intensive production,
particularly in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal and
Western Cape industrial areas (where restrictions
applied on the location and expansion of industries),
this was a major source of conflict with the state.
These two areas accounted for 2/3rds of employment and
industrial output. Intense competition, which fueled the
pressure for expansion and employment, simply led to
widespread disregard of legal controls. Despite this,
state policy was pursued with determination, as
reflected in a statement made by Jan Haak, Minister of
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Economic Affairs in 1970: "We must accept that the days
of uncontrolled influx of Bantu labour into the
metropolitan areas are gone forever...the
decentralisation policy would be pursued even if it
involves a sacrifice in the overall economic
performance" (Ibid:154). Capital's incentive to campaign
against state regulation of black labour and the living
conditions of workers which accompanies these
regulations arose from the belief that average labour
costs would decrease and productivity would rise with
the reduction in state regulation and the improvement in
living standards. Capital was not, on the whole,
persuaded by the incentive schemes encouraging
decentralisation. They feared industrial unrest as a
result of low wages in such areas, political upheavels
arising from the policies of the bantustans and economic
fragmentation. Sections of industrial capital preferred
a settled and permanent urban labour force in order to
facilitate increased productivity and the investment of
resources in the training of skilled and semi-skilled
workers. No doubt, capital was also motivated by the
need to nurture the local market, in which black
consumers hold the key to potential future expansion: "
From the viewpoint of sales, it is absolutely clear that
the non-white urban population of South africa
constitutes a vital market. This is the real mass market
of South Africa and no manufacturer.., can survive in
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the future unless he obtains a significant and growing
share of the non-whites' purchasing power" (ibid:425).
But it was to be the deliberate action of organised
labour in 1973 and 1976 that would prove to be the
decisive acts that were to propel both capital and the
state to confront directly the class agenda asserted by
labour.
import substitution
The path of post-war industrial development in SA was
strongly directed by the state policy of import-
substitution. But this policy was based on supplying a
narrow market of mainly white consumers with consumer
durables. As a result the development and expansion of
manufacturing was mainly dependent on growth in the
internal consumer market and the extent to which
imported goods were replaced by locally manufactured
products. The structural weaknesses which beset the
manufacturing industry and which limited its potential
for growth arose from its dependence on imported parts
and equipment, the low level of exports and the
extremely skewed income distribution in the population,
limiting the development of a sufficiently broad mass
market and encouraging the premature expansion of the
market for sophisticated durable consumer goods. As a
result, the manufacturing industry remains a net
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importer dependent for expansion on capital inflows or
from funds generated by the export of primary products.
Despite the policy of import-substitution, "overall
import-intensity (imports/GDP) has not changed since the
1920's and imports still accounted for as much as 24 per
cent of GDP in the period 1980-84" (Black,1991:161)
According to Black, what has happened instead is that
the importation of consumer goods has been significantly
reduced, but, at the expense of increased imports of
capital goods and continued dependence on foreign
technology. Domestic manufacturing has not been able to
improve its export performance significantly. "For the
manufacturing sector as a whole, the high costs and
inefficiencies generated by South Africa's particular
form of import-substituting industrialisation have
worked against any competitiveness on international
markets...Tafiff protection...uncertainties about
exchange rate fluctuations and sanctions have also led
to a situation where in spite of the weak rand there has
been little new investment in export-oriented
production" (Ibid:162) The investment in manufacturing
has mainly concentrated on those sectors employing
capital-intensive production methods. This has been
deliberate policy of the state: "Mechanised plant has
been artificially cheapened through subsidies in the
form of capital investment allowances and, until 1981,
through artificially low interest rates. Over-valued
exchange rates and the fact that import tariffs are not
usually applied to capital equipment have also
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contributed to relative factor prices that favour
increasing capital-intensive production techniques"
(Ibid:163). Thus investment was directed at precisely
those sectors where skilled and semi-skilled white
workers were employed. Restrictions on black workers'
rights of movement and employment and the cost and
shortage of skilled labour have further encouraged the
capital-intensification of manufacturing. As stated
above, this capital-intensification is skewed in the
direction of supplying the high-earning white consumer
market with luxury products. The development of a large-
scale motor industry for example was made possible by
this market. The consequence to the economy, given the
dependency on imports in this industry, has been even
further dependence on imports for capital goods and the
growing relative importance of primary production.4
The relative backwardness of manufacture and the
importance of primary production are structural features
of the domestic economy that is the basis for the
imbalance in the relations between industrial sectors
4 The contribution of mining to the GDP was declining
until the 1970 1 s but with the lack of expansion of the
manufacturing sector, this trend is reversing. "In the
decade up to 1975 fixed investment in mining was on
average little more than 30 per cent of investment
levels in manufacturing. In 1986-8 fixed investment in
mining was roughly equivalent to that in the
manufacturing sector...there is clear evidence of a
reversal in the long-term trend according to which
manufacturing grew in importance relative to mining
until the 1970's"(Black, 1991:172).
129
and characterises its relationship to the world economy.
The continuing crisis in the balance of payments is an
expression of this structural imbalance, in its monetary
form.
3. Structural imbalance and the crisis of the balance of
payments
The failure of manufacturing to take off in South Africa
is starkly revealed by declining output, employment and
manufacture's share of Gross Domestic Product. The table
below shows that despite all attempts at structural
reform in the 1980's, the state has not succeeded in
halting the decline of manufacturing output and of its
dwindling share of GDP.
Table 2. GDP growth and manufacturing growth. 1965-1991 
Average rate of manufacturing growth per annum
Year	 output (%)	 employment	 (%)GDP(%)
1965-1970 7.4 3.2 5.4
1970-1975 6.0 4.1 4.0
1975-1980 4.1 1.5 3.4
1980-1985 -1.4 -1.0 1.1
1985-1991 0.7 -1.4 1.0
Source: Macroeconomic Research Group, 1993:239.
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The decline of domestic manufacture has been expressed
in a depency to import capital goods and the relative
predominance of primary exports. This is reflected in
the low percentage share of final process goods in total
exports. The table below shows that only 6% of exports
in 1988 were final processed products compared with 42%
of raw materials excluding processed raw materials.
Table 3. Percentage exports by state of production,
1960,1970,1980,1988
Category 1960 1970 1980 1988
Raw materials 29 37 42 42
Processed raw
materials 40 32 36 46
Sub-total 69 69 78 88
Material int.
products 15 17 12 6
Final processed
products 16 14 9 6
Sub-total 31 31 21 12
TOTAL 100 100 100 100
Source: RSA, Dept of Finance Budget Review,1990;
Cited in MERG, 1993:241.
What these figures reveal is that a fundamental source
of the problems capital and the state have to confront
lies in the Imbalance between the different sectors of
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the SA economy. The historical process of capital
accumulation in South Africa and its integration in the
world economy has continued to be characterised by a
relationship of dependency. South Africa has always
relied on the importation of capital equipment. As a
result, its capital stock remained generally undeveloped
and its South Africa's economic development always
skewed towards mining and agriculture. As a result its
role in the international division of labour has been
essentially as a primary producer. This was the case in
the sixties and it has continued to worsen.
South Africa's link to the world economy has taken the
form of exporting precious metals and raw materials and
importing capital. It hardly developed its own
technological capacity. In the early sixties, through a
combination of import substitution, high mining profits
and low wages during the boom period SA was able to
attract considerable direct foreign investment. The
inflow of foreign capital which stoked the boom
coincided with favourable export conditions in the
primary sector. So South Africa enjoyed a favourable
balance of payments situation which sustained the boom.
But this was not sustained and South Africa remains
extremely prone to crisis in the balance of payments.
The balance of payments expresses the overall
relationship between manufacturing and the other sectors
as mediated by their integration into the world economy.
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Through market adjustments or state intervention, it is
possible to try to regulate the relationship between the
sectors. Similarly, any imbalance in the relationship
between the sectors is inevitably reflected in the
balance of payments situation and appears as a monetary
crisis. The structural problem in the SA economy arises
from this imbalance. It is for this reason also that the
boom in manufacture can only be fully understood in
relation to the series of active interventions of the SA
state in its attempt at maintaining stable balance of
payments conditions. With South Africa's integration
into the world market, the world market necessarily
mediates the relations between sectors. If mining booms
then export earnings plus a growing home market and
manufacture can grow. The hope was that manufacture
could take off, but it remained backward by world
standards. A lag in primary production therefore creates
a crisis of the balance of payments and in
manufacturing. As Brian Khan (1991:62) confirms, "Such
was the pattern of adjustment to cycles that an
acceleration of investment expenditure and the
concomitant increase in capital goods imports would
eventually hit the balance of payments constraint.
Concern for the level of foreign exchange reserves led
to monetary restraints and high interest rates. The
consequent increase in the cost of capital slowed the
rate of investment and consumption, and thereby reduced
imports". The rising deficit in the balance of payments,
due to the fact that with the increasing importation of
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capital equipment there was no corresponding increase in
the value of exports, forced the SA economy into
recession by the end of the sixties.
The balance of payments problem that constantly beset
the SA economy is the consequence of underlying
structural deficiencies that arise from the nature of
the production and accumulation of surplus-value. The
uneven development of the manufacturing sector relative
to the primary sector is a consequence of the dependent
relationship to the world economy and the 'distortions'
resulting from colonialism. More importantly, the social
relations of production - in this particular case, the
social relations in the immmediate process of
manufacturing production - is a function of the historic
development of class struggle, the relationship between
capital and labour.
The need to develop manufacturing production was part of
the struggle to impose the command of capital over
labour. In the case of SA, proletarianisation was
accompanied by state-imposed labour control and
distribution in accordance with apartheid policy. This
immediately exposes the relationships of power and
coercion that accompanies the production of surplus
value to the extent that any intensification of labour
means the intensification of class struggle. In order to
make the manufacturing industry competitive
internationally, it is necessary to restructure
134
production. This involves the intensification of labour
and the increase of work discipline in order to reduce
the cost of labour power and increase productivity. This
process, necessary for correcting the imbalance between
the sectors, exacerbates the problem by intensifying the
struggle between capital and labour at the point of
production, on the one hand,and between the state and
labour, on the other. "The contradiction that besets the
South African state is that it has to resolve the
economic crisis without intensifying the political
crisis to such an extent that the very persistence of
capitalism in South Africa is threatened"
(Clarke,1972:70).
4. The state and the money form of the crisis
The manufacturing boom intensified the class struggle
between capital and labour at the point of production
and between the state and the rapidly rising reserve
army of labour displaced by the introduction of modern
technology and the restructuring of the labour process.
This intensification of conflict and the increasing
manifestation of the economic crisis reinforced each
other, and revealed and extended the coercive and
interventionist character of the SA state.
The crisis is a crisis of the reproduction of capitalist
production relations. But the crisis is not confined to
the sphere of production, but is expressed in a variety
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of economic, political and ideological forms. The impact
of the crisis on the state is mediated by these forms.
The state could respond to the political challenges of
the working class with intensified repression. But
direct and indirect acts of repression only intensified
the crisis. The state could equally ignore or reject the
representations of 'progressive capitalists'. But this
has only dented the political and ideological
foundations of state power. More fundamentally, the
financial and monetary expression of the crisis
undermined the material reproduction of the state. The
monetary crisis is thus not an independent or even an
isolated expression of the crisis, it is the culmination
of the crisis at the level of the state.
It is in this form that the structural weaknesses of SA
capital are revealed. The stability of the state becomes
expressed in the stability of the money-form. In other
words, the political power of the state depends on the
social power of money. In this way, the state and civil
society is permanently subordinated to the social power
of capital. The boom in manufacturing in the sixties,
the subsequent development of the economic crisis as a
component of the crisis in the social relations of
production, the monetary form in which the crisis is
expressed, through to the early 1990's, reveals how the
rhythm of class struggle - the dynamic relationship
between capital and labour has shaped the nature of
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capital accumulation and the form of the state in South
Africa.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Economic crisis and mass struggle
With the demise of the sixties boom the nature of the
accumulation crisis in South Africa came into sharper
relief. Not only was the quantitative and qualitative
character of this brief period of intensified
industrial expansion exposed, but it also enabled new
pressures, both domestic and global, to change the
dynamic of capital accumulation and reveal new
struggles between capital and labour. Growing economic
pressures on the South African economy intensified.
But the ability of the domestic economy to overcome
the movement towards recession and crisis was
subverted by rising inflation, deficits in the balance
of payments and a growing shortage of skilled workers.
The drift towards recessionary conditions in the
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seventles was a function of structural imbalances in
the SA economy. This imbalance manifested itself by
exposing the limited and dependent nature of
manufacturing as well as South Africa's vulnerability
to the money and capital markets. These structural
features which precipitated the seventies recession
were further exacerbated by the 1973/4 crisis in the
world economy and the mass action of 1976.
In the face of growing economic crisis state attempts
at overcoming the crisis by a programme of
restructuring was counterbalanced by increasing worker
militancy and organisation at the workplace and
popular struggles against the apartheid state. This
chapter aims to address the relationship between the
economic crisis and the mass struggles which occured
in the seventies. In order to do so, it is necessary
to analyse the domestic and global developments which
were central to the crisis of capital accumulation
apparent in the immediate aftermath of the boom. These
are, the limited development of manufacturing, the
vulnerability of the internal money and capital
markets and the consequence to the SA economy of the
1972/3 	 recession.
1. Limited development of manufacturing
From a peak of 9.9% in the period 1960-65, the average
per annum growth of the rate of manufacturing output
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dropped steadily in the seventies, reaching a low of
4.1% in the 1975-80 period and -1.2% in 1980-85
(Black, 1991:157). The fragility of the boom in
manufacturing was manifested not simply by the drop in
output after 1965, but also by the qualitative
character of the manufacturing expansion which
occured. Reflecting on the development of
manufacturing in the 1980's, Black argues that "the
slowdown has been of a much longer duration.., and is
attributable more to structural problems that began
emerging in the earlier period of rapid growth. In
particular, it is symptomatic of the failure of South
Africa's post-war growth model" (Ibid:156-7). These
structural problems concern the dependence on imports
by the manufacturing industry, the lack of
'
manufacturing exports and the consequent pressures on
the balance of payments that arise from this
imbalance.
Analysing the development of manufacture between 1919
and 1976, Jill Nattrass observed that, "both the
increase in the degree of capital intensity in
production methods and in labour productivity were
relatively low, and ... on average the increases in
output that occurred came mainly from the creation of
new jobs, rather than from the introduction of more
mechanised techniques." (Nattrass,1981:165) This is as
a result of the predominance of 'capital widening'
(expanding existing production methods), rather than
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capital deepening' (introducing production methods
that facilitate the intensification of surplus-value
production by increasing the organic composition of
capital. Taking the period as a whole, only 25% of the
annual growth of capital resulted in an increase in
the intensification of production, with the real value
of output (per rand) remaining constant overall. In
the latter part of the period, Nattrass found that
between 1951 and 1970, "the proportion of investment
going to create new jobs decreased to 57 per cent
(from 78% in 1936-1951) and then increased again to 68
per cent over the 6 years to 1976" (Nattrass,
1981:167). This suggests that the sixties boom did not
result (in the seventies, at least) in a significant
lasting shift towards the intensification of the
production of relative surplus-value. Private sector
investment in manufacture dropped from 1974 and the
volume of manufacturing output between mid-1974 and
mid-19.75, fell by 6%. During 1978- 1979, only 16% of
the increase in manufacturing output could be
attributed to productivity increases as a result of
the introduction of new technology as compared to 66%
in the developed capitalist countries (Saul and Gelb,
1981:28).
These figures concerning the character of the
development of the manufacturing industry suggest that
manufacturing production, particularly the production
of capital goods, remained limited relative to the
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economy as a whole and was unable to break out of its
dependence on foreign technology and imported capital
goods. Taking a comparative perpective, Moll (1991)
argues that SA's growth rate, compared to similar
middle-income developing countries, remained
,
consistently mediocre', with the economy in an
economic slump since the 1940's, despite a high
potential for growth in the post-war economy. This
potential for economic growth rests on relatively
stable political conditions after the war, relatively
advanced communications and trade links and a mining
sector earning foreign exchange and easing the balance
of payments situation. What Moll's figures show is
that SA's share of world manufacturing production was
in steady decline between 1955 and 1985, its
productive capacity was such that it could not respond
favourably to world demands on competitive terms that
would increase its export of manufactured products.
South Africa's share of 'developing' countries'
manufactured exports drop from 12.61% in 1955 to 1.92%
in 1985 while the comparative figures for SA's share
of the total world manufacturing exports are 0.78% and
0.27% respectively (Mo11,1991:282).
However, despite the limitations outlined above, there
did occur a relative tendency towards increasing
capital intensity in the sixties and seventies, in
marked contrast to the period after the war. The
expansion in manufacturing capital changed the nature
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of the enterprise in the immediate process of
production in each industrial sector. This included
the diyersification of production, structural changes
in manufacturing output, changes in employment and
working conditions and in the productivity of labour.
While, in the earlier period the manufacturing output
was geared towards the production of goods for mining
and for the domestic consumer market, in the seventies
a shift occurred towards the production of machine and
metal products, many substituting for previously
imported products. The new skill requirements resulted
in changes in the labour market particularly
concerning the racial division of labour and the
implementation of controls over black labour.
Manufacturing expansion was also a reflection of the
changing relationship between the state and capital.
The seventies saw the intensification of the state's
involvement in the industrial sector with the
expansion of SASOL, ESCOM, ARMSCOR and ISCOR. By 1972,
25% of manufacturing capital was owned by the state
(Nattrass, 1981:234).
Increasing state spending on infrastructural
development, the expansion of parastatals and rising
-
defence expenditure, meant increasing reliance on
long-term loans from foreign banks. The sixties saw a
shift in foreign investment from concentration on
mining stock, investment by foreign multinations
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became increasingly direct, particularly with the
mining of 'strategic' minerals. 1 But the increase in
direct foreign investment did not change SA's
dependent status. It was still cheaper to import
technology rather than develop it domestically. In
1973, for example, 75% of imports were for machinery
and industrial equipment (Saul and Gelb,1986:75). This
put pressure on the balance of payments, plagued by a
rising deficit.
2. Vulnerability of the internal money and capital
markets
SA money and capital markets remained vulnerable to
the vicissitudes of the international financial system
because SA lacked a modernised internal financial
system The intensification of class struggle in the
late fifties and early sixties resulted in the
institution of various controls over the flow of funds
to reduce the outflow of capital, particularly after
Sharpville. Differing forms of exchange control were
applied with varied success. In May 1961, a set of
measures was adopted to tighten exchange control and
strengthen existing import control measures but this
failed to affect stock control transactions, the main
1 "Many of the new investments of the 1960s and the
1970s were joint ventures between some combination of
foreign, local private and state capital (the latter
through the IDC)." Saul and Gelb (1986)p. 76
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conduit for capital flight. In June 1961 this outlet
was plugged through wider control over securities,
subjecting the local sale proceeds of all foreign
investment in local companies to a 'blocking'
procedure. According to Franszen (1983:110-111) while
effective, this measure "had far-reaching long-term
external and internal effects".
South Africa's importance as a supplier of raw
materials, particularly strategic minerals and gold
and its importance as a regional power in Southern
Africa, has enabled the domestic economy to carve a
niche for itself as a key component of the global
accumulation of capital. Historically, British
investment particularly in the mining industry, but
also in manufacturing and finance, has played a key
role in the global location of the SA economy. But US
investment, particularly after capital outflows as a
result of the Sharpville massacre in 1961, played a
critical role in shaping SA's relationship with global
capital during the period of US domination of the
world economy. The key areas of US capital investment,
viz capital goods, computers, transportation and
energy, were crucial in the period of industrial
expansion after Sharpville. The importance of foreign
investment in this period was confirmed by the SA
Reserve Bank:
"In the long run, South Africa has to a large extent
been dependent on foreign capital for development
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purposes...It is highly dependent on foreign capital,
particillarly risk capital, to achieve a relatively
high rate of growth. The relatively high rate of
growth experienced by the South African economy during
the past three years (1969-71) was, therefore, only
achieved with an increase in the relative importance
of foreign funds in the financing of gross domestic
investment." 2 South Africa is also critical in
providing a stable supply of gold to the world
financial system.' To the SA economy, this relationship
has meant that economic conditions in SA are locked
into the cyclical nature of the world economy with the
economy subjected to major strains as the global
economy oscillates between boom and recession. The
balance of payments crisis which has been a feature of
SA's economic crisis is a consequence of SA's role in
the international division of labour. Both the
current and capital accounts of the balance of
payments are sensitive to both local and international
conditions of accumulation,"Thus the extent to which
the domestic crisis has affected the balance of
payments is affected in turn by the changing nature of
the international monetary system" (Khan, 1991:59).
2 cited in B. Rogers (1976) p97 For US investors, the
risks were very favourable, as confirmed by Fortune in
1972: "Capital (in SA) is not threatened by political
instability or nationalisation. Labor is cheap, the
market is booming, and the currency hard and
convertible." Cited in Milkman (1982) p438
3 In 1969 SA was responsible for 68.8% of the world's
production of gold, according to the Minerals
Yearbook, 1969, US Department of the Interior.
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Although the IMF was a crucial source of funding to
offset the balance of payments deficits that plagued
SA, particularly after 1970, during the recessionary
periods 1974-1977 and 1981 to the present (Padayachee,
1991) it could not remove the source of SA's crisis:
the contradictory nature of capitalism arising from
the limits imposed by working class struggle on
capitalist accumulation and the resistance to the
political institutions imposed by the apartheid state
to counter this threat to its power.
Between 1946 and 1973 the main source of foreign
investment came in the form of either direct or
indirect investment. In the early seventies, however,
foreign investment came increasingly as loan capital
from private international banks (15% in 1974 to 32%
in 197.6). Importantly, these loans and bonds to South
Africa were made, managed or underwritten by large
international banks, which have extended large
quantities of credit to South Africa since the early
1970's. Compared to earlier forms of investment, these
loans were 'untied' and monitoring was almost non-
existent. The inflow of loan capital to South Africa
between 1973 and 1976 was made possible by the greater
availability of recycled petro-dollars after the 1973
oil price hike at a time when investment demand in the
industrialised economies was low. As a result of
political developments in Southern Africa, medium to
long term international credit from private banks
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virtually dried up in the late seventies. But the oil
price increase in 1979, rising price of gold and the
international debt crisis renewed interest in bank
lending to South Africa in the early eighties.
"The slow-down in direct foreign investment does,
however, indicate that foreign investors, motivated by
South Africa's poor economic performance virtually
throughout the period 1973-1985 and by political
instability for much of the time, have taken a fairly
negative view of South Africa's long-term economic and
political prospects. This slow-down in equity and risk
finance placed upward pressure on local interest
rates, in turn forcing domestic borrowers to seek
foreign funds. Especially between 1973 and 1976 and
again between 1982 and 1984, the demand was easily met
by foreign bankers anxious to place money in South
Africa, which seemed a good risk - for this type of
investment anyway - in view of its impeccable debt-
servicing record up to then" (Padayachee, 1991:94).
South Africa's link to the world economy is based
predominantly on its export of precious metals and raw
materials and the importation of capital. As I have
shown above, this and the structural imbalance between
the industrial sectors manifests itself in a chronic
balance of payments deficit. Attempts to protect the
foreign exchange reserves led to monetary restraint
and an increase in interest rates. "The consequent
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increase in the cost of capital slowed the rate of
investment and consumption, and thereby reduced
imports...During the 1970s, at the same time that the
international monetary system was undergoing changes,
South Africa experienced a decline in its terms of
trade as a result of higher import prices,
particularly capital equipment, and fluctuating prices
of primary commodity exports...At the same time South
Africa experienced a relative decline in direct
foreign investment...as the international,division of
labour changed" (Khan,1991:62). These developments put
pressure on the balance of payments. The vulnerability
of thee current and capital accounts is a consequence
of the situation in which "South Africa's place in the
international division of labour has not changed from
being a raw material supplier" (Khan,1991:72).
Between the period 1970 to 1984, the proportion of
direct foreign investment to total foreign investment
declined from 68% to 39%. The growth of the Eurobond
and Eurocurrency market provided easier access to
international liquidity. The SA state's expenditure on
strategic infrastructural development was financed
through untied loans from these markets.
Liberalisation policies of the SA Reserve Bank made
possible unrestricted borrowing by private companies
in the early 1980s.
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The increasing emphasis on foreign loans rather than
direct investment underlined the need to export
primary commodities in order to generate foreign
exchange to service the loans. In addition, political
conditions, and the perception of these conditions
overseas, encouraged a tightening of loan conditions
and heightened the threat of loan withdrawals.
3. The 1973/4 world crisis
Expansionary economic policies pursued by the US
government, while it stimulated accumulation on a
world scale, also propelled the world economy into an
inflationary boom. The effect this had on the world
economy was of overproduction in manufacturing (supply
of raw materials could not keep up with manufacturing
production), with surplus capital being redeployed to
speculation on the commodity markets. The oil-price
hike and the general rise of commodity prices in 1973-
4, while it stemmed the boom, resulted in large-scale
transfers of surplus-value across the globe,
particularly between oil importers and exporters. With
its lucrative and relatively secure profit rates, SA
was a prime target for international capital at this
time as a market for high-technology, capital-
intensive commodities.. Commodity price rises
disrupted the international payments system and
industrial countries faced the prospect of large
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balance of payments deficits. However, recycled petro-
dollars, increased liquidity, enabling the financing
of immediate payments deficits, easing pressure on the
system of international payments. "However the rise in
import prices increased inflationary pressure and
further eroded profits, while the instability of the
international financial system...increased the
vulnerability of national currencies to speculation.
Thus the crisis of 1974 precipitated an unprecedented
crisis of profitability, and presented national
governments with the pressures of domestic and
international monetary instability" (Clarke,
1988:345).
The nature of the South African economy's insertion
into the world economy, with its high propensity to
import capital and export primary commodities, meant
that the world crisis had immediate consequences for
the SA economy. South Africa, along with other
'
economies faced the prospect of either pursuing
restrictive policies to cushion the inflationary
effect of rising import prices, or to pursue
expansionary policies to maintain profitibility. The
options open were primarily a function of the balance
of class forces: "While the former strategy would
squeeze domestic profits further, provoking a sharp
recession with rising unemployment and the liquidation
of weaker capitals, the latter strategy threatened to
precipitate an inflationary spiral. The policies
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adopted were determined primarily by the financial and
political pressures to which the various national
governments were subject. The outcome of such policies
depended not so much on the policies adopted, as on
the course of the industrial and political struggles
that it un/eashed u (Clarke,1988:346 - emphasis added).
The expansion of productive activity in SA was largely
financed by inflation. Beginning from the fifties,
"the monetary system was restructured to facilitate
high levels of government borrowing at low interest
rates, even though the new arrangements hampered the
state's ability to control growth in credit extension
by banks and in the money supply. Reinforced by rising
prices in its major trading partners, the advanced
capitalist countries, inflation became a structural
feature in South Africa and this became extremely
costly to capital from the early 1970s" (Saul and
Gelb,1986:73).
As the state cut back on its expenditure, to stem
escalating balance of payments problems, declining
investment led to a rapid rise of unemployment
'particularly among black workers. The crisis escalated
with the fall in the gold price in the first half of
1975 and the drop of 25% in the foreign exchange
reserves during the first quarter of 1976, prompting
an approach to the IMF for an emergency loan and the
implementation of deflationary policies. These
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developments, however, have important social
consequences. Each moment of crisis reveals
contradictions. The state and capital's strategies to
resolve' them, are circumscribed by the ability of
the working class to resist those strategies
threatening the conditions of labour. The increasing
combativity and organisation of Black workers,
suffering the brunt of rising unemployment, inflation
and restrictions on their ability to enter wage-
labour, inevitably politicised the strategic options
facing the state and capital and posed an important
barrier to the search for alternative capitalist
solutions to the crisis.
4. Economic crisis and mass struggle
The period leading up to the mass uprising of 1976 was
already revealing the critical state of the SA
economy. But it was also showing that the fate of the
economy is at the same time a barometer of the growing
intensity of the class struggle. With the growing
intensity of class struggle, and the resultant
barriers placecton_capital accumulation_by the working
class, the contradictions arising from the structural
imbalance of the economy intensified. Thus, despite
declining GDP and GNP and unfavourable terms of trade,
government spending accelerated because of the
necessity to invest more in repression in an attempt
to impose political conditions on the working class
153
that would ensure its political and economic
domination.
With the Portuguese coup of 1974 and the subsequent
collapse of Prtuguese colonialism in Africa, the
stakes were raised for foreign investment in SA. At a
time of global recessionary conditions and the sharp
drop in the gold price in August 1975, SA's terms of
trade remained unfavourable. The inability of
manufacturing to compete on the world market further
emphasised the predominance of the primary sector in
the economy.
Attempts made by the Reserve Bank to overcome the
economic difficulties by tighter monetary control
through increasing the bank rate and the minimum
liquid asset requirement, introducing new exchange
control measures and devaluing the rand by 17.9% in
terms of the US$ in September 1975 did not improve
mattefs. Political developments in Angola, Mozambique
and Rhodesia placed pressure on the SA economy that
subverted the policy measures of the Reserve Bank.
Despite attempts to protect it through gold swap
agreements, import deposit schemes and a loan from the
IMF, the balance of payments remained under pressure
with a declining capital account. The attempt to
control bank credit led to a crisis in the banking
sector. In the process, manufacturing production
suffered considerably, devaluation of the rand meant
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higher import costs on top of the impact of the
recession, while domestic recession limits the ability
to raise prices.
What this pointed to was a crisis in the ability of
the SA economy to integrate successfully with the
international economy. It was clear that a 'go it
alone' strategy for the SA economy was not
possible.This path could only lead to financial crisis
and economic decline. Rather, what the economy needed
was to maintain the balance of payments and to finance
the rising deficit in the balance of payments. In
addition, the failure of capital deepening in the
manufacturing industry, meant the continued reliance
on loan capital in the form of foreign investment.
Furthermore, the increases in government borrowing to
finance capital projects was an additional strain on
the financial system. Everything pointed towards the
necessity of modernising the financial system in order
to make possible greater and more efficient
integration of the economy into the world financial
system. The conditions for such integration rests on
financial stability, the reduction of government
borrowing and making possible an expansion in private
sector investment. A restructuring of the financial
sector was necessary for servicing capital
accumulation under the new conditions being confronted
by capital and the state. Financial restructuring is
not just about raising more money. Firstly, it is
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about the allocation of finance. Secondly, it is about
subjecting capital to financial pressure. State
intervention has been expensive and of limited
success. Capital was therefore placed under stronger
competitive pressure in the financial markets.
Thirdly, restructuring is aimed at depoliticising
economic policy. Finally, it is about subjecting the
state to the command of capital.
Throughout this period of crisis for capital
accumulation, a groundswell of working class
resistance to the conditions imposed by capital and
the apartheid state, was growing apace. The
modernisation of the system of labour control under
apartheid, after the political defeat of the working
-
class in the early sixties, made possible the
expansion of manufacturing production. But this
process produced its own counter-tendencies within the
working class. The intensification of labour and the
large-scale displacement of workers with the
introduction of new technology in manufacture,
alongside the economic problems faced by the SA
economy after the sixties boom, resulted in a growing
movement of militancy and organisation, culminating in
the Natal strikes of 1973, which marked the beginnings
of the independent trade union movement and
-
anticipated the mass uprising of 1976.
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The mass action of 1976 was an important moment in the
-
class struggle between capital and labour. In re-
defining the relationship between capital and labour,
the mass action attempted to assert its agenda on the
political and economic relationships defined by the
apartheid state. It set the crisis confronting the
_
South African ruling class on a new level. No more
could the fate of its project rely simply on
immediate, short-term solutions to the crisis; a more
fundamental restructuring of its strategic perspective
was necessary. The resultant impact of 1976 on state
and capital was such that representatives of capital
began to assert and defend, in a more overt manner,
what was seen as the long-term, strategic interests of
capital. Their struggle was aimed primarily at the
threat posed by organised labour and mass militancy.
But, capital was also concerned and mindful of the
danger of the politicisation of economic relations
arising out of the policies and practice of the
apartheid state. As Gerald Browne, the then Secretary
of Finance, was reported to have said: "we have been
hit on all fronts - the depression overseas, the
decline of the gold price, the political disturbances
in Southern Africa and during the past months in
Soweto and other black townships and the reduction of
the capital inflow as a result of these"
(Star:12.04.77). As a result, capital pursued a twin
policy of involvement in social reform measures and
increasing political organisation and agitation in
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favour of reformism and economic activity unfettered
by apartheid regulation. Barclays Bank warned in its
Chairman's statement in 1977, that "unless socio-
political change on an evolutionary basis is actively
promoted by the authorities, the consequence of these
adverse factors could permanently damage the economy
of our country...The attraction of fresh capital from
overseas to alleviate the Republic's capital account
is dependent upon overseas investors being satisfied
that evolutionary change as distinct from
revolutionary change will take place at a reasonable
pace" (Star:20.12.77). Impatient with government
policy and its lack of a reform agenda, capital
attempted to initiate their own efforts in this
direction, to the chagrin of Prime Minister B.J.
Voster.
The political crisis caused by the 1976 uprising, the
resultant militancy and organisation among the ruled,
the agitation for political reform and free market
capitalism within capital, the increasing support for
the economic isolation of SA from the world economy,
all pointed towards the need for strategic realignment
of class forces defining the nature of the apartheid
state. An important precondition for this strategic
realignment is the need to reform the financial system
in order to make possible the allocation of the
finance to implement such reforms and to pressure
capital to restructure, i.e. transmit the pressure of
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global capital to individual capitalists. Financial
reform was fundamental before the state could consider
the general parameters of a strategic realignment.
Thus it was that the agenda of state and capital, in
the immmediate aftermath of the 1976 mass uprisings,
was concerned with the urgency of financial
restructuring.
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CHAPTER FIVE
AFTER 1976: WHERE TO ?
Strategic implications for state and capital of the 1976
uprisings.
The post-Soweto period was marked by intensified efforts
by capital and the state to seek solutions to a crisis
which was becoming increasingly clear could not be
overcome by short-term 'ad-hoc' measures. The political
debates within capital, while they may express
historical divisions arising from particular economic
and political interests, also, and more importantly,
reflected the anxiety of capital as a whole, threatened
by the upturn in working class militancy, to find an
urgent but also comprehensive strategy to ensure its
long-term security.
The economic crisis increasingly manifest after the
sixties boom was one aspect of a social crisis reflected
politically by the politicisation of I ions.
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The social forces which propelled the working class onto
the streets to register their anger against the state in
1976 were also the basis of the economic crisis. The
ruling class had to contend with a situation in which
the working class was responding to the economic crisis
politically. Consequently, the mass response to the
growing economic crisis was not channelled or limited to
the economic sphere (the institutional structures were
not in place to make this possible) but was, instead,
politicised. Disenfranchisement, the suppression of
political dissent and assembly, the legal controls over
trade union organisation and employment conditions for
black workers all contributed towards the immediate
politicisation of the response of black workers to
worsening economic conditions. The forms of domination
and exploitation on which the apartheid state depended
resulted inevitably in a working class response that had
no respect for the illusory boundaries between the
economic' and the 'political'. For this reason, capital
and the state could not confine their strategies to the
economic sphere but were forced to combine their
economic solutions with a long-term political strategy.
In the' absence of a political solution, the only way to
resolve the political crisis was through economic
growth. In the context of South Africa, this meant a
rise in output of manufacturing. For this to be possible
it was necessary to restructure the manufacturing
industry. Thus it was that the immediate political
pressures on the apartheid state brought about by the
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mass uprisings of 1976 was to begin a process of
restructuring the domestic economy. At this stage,
economic growth was the only way to avoid political
reform.
However, a commitment to structural reform inevitably
means confronting the question of how such reforms were
to be implemented. The pressure for structural reform
coincided with the failure of state intervention in the
domestic economy. Lack of funds reduced the ability of
the state to subsidise industrial activity. Underlying
the reform agenda of capital and the state is the
question of how the reform process itself would be
financed. Behind the immediate political pressures faced
by the ruling class, particularly after Soweto, is the
acute financial pressures experienced by the domestic
economy. 1976 brought home to the South African ruling
class that a policy of sustained attrition through
repression is not likely to stem the rising tide of
militancy among the oppressed and, importantly for the
critical state of the South African economy, political
domination ultimately bears financial costs for the
ruling class.
Before examining the responses of capital and the state
to the mass struggles of 1976 in more detail, I will,
firstly, outline the conditions which not only made
adjustments to the class project inevitable but also
imposed barriers to how this was to be achieved.
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1. Rising costs of the apartheid state
The intensification of the struggle between capital and
labour, as manifested for example by the Natal strikes
of 1973 and the mass uprisings of 1976, threatened the
command of capital over labour and in so doing, limited
the ab.ility and the capacity of the apartheid state to
continue to rule in the old way. The consequence of
worker militancy was the intensification of the efforts
of the apartheid state to assert the command of capital
over labour. This was done in a variety of ways. In the
first instance, the state relied on its capacity for
coercion harnessing the police and military to suppress
popular and worker militancy and employing the legal
apparatus to attempt to circumscribe the ability of
workers to increase their independence, mobility and
organisation. On the other hand, the state played an
important role in the expansion of the manufacturing
industry.
The political significance of this can be discerned by
the ways in which the SA state attempted to determine
the quantitative and qualitative character of
manufacturing in order to achieve specific political
objectives. Through the introduction of the policy of
import substitution in 1925, the PACT government aimed
to increase the employment of 'civilised labour'. The
job colour bar of the fifties and the decentralisation
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policies of the sixties were all part of the attempts of
the SA state to shape the development of industry in
order to achieve specific social objectives to ensure
the command of capital over labour. What became
increasingly clear in the seventies was that these
strategies require significant expenditure on state
resources both in their implementation and regulation
and also in dealing with the consequences of such
changes i.e. the cost of dealing with working class
resistance to such measures. It was inevitable,
therefore, that these would contribute to the rising
costs of maintaining the apartheid state. As the
economic crisis worsened, the ability of the state to
afford such expenditure would become increasingly
circumscribed.
The policy of restricting certain occupations to
racially defined groups, the job colour bar, which was
the pillar of the apartheid system and on which the
relative privileges of the white working class depended,
became a fetter on the further expansion of
manufacturing in the sixties in that it narrowed the
'
potential supply of skilled and semi-skilled workers at
a time when there occurred an increasing tendency
towards capital-intensification. Traditional sources of
skilled labour (white workers and European migrants) had
reached its limits. The pace of expansion of
manufacturing could not be met (in the short-term) by
the training of black workers. Furthermore, the
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relatively high cost of white labour, as a result of
enjoying years of favoured status within the labour
market, restricted profitability and the international
competitivity of SA manufactured goods.
According to Merle Lipton, it was the policy of
protectionism which cushioned domestic manufacturing
and kept white workers' wages high. While this may have
been effective in the short-term, "it raised the cost
structure of the whole economy, as expensive SA goods
had to be used in preference to cheaper imports" (Lipton,
1986:240). With the expansion of manufacturing, the
consequences of protectionism was a weakening balance of
payments situation, which, by the end of the sixties
became a serious threat to accumulation.
The Reynders Commission, investigating the problem of
manufacturing, added its voice to the calls for reforms
when it accepted the need for structural changes both in
the organisation of the labour market to enable the
development of skills training among black workers and
to expand the internal market through increasing black
wages.
Added to the structural imbalances in the economy,
international pressure on the SA state to change its
political policies, in the form of economic sanctions,
threatened exports and the ability to attract foreign
capital.
165
In addition, the intensification of mass struggles
against the apartheid state, increased state expenditure
in counter-insurgency measures which included both
repression (security and defence) and reforms to
alleviate socio-economic conditions within the black
population - acknowledged by the state as a prime source
of the problems that led to 1976.
It is this 'total strategy' that was to become, in the
eighties, the essential ruling class response to 1976.
This strategy of reform and repression placed great
pressure on public expenditure at a time when the
government was pursuing ambitious infrastructural
expansion plans.'
Furthermore, given the relatively small tax base, heavy
government expenditure placed constraints on financing
the balance of payments and the budget deficits.
Structural problems in the economy and the crisis in the
• balance of payments in particular, have direct
implications for budgetary and fiscal policies. How the
balance of payments deficit is financed, for example,
will affect the rate of inflation, the interest rate and
the exchange rate. Fiscal policies are subject to
political pressures and require direct intervention.
Rail and harbour developments at Richards Bay and
Saldanah Bay, the oil-from-coal project, the nuclear
enrichment programme and the introduction of television.
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At a moment when the apartheid state is attempting to
de-politicise the domestic economy, calls from capital
against direct state intervention in the domestic
economy in favour of control by the market, were
becoming increasingly persuasive to the ruling class.
Thus, Chief of the Defence Force, Gen. Constand Viljoen,
in 1981: "A basic principle in the revolutionary
(sic)struggle was to remove the sting of the revolution
by making early changes...from a position of
strength...The effort by government to accommodate the
fair aspirations of all in SA was, from a security point
of view, among the highest priorities" (quoted in
Lipton, 1986:246).
2. State and capital's strategies for economic and
political liberalisation
Capital, threatened by events in 1973 and 1976,
increased its political profile by pressurising
government to initiate liberal reforms. It also set up
its own projects, such as the Urban Foundation. As a
contemporary journalist testified: "The year 1976 proved
overseas financial pundits correct: South Africa could
not afford a prolonged recession without devastating
consequences, and alarm bells in boardrooms throughout
the country forced businessmen into the political arena
en masse....The head of a giant international store
chain, Mr M.D. Seiff, warned that hope for an economic
recovery was misplaced unless the government was willing
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to make fundamental changes to basic policy. Foreign
investors were pulling out" (Cape Times: 29.12.76).2
Recessionary conditions were heightening class struggle.
The deterioration in the living conditions of black
workers politicised economic conditions and fueled their
militancy. Soweto was as much a consequence of the
economic crisis as it was a political moment in the
struggle against the apartheid state. The
intensification of class struggle at the point of
production provoked capital to seek a long-term solution
to a problem they saw as endemic. Dennis Etheridge, an
executive of the Anglo-American Corporation, called for
the dismantling of the legal controls that keep blacks
outside the economic and political system: 'Those
restrictions which prevent blacks from participating
equally with whites in the market must go....If we keep
wages low so that we can create as many jobs as
possible, there must be two grave results: firstly we as
an exporting country will not be able to keep pace with
an increasingly competitive world and secondly, the free
enterprise system will be rejected by black people and
eventually overthrown' (Natal Mercury 28.10.80).
2Capital rallied behind the establishment of the Urban
Foundation. Objectives included the improvement of
housing standards, education, community activities,
recreation facilities and job opportunities and the
promotion of homeownership among Blacks.
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The immediate post-Soweto period was characterised by a
division between state and capital over the nature of
-the reform process. To capital, liberalisation of the
economy is a necessary part of the liberalisation of
politics. To the state, its immediate response to Soweto
was a combination of political repression, state-induced
reforms to enable limited and controlled incorporation
of certain sections of the disenfranchised and further
controls over economic activity, including further state
regulation of the financial institutions.
Capital's political project was centered on liberal
reforms to remove SA's pariah status which was
inhibiting foreign investment, whereas its economic
strategies were centered principally around industry
specific interests. The state on the other hand, in
acknowledging the need for political liberalisation
after Soweto (to further the integration of the SA
economy in the world economy), was concerned with the
effect this would have on the general conditions of
capital accumulation within the domestic economy. Given
the political and economic crises facing the state, the
reform process became a matter of necessity. As the
Governor of the Reserve Bank, Dr GPC De Kock, confirmed
later: "Let us be realistic. As a result of unfavourable
exogenous economic and non-economic events since the
early seventies the South African economy inevitably had
to undergo a process of adjustment. Meaningful
compensating', neutralising' or 'immunising' measures
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were impossible. What we did need was 'adjustment' and a
proper 'handling' of the situation... .We only had a
choice between different methods of adjustment, and
between different ways of spreading the adjustment
burden. But that we had to adjust was quite unavoidable"
(De Kock,1986:37).
The political consequences of this process were clear to
the Governor. Reform has to encompass the whole gamut of
economic and political relations defining the apartheid
state if it is to be of any success: "It is fallacious
to think that, irrespective of what happens on the
political front, South Africa can achieve optimal
growth, low inflation, and so on, simply by adjusting
its economic policies, and that it should give a higher
priority to 'getting the economy right' than to
political reform...The close interrelationship between
politics and economics in South africa makes it
imperative for the country to move forward on both these
fronts.
 simultaneously" (De Kock,1989:28).
This realisation by the ruling class, however, only
came to fruition in the latter half of the eighties, in
the period after the Final Report of the De Kock
Commission. It was the consequence of the
intensification of class struggle. The appointment of
the De Kock, Wiehahn and Riekert commissions in 1979,
reflected the presssure of the mass struggles of 1976 on
the state and the efforts of capital to de-politicise
170
economic relations. The De Kock Commission was appointed
in 19713 to investigate ways in which the financial
system and monetary policy could be restructured.
Wiehahn was concerned with developing institutions
facilitating industrial conciliation in the face of the
inability of capital and the state to control worker
militancy and organisation, whereas the Riekert
Commission was concerned with modernising the system of
control over the movement of labour.
Capital welcomed the steps towards reform as these were
steps towards the solution of their own problems of
accumudation. In welcoming the reforms to government
policy consequent to the Wiehahn and Riekert
commissions, Gavin Relly, representing AMIC, saw the
reforms as a necessary step towards making SA
manufacturing internationally competitive: "The creation
of a unitary and non-racial industrial relations system
is an urgent priority for the South African economy and
the extension of registered trade unions to all but
temporary foreign employees is a step in this
direction....Since the early sixties South Africa has
experienced acute shortages of skilled workers. The
creation of a collective bargaining system which
includes workers of all races and will facilitate the
opening of skilled jobs to blacks can ameliorate the
position which becomes critical in times of economic
expansion....the brutal fact is that, unless South
Africa can train and improve its total labour force to
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an efficiency and effectiveness at least equal to that
of its competitors, it will lose out to competition,
particularly from the East, in many fields" (Financial
Mail: 4.4.80).
A similar call for changes in government policy was
made by Gordon Waddell of the Anglo-American Corporation
at a FM investment conference in 1979. He observed that
SA's economic growth would be blunted by the lack of
foreign capital. "Waddell put investment in SA in
perspective by showing that its performance as seen by
foreign investors had worsened. He said a comparison
with more developed primary producers, such as Brazil,
Spain and Turkey, would illustrate that SA had fallen
behind in both GNP and GDP per capita between 1960 and
1974. To Waddell, the acceptance of the proposals put
forward by the De Kock, Wiehan and Riekert Commissions
were imperative to show outsiders that SA was prepared
to change politically and financially" (Financial
Mail:09.11.79).
The changes in class relations as a result of struggles
between capital and labour were of such a nature that
they were perceived as threatening the continuation of
existing social relations. From the point of view of the
ruling class, the situation required new forms of
domination. The consequent restructuring of the form of
the apartheid state in the eighties institutionalised
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these new forms of domination and accumulation. Although
capital attempted to reassert its power through the
apartheid state, the success of its project is not only
determined internally, within the geo-political
boundaries of the apartheid state. The project is also
of regional and global significance - and capital draws
from its resources at all levels. The power of capital
is asserted, in its most abstract form, in the power of
money. • It is in this abstract form that particular
interests of capital are subsumed under the general
interest.
3. The fundamental necessity of financial reform
Because of their visible political impact, much emphasis
has been placed on the Wiehahn and Riekert reforms. It
is my contention however that the investigations of the
De Kock Commission and the restructuring that occurred
as a r,esult of its recommendations were fundamental to
the reform project of capital and the state. It was at
the level of money-relations, the abstract, generalised
expression of capitalist relations, that the apartheid
state initiated the process of reform. The financing of
repression and political reform in the period of
economic crisis that SA faced in the seventies placed
great pressure on the financial system to raise the
funds necessary for restructuring. Financial reforms, to
implement the reform strategy, are fundamental.
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Underlying the state's restructuring of the financial
system was the need to finance the measures necessary to
maintain economic and political stability. Adjustments
to the form of the apartheid state have financial
implications - not simply derived from a 'cost-benefit'
assessment a la Lipton, but more fundamentally as part
of the process of asserting the predominance of
capitalist social relations and the power of money in
society.
In the first instance, financial reforms were introduced
as part of the state's attempt to overcome the endemic
balance of payments crisis. In order to maintain
stability in the balance of payments, monetary restraint
and higher interest rates were introduced to slow down
the rising deficit. Monetary restraint came, in March
1977, with measures by the Reserve Bank to restrict bank
lending by withdrawing the concession to banks which
enabled them to increase their ceilings on certain loans
and advances to the private sector by 1/2-t a month. This
not only raised the cost of capital but slowed down the
rate of investment and consumption. The SA economy went
into recession at the same time as the world economy was
undergoing a process of restructuring. This impacted
directly on the national economy particularly, in
manufacturing, with the rise of import prices of capital
equipment.
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Capital opposed the restrictions on bank lending, seeing
it as a means by which "more funds will be channelled to
the public sector rather than the private sector"
(RDM:31.03.77). 4 But the state's financial strategies
were inadequate for the objectives it wanted to achieve
and occurred at a time of global recession, substantial
infra-structural developments and capital outlays to
public corporations boosting central government
expenditure during which the deficit in the balance of
payments lasted longer than expected. This increase was
financed largely by bank credit and therefore
contributed to the excessive increase in the money and
near money supply.
Political developments in Southern Africa, the demise of
Portuguese colonialism and SA's military involvement in
Angola and Mozambique, placed further pressures on the
balance of payments deficit. The Reserve Bank responded
by tightening monetary policy. But the depressed
conditions worsened, and unemployment rose rapidly.
4 Similarly, the insurance industry, was bracing itself
for further state controls as a result of the Louw
commission into the long-term insurance industry. The
commision recommended wider powers of intervention of
the Registrar of financial Institutions. Donald Gordon,
chair of the Guardian/Liberty Life Group estimated that
"No less than 65% of the cash flows of life insurers and
pension funds for the fiscal year to March 1978, will be
compulsorily appropriated by the public
sector"(RDM:27.5.77).
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In August 1976, the IMF provided a standby facility of
R153m for the purpose of absorbing some of the pressure
on the gold and foreign reserves while the Reserve Bank
makes monetary and fiscal adjustments. This process was
fraught with difficulties as it had a direct impact on
accumulation, as the Reserve Bank Governor testifies:
" The adjustment process made heavy demands on the
domestic economy during the past year. Various business
•
undertakings experienced severe cash flow problems and
the banking system had to withstand severe pressure"
(OGM,1977:5). In the 1977-78 budget the Minister of
Finance increased the minimum prescribed investments for
banks, building societies, insurers and pension funds,
imposed a surcharge on certain imports and increased
indirect taxation.
But political conditions in Southern Africa combined
with a decline in trade credits, decreasing fixed
investment and a decline in the yields from direct
investMent contributed towards a deterioration in the
capital account as a result of the net outflow of short-
term capital and a decrease in the inflow of long-term
capital. The net inflow of capital of R1 664m in 1975/76
and R33m in 1976/77 changed into a net capital outflow
of R1 064m in 1977/78. "The size of the net capital
outflow ...was related to the decrease in foreign
financing of imports as well as political developments
in Southern Africa"(0GM,1978:3).
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The limited success of these short-term measures,
despite the heavy demands on the domestic economy, put
pressure on the need for longer-term strategies. The
government changed track by attempting to restimulate
the economy, incorporating steps to increase state
expenditure on improving conditions in the black
townships by allocating increased amounts for low-cost
housing, extending the period for hire purchase payments
on passenger and commercial vehicles and postponing the
5th phase of the local content programme for the
manufacture of motor vehicles. The ceilings on bank
credit to the private sector were raised by 4% of the
base figures as at 31 December 1975 and an increase was
announced in the circumscribed credit extension to the
private sector which a banking institution may not
exceed without becoming subject to the ceiling
requirements (OGM:1978). The measures were designed to
respond albeit inadequately to the social and economic
conditions of the black working class whose struggle
imposed contraints on state attempts to overcome the
crisis. These were the first tentative steps towards a
combined reform strategy.
Capital continued agitating against state controls. The
forms of regulation introduced wer regarded as undue
inteference in the economy. Capital's reform project, on
the other hand, was aimed at de-politicising economic
relations. Many felt compelled to intervene more
directly in the political process. Bob Aldworth,
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managing director of Barclays National Bank: "Surely
the time has now come to free the capital market in
South Africa from the inhibitions imposed upon it by the
,
captive' market and to allow interest rates freer play
in allocating the available savings resources between
'
the private and public sectors of the economy"
(RDM:22.4.80).
While the process of restructuring the relationship
between the state and capital gathered momentum, the
Reserve Bank was still responding to the short-term
pressures to finance expenditures and the balance of
payments. This created a conflict between immediate
economic pressures and long-term restructuring. This
tension, expressed in capital's exasperation with
existing monetary policy, was strongly captured in a
Financial Mail leader comment:
"The blatant contradictions within this country's
monetary system have suggested for some time now that it
needs a thorough overhaul...For instance, control of the
money supply has required, even during a period of
reduced bank lending, both a tight quantitative credit
ceiling as well as inordinately high bank liquidity
ratios. We have seen the money supply itself fluctuate
wildly from month to month, suggesting that at times the
authorities were not in complete control. Moreover, the
piecemeal implementation of policy has resulted at times
in the rand's international value actually declining
when the trade surplus was approaching record
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proportions. This meant that, while trying to curb
inflation at home via the money supply, we were
encouraging import prices to rise via the exchange rate.
Our peculiar brand of monetary policy has also resulted
in government, which does not need the money, borrowing
at half the price paid by commerce and industry,
investment in which has been lagging" (FM: 8.2.80).
Capital is concerned that the state be subordinated to
monetary constraint and the internationalisation of
capital.
The agitation for monetary policy to be directed by
market forces' instead of direct controls found support
in the interim report of the De Kock Commission. The
Commission's recommendations tended towards favouring a
'managed' float of the rand, a position subsequently
adopted by a government keen to show its commitment to
monetarist policies. In an address to business
representatives in November 1979, the prime minister
stressed that the government's economic strategy, "does
not in any way imply greater government intervention in
the private sector by way of measures of control. My
government not only fully subscribes to the principles
of free enterprise and the market mechanism, but will
apply these principles in practice to a greater extent"
(FM:8.2.80). But the apparent reluctance of the Reserve
Bank to implement this policy made it a target for
attack: "Are we heading towards the trauma of yet
another series of massive and sudden changes in the
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external value of the rand? Is the economy again to be
buffeeed by sharp speculative moves into and out of the
rand, anticipating overnight revaluation or devaluation?
Are the reserves again to be depleted and growth
thwarted by an inadequate exchange rate policy? It is
clear that SA's currency is undervalued. How can it fail
to reflect, even marginally, gold's recent surge? ....a
policy is also not wise that does not allow market
forces to be reflected in prices, which are nothing more
than signals sent by the market. If these signals are
smothered by bureaucratic controls, resources are not
efficiently allocated and the economy, and the people,
suffer. This is happening in SA today and the guilty
party is the Reserve Bank. What make matters the more
galling is that the bank is out of step with governments
own advanced thinking. This is to move away from
controls towards the free play of market forces that
jointly will encourage faster growth and enable the more
effective implementation of official policy"
(FM:8.2.80).
To the Reserve Bank, however, monetary policy was aimed
principally at preventing excessive liquidity in the
economy, a condition which distorts relative interest
rates and therefore the flow of funds in the economy,
increases in the rate of inflation and capital outflows
(RDM:26.5.80). For this purpose, the Reserve Bank has
always resorted to interventionist measures, a strategy
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viewed with disapproval by the rising tide of monetarism
within state and capital.'
While monetarism found ready converts among
representatives of capital, the state's position was
much more pragmatic. Its shift towards monetarism arose
from the failure of earlier policies to deal effectively
with the economic and political problems facing SA in
the seventies and eighties. According to S.S. Brand, the
Chief of Financial Policy in the Department of Finance,
, the shift in policy "has not been simply a matter of
rhetoric, and did not arise in the first place from
ideological views on the merits of different kinds of
economic systems...it arose rather from pragmatic
responses to experience which indicated that, given the
characteristics and resources of the South African
' The monetarist arguments centred on " the wide swings
in bank liquidity and the policy of trying to mop up
this liquidity which is created by exports and
savings.., the current low rates of interest when
inflation is rising, and the control of bank lending,
instead of controlling the monetary aggregates... (and)
central banks intervention in the foreign exchange
market" (H. Fridjhon, RDM:26.5.80)
Michael Parkin (monetarist, leading a seminar on
monetary policy and financial markets in Johannesburg,
attended by Chris Stals, then Dep. Governor of the
Reserve Bank and Jan Lombard, Special Advisor to the
Reserve Bank): "If the Reserve Bank concentrated its
attention on ensuring that the money supply in SA was to
grow at a steady predictable and ultimately non-
inflationary rate, and if free markets were left to
determine interest rates and exchange rates, SA would be
well on the way to rapid, sustainable economic growth
with little or no inflation. With domestic interest
rates determined in the market place there would be an
appropriate allocation of capital from the rest of the
world to SA"(FM:30.5.80:981).
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economy and the aims of economic policy in South Africa,
government involvement and intervention had gone beyond
the point where it was necessary and useful, and had in
many respects become counterproductive" (Brand,
1981;129). The basis for the policy shift, as seen by
Brand, arose from the need to curtail the rise of public
sector capital spending which reached 54% of gross
domestic investment in 1977, the ineffectiveness of
government control measures, and the realisation that
under present conditions, the public sector purse alone
is inadequate for certain expenditure needs, in
particular, housing. But Brand also sees the continued
importance of the role of the state: (1) pressure for
state action to reduce disparities in social services;
(2) underparticipation of sections of the population in
the economy; and (3) international political pressure
and economic sanctions
What was becoming clear to the ruling class, above all,
was that a 'go-it-alone' strategy would simply lead to
continual financial crises and economic decline. The SA
-
economy needs to be further integrated into the world
economy. For this, a long-term strategy needs to be in
place which would maintain financial stability, a cut in
government borrowing and stimulating private sector
investment. A modern financial sector is required to
allow for the servicing of all aspects of capital
accumulation. In other words, a new class project has
become necessary.
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4 De Kock and the triumph of monetarism
The sharp drop in foreign reserves at the end of 1978
brought renewed attention to the work of the De Kock
Commission. While the Reserve Bank argued optimistically
that "the current account was still in surplus and,
despite a continuing outflow of capital, the basic trend
of the net foreign reserves was still upwards", to the
Financial Mail, "The important thing, however, is to
ensure that the mechanisms exist - and economic policies
are pursued - that will help the balance of payments
adjust to a higher rate of growth; in other words, that
will stop the overall balace of payments from weakening
and the reserves from plunging if the rate of growth
accelerates. That, one hopes, is what the De Kock report
is all about" (FM12.01.79:67).
The De Kock Commission's Interim report, released in
January 1979, received an enthusiastic welcome by
capital. Conrad Strauss, MD of Standard Bank saw the De
Kock changes as a "removal of current deterrents
towards non-resident investment in SA. ...Foreign
investors should feel easier about committing their
money to SA. They will be increasingly convinced of SA's
investment merits by the fact that the Reserve Bank will
have to spend less on supporting the rand and can now
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concentrate efforts on stimulating the economy"
(FM:26.01.79). International capital's response was
muted by political conditions: "The overall view of
bankers, stockbrokers and industrialists in London and
the continent is that the most significant part of the
De Kock package is that the broadening of the
securities' rands market will enable foreign investors
to invest in South Africa at a substantial discount.
They cautioned however, that the political situation
remained the most important factor and no technical
changes in the exchange rate nor even large discounts
would encourage the large scale long- term situation
unless there is a turn for the better"
(Cape Times:26.11.79).
To De Kock the success of political reform is
conditional on " the attainment in South Africa of a
well-functioning monetary system with efficient
financial markets and effective monetary and fiscal
policies. We must have an appropriate degree of internal
and external economic stability and a strong rand"
(RDM:04.12.79). Whatever the subsequent fate of the De
Kock Commission, its interim report went a long way in
raising the expectation of the monetarists that their
framework will be embodied in future state policy on the
economy and that the spectre of state intervention in
the economy is fading away.
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CHAPTER SIX
DE KOCK TO THE RESCUE?
An assessment of the Interim Report of the De Kock
Commission of Inquiry into the monetary system and
monetary policy
1. Crisis in the banking system and foreign exchange
markets necessitate emergency measures
The sharp drop in foreign reserves at the end of 1978,
preceded by a period of instability in the banking
sector which resulted in the collapse of the Rondalia
and the Rand banks, focussed attention on the necessity
for reform of the monetary system and renewed the
urgency of the De Kock Commission's task. But the
Commission, appointed in 1978, was only expected to
report to parliament in 1982 at the earliest.
Continuing pressure on the SA economy, however,
necessitated a short-circuiting of this process. The
strategic concern of the ruling class was to ensure the
financial integrity of the apartheid state both
internally and externally. Growing economic and
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political instability was threatening the financial
integrity of the SA state. At precisely the moment when
1r
the ruling class was vulnerable to the threat of
internal opposition, continuing turbulence in the
international economy in the wake of the collapse of
Bretton Woods, meant that South Africa's relation to the
world economy was in crisis. It needed to restructure
the domestic economy in order for it to integrate
effectively with the international economy. At the same
time, SA capital, responding to working class struggles
in the seventies, found it necessary to de-politicise
economic relations under apartheid. It was in the sphere
of monetary policy and the financial system that the
state -sought to restructure economic relations in this
way. Thus it was that the Commission's original tasks
were modified to give urgent attention to the question
of the SA economy's integration with the world economy,
in particular, its exchange rate policy. The search for
strategic solutions to the crisis could not wait for the
full deliberations of the De Kock Commission. As the
Minister of Finance put it, "the abnormal combination of
inflation, recession and balance of payments
disequilibrium experienced in South Africa during the
preceding years", made necessary the release of an
interim report to investigate (a) the money market and
interest rates, and (b) the foreign exchange market and
exchange rates.
1 De Kock Commission, 1978; appendix to the Final Report,
1985:iii.
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1.1 The banking crisis
Developments in the domestic banking sector played a
41.
crucial role in putting pressure on the state to
restructure the banking system. The crisis in the
banking system exposed to capital the volatility and
. fragility of the financial sector in the SA economy and
the importance of restructuring the monetary system.
The immediate cause of the banking crisis was the
collapse of the real estate property market. The boom in
the sixties led to the intensive development of the
luxury property market with the construction of major
commercial properties and up-market shopping-centres.
The scale and ease with which bank credit found its way
into the property market at this time, was a consequence
of the optimism engendered by the boom. As a result,
major banking consortiums invested heavily in the
property market. But the economic crisis, rising
interest rates and the mass actions of 1976, buried the
property developers. Writing on the Glen Anil collapse,
the Financial Mail commented: "the company's problem is
a lack of ready cash caused by the slump in property and
rising interest rates....The residential property market
is in the doldrums partly because of a lack of long-term
finance - a problem caused by inflation - and partly
because of a general lack of confidence in the future -
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a result of the political situation" (FM:14.1.77:63).
The collapse of Glen Anil and the millions of bank
credit further exposed in the Corlet Drive collapse
later, forced state and capital to re-examine the basis
on which their economic and political strategies rested.
1. It exposed the vulnerability of the SA economy to
developments in the world economy and the consequences
of heightened class struggles. It reinforced in a direct
way to the financial sector the consequences of 1976 and
the lack of political and economic reform in an attempt
to de-escalate rising social instability.
2. Given the scale of the exposure of bank credit, and
the number of banks involved, it brought to the fore the
character of the banking industry as a whole and its
relationship to the individual capitalist enterprise.
"The banks should pay more attention to assessing the
changing outlook for industries as a whole, as distinct
from that of individual customers" (FM:29.10.76). The
intensification of competition within the banking sector
and the subsequent large-scale exposure of bank credit,
created a major turbulence in the banking industry;
3. It raised the issue of the role of the state in
protecting the general interest of capital: To the
Financial Mail the answer is simple: "To ensure the
long-term survival of the free enterprise system in
South Africa the best way is not to come to the rescue
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of ailing companies. It is to let them go to the wall"
(FM:14.01.77:64). Henri De Villiers, Managing Director
of the Standard Bank Group, acknowledging possible
,
social and or strategic implications' when a company
collapses, nevertheless, is primarily concerned with the
threat to profits that state intervention may bring: tl if
one asks the state to cushion losses, one is also
inviting the state to put a ceiling on profits which
would represent a further erosion of the free enterprise
system" (FM:14.01.77: 63). Despite the demise of the two
small banks, the state was careful that its policies do
-
not encourage further the tendencies towards
monopolisation in the banking industry.
4. Nevertheless, the property collapse showed, through
the different fate of the small banks to the big banks,
the divide that exists within the banking industry. The
demise of Rondalia and Rand Banks threatened a run on
all small banks, prompting the Ministry of Finance to
intervene and reassure the public: "I have received an
assurance from the Registrar of Finance Institutions
that, according to the information at his disposal, all
other banking institutions are sound and that, if they
receive normal support from the public, the monetary
authorities know of no reason why they should experience
difficulties." (Press statement by the Minister of
Finance, Owen Horwood, Issued by the Dept of Information
at the request of the Ministry of Finance, 2 February
1977) It was not long after this statement that the SA
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Reserve Bank announced measures to assist the small
banks, discounting acceptable securities and providing a
R55 million fund through the NFC with contributions from
V
the big five banks.
5. The banking crisis led to calls for further
regulation and rationalisation of the banking system:
"The first thing that needs to be put right and which
deserves the immediate attention of bank boards - and of
the Registrar - is closer supervision of the quality of
bank assets, not merely the conventional liquid asset
and capital ratios" (FM: 4.2.77:282). "In fact if there
is to be any aid at all (to the small banks) it should
be flanked by a major effort to rationalise the whole
Al•
banking structure. That points to the need to engineer a
reduction in the total number of banks from 51 to a much
smaller number via mergers and consolidations"
(FM:18.2.77:450).
6. The crisis prompted significant mergers and
takeovers. Trust Bank was incorporated into Bankorp, the
Rembrandt group chose this moment to enter the banking
sector for the first time with a 20% acquisition in
Volkskas and negotiated a similar stake in Bankorp and
Volkskas acquired Sanlam's stake in Bonuskor.
7. Intensification of competition: The 60-year old
cartel arrangement between the big commercial banks
(Register for Cooperation - ROCO) collapsed in the face
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of increasing competition with the small banks. Through
aggressive promotion of newer paper (trade bills and
promissory notes) the smaller banks were able to
increase their market share over that of the bigger
merchant banks whose business was traditionally based on
the bankers acceptance market. The dissolving of ROCO
freed 'the big banks from minimum charge arrangements on
the discounting of bills, enabling them to take on the
smaller banks. According to the Financial Mail, "The
picture is of a market that has lost its head."
(FM: 5.12.80) In a matter of days after the dissolution
of ROCO, the Merchant Banking Association convened a
meeting of banks where an agreement was reached to form
an enlarged banking cartel including representatives
from all the banks. Despite the intensification of
competition, all the banks stood united in the face of
possible state intervention: "all the banks, in fact,
have a desire to maintain at least the semblance of an
orderly market, if only to prevent the greater evil of
official intervention to preserve market harmony."
(FM: 5.12.80)2
8. The banking crisis exposed SA to the scrutiny of
international bankers: "Foreign bankers, already wary of
lending to South Africa because of the indeterminate
2 At the same time, the banking sector increased its
share of the savings market, from 39% to 51% between
1971 and 1978, while the building society's share was
declining. (Source: Sunday Tribune 4.11.79)
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political situation, are flocking to this country to
check on their security now that two banks have been
pressed to the wall...These bankers are also giving
close attention to the domestic political situation"
(Star: 20.2.77).
9. State controls under conditions of intensive
competition have simply led banks to bypass controls:
"The official (bank) ceilings have become a farce with
the explosions in bank balance sheet financing through
bills, local and foreign, and promissory notes. Bankers
say that the authorities no longer have any real control
because they have very little idea of what is going on
with the extent of non-bank intermediation" (Harold
Fridjohn, RDM: 5.3.80).
The banking crisis played an inportant political role in
harnessing state and capital for the task of
restructuring the monetary and financial system. It also
brought home, in an immediate and direct way to its
political constituency, the financial consequences of
the apartheid dispensation and the lack of political
reform.
1.2 The significance of the banking crisis
The banking crisis was significant in that it brought
home to capital and the state that the integrity of the
state as an institution with the task of controlling and
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regulating capitalist relations of production depends
on the stability of the currency for the efficient
exercise of its task of continuously expanding the
command of capital over labour. But money-capital in
turn, in its abstract and generalised form, exercises
its power through the state, an institution that is
defined by, and whose power is shaped through, the
relationship between capital and labour. It is the
struggles of the working class that place limits on the
extent to which the state is able to successfully
establish the command of capital over labour, and in
this way too, labour confronts the power of money. In
the banking crisis, money-capital was confronting state
and capital with the contradictions both sought to
overcome. It is not surprising therefore that the state
sought, early on in the attempt at reform, to begin to
tackle the restructuring project at the level of the
money-form. It was in this form that the structural
imbalance of the economy is reflected in its most
abstract and generalised form. Also, the stability of
the money form is essential for the stability of the
state itself. In its task of protecting the stability of
the rand, the Reserve Bank is exercising its central
political function for the state of maintaining its
economic and financial integrity - a notion implicitely
confirmed by W.N.Meyer with his assertion that "For
South Africa, after all, external floating [of the
exchange rate of the Rand] has been the mirror-image of
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the socio-political disorder created at home".
(Mayer, Securities Market no.5,nd:22) "Money-capital not
only confronts particular capitals...but also confronts
the state. The relations between money-capital and the
state is realised through the state's responsibility for
the regulation of the monetary system, and is
institutionalised in the relation between the Central
Bank.. .and the state" (Clarke,1972 65). The De Kock
Commission's task should be seen in this light. The
regulation of the monetary system is concerned with the
general conditions of surplus-value production in the
internal economy and how these conditions are expressed
through the economy's relationship to the world economy.
What distinguished the state's reform strategy from that
of particular capital, was that the state was concerned
that liberalisation should not disrupt the existing
institutionalised relationships within the system of
administration and regulation. From this perspective,
limits need to be imposed on inter-capitalist rivalry so
that the larger goal of apartheid social-engineering
could be fulfilled and that those institutions and
economic units which have contributed over the years
towards this goal should not suffer unduly from such
liberalisation. While the De Kock reforms did see a
movement towards monetarism, the financial strategies of
the state remained pragmatic despite its monetarist
rhetoric. On the other hand, the response of capital to
the movement for reform was shaped by the concern of
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particular capitals, worried about the specific
interests and fate of their industries in the reform
process.
To summarise, the deepening crisis of the SA economy was
reflected in its money form, as, firstly, a crisis of
the balance of payments, and secondly, as a crisis of
the banking sector. The money form of the crisis
,
reflects the crisis facing capital in SA at its most
abstract, generalised level. The failure of
manufacturing to fully integrate the SA working class
under the command of capital not only resulted in a
financial crisis, but also reimposed the centrality of
the power of money as the way for capital and the state
to assert the command of capital over labour by imposing
capitalist social relations in its money form. The
balance of payments crisis, as I have argued earlier, is
a consequence of the structural imbalance between the
various sectors of the economy and reflects the nature
of SA's relationship to the world economy. Within the
domestic economy, the crisis of South Africa capitalism
found expression in a banking crisis that led to the
collapse of certain banks and calls for the
restructuring of the banking system. It was this crisis
in the domestic banking system that underscored the
urgency of and galvanised the state into taking
immediate steps to restructure the monetary system. In
its quest for a long-term solution to the crisis, the
state was not allowed the luxury of suspending short-
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term measures to deal with immediate problems. The
dynamic of the crisis as a moment and a movement of
class struggle, determined the constraints and the
priorities of financial and monetary policies.
2. Crisis in the foreign exchange system
The Interim Report investigated the money market and the
foreign exchange market. In doing so, it traced the
recent history of the rand in relation to the
international currency market and the international
financial system, in particular the consequences of the
dollar-pegging of the rand.
With the Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971 the
capitalist economies realigned their exchange rates,
including a devaluation of the dollar. In tandem with
this adjustment, SA devalued the Rand by 12.28%. The
Rand devaluation was also aimed at broader objectives:
to raise the rand income of exporters of primary
commodities and gold, to improve the competitiveness of
domestic secondary industries, thereby stimulating
production and investment, to increase government
revenue and to make the general monetary and financial
climate more conducive to economic expansion"
De Kock1,1978:5) However the subsequent instability of
the international currency exchanges reflected the
failure of the system of fixed exchanged rates. This
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system was later abandoned in favour of 'floating'
exchange rates.
International monetary reform eventually led, in April
1978 to the Third Amendment to the Articles of Agreement
of the IMF. This allowed each Fund member to choose
whether to adopt free-floating, managed-floating or
pegging of its currency. These reforms in the
international financial system put great pressure on
those countries without the necessary foreign exchange
markets in place to fully integrate with the
international financial markets. This applied
particularly to SA, where the rand has been pegged to
the US dollar since 1971. Dollar-pegging was seen as
necessary because of the absence of a developed foreign
exchange market in SA. As a result of wide currency
fluctuations, this policy was changed in June 1974 to
one of 'independent managed floating' of the rand in
order to more closely reflect changes in South Africa's
underlying balance of payments and domestic economic
situation'(Ibid:5). 3 This did not however prove very
succesful, the fate of the rand remaining effectively
tied to the fluctuations of the US dollar, leading, in
September 1975 to a further devaluation of the rand.
The Commission believed that while rand depreciation may
increase inflationary pressures on prices and costs,
3 from a statement by the Min. of Finance, 1974.
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under certain circumstances it could be a stimulus to
economic growth. It would raise the rand revenue of the
mining industry and other exporters. This in turn would
stimulate consumer spending and fixed and inventory
investment. Accordingly currency depreciation was
considered by the commission as a possible method to
stimulate the economy without placing immediate pressure
on the balance of payments. But the price that would
have to be paid for this is a higher rate of inflation.
Under a floating rate system, the exchange rate tends to
be an internal rather than an external influence on the
balance of payments and the domestic economy. "It is no
longer in the first instance a matter of analysing the
likely effects of a devaluation or revaluation. Rather
it becomes a question of how the different economic
variables, including the exchange rate, would react to
given changes in economic policy or to specific natural
economic developments" (Ibid:12).
In a system of free or managed floating therefore, a
different approach to the relationship between exchange
rates and other economic variables is required in
contrast to a system of stable but adjustable exchange
rates in which the exchange rate is seen as a policy
instrument which is applied externally (as in the case
of SA). With the move towards floating currencies among
the major capitalist economies the inadequacies of the
exchange-rate system in SA was exposed. As a result, the
Commission concluded, "The essence of the problem is
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that the present system, based as it is on a relatively
fixed dollar pegging in a relatively undeveloped foreign
exchange market, is not conducive to the attainment of
the optimum combination of economic growth, balance of
payments equilibrium and internal economic stability"
(Ibid:13).
3. Deficiencies in the financial system
The banking crisis exposed the undeveloped character of
the SA financial system. While the expansion of
manufacturing in the 1950's and sixties led to a mining-
led restructuring of the financial system, by the end of
the sixties, given the changes in the global economy and
the political and economic crisis confronting the SA
state, the financial system proved inadequate and was
straining with the pressures on the economy.
The need for restructuring the financial system arose
from the transformations that were taking place in the
international foreign exchange markets. The dependent
nature of SA manufacturing on the importation of high-
technology capital goods requires an efficient financial
system able to provide a fully integrated service for
effective international trade and financial relations.
This, the present system was not able to provide.
Fluctuations of the rand exchange rate, pegged to the US
dollar, capital-flight at every occasion of political
instability and the banking crisis contributed to the
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instability of the rand. Given the politicisation of
-
economic relations in SA, an unstable rand reflects
directly on the state and its institutional
responsibility for ensuring constant reproduction of the
social relations necessary for the production of surplus
value.
The De Kock Commission was appointed to investigate the
efficacy of the financial system. This was necessary so
that new strategies could be developed to ensure
continuing capitalist production and accumulation. The
Interim Report outlined the deficiencies in the
financial system. These included: (i) The absence of an
active spot foreign exchange market in which currencies
are bought and sold for immediate delivery. Without this
a system of free or managed floating is not possible,
and the Reserve Bank is obliged to continue pegging the
rand or to fix the rand-dollar exchange rate
administratively. Often maintenance of the stability of
the rand-dollar exchange rate is done at the expense of
economic growth targets or steps to reduce unemployment,
limiting the ability to overcome the social consequences
of the economic crisis. With the existing system, there
is a tendency for changes in the balance of payments to
be reflected immediately in the level of the foreign
reserves and not in changes in the exchange rate. In an
international currency market where the difference
between the 'spot' (currencies bought and sold for
immediate delivery) and 'forward' (currencies brought
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and sold for deliveries in the future) pricing is part
of everyday international financial transactions, the
absence of a developed spot market is a major
deficiency. (ii) The absence of an active spot foreign
•
exchange market hinders the development of a proper
forward exchange market. South Africa has "an
administered forward exchange 'market' which is
relatively undeveloped, artificial and even more tightly
restricted by exchange control regulations and rulings
than the spot market" (Ibid:15). (iii) The relatively
high spreads between mandatory buying and selling rates
for foreign exchange. These wide margins have tended to
divert foreign exchange dealings involving rands to
overseas markets. (iv) The present exchange rate system
relies too heavily on a system of exchange control which
is not effective nor efficient enough. It is not able to
protect the official reserves against erosion and can be
circumvented, legally and illegally. (v) The existing
system "constitutes a serious deterrent to the inflow of
capital into the country from abroad. A non-resident who
wishes, for example, to invest directly in new plant,
equipment, construction or property in South Africa, has
to transfer his foreign currency into rand at the
official exchange rate, but if he subsequently wishes to
repatriate these funds, he either has to invest the
funds in question in special government securities for
seven 'ears, or has to transfer the funds out of the
country at the so-called 'securities rand' rate, which
201
for some time now has been standing at a discount of
between 30 and 40 per cent against the official rate"
(Ibid:17).
It was clear to the Commission that the existing
financial system was not only subject to internal
strains but was also not able to keep up with existing
developments in the international financial system. The
result has been chronic deficits in the balance of
payments, inflation, rising interest rates and
decreasing foreign investment.
4. The De Kock Commission's emergency reform proposals
The Commission confirmed the necessity to restructure
the foreign exchange system. It recommended "a unitary
exchange rate system under which an independent and
•
flexible rand finds its own level in a well-developed
and competitive spot and forward foreign exchange
markets in South Africa, subject to Reserve Bank
'intervention' or 'management' by means of purchases and
sales of foreign exchange (mainly U.S. dollars), but no
exchange control over non-residents and only very
limited control over residents" (Ibid:18). The
recommendation was not for immediate abolition of
exchange control, but rather to introduce a transitional
measure to enable gradual movement towards the market
determination of the rand exchange rate.
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This transitional measure would include "the expansion
of the existing dual exchange rate system in South
Africa into a more developed and formal system with a
managed, market-determined rate for an independent and
flexible 'commercial rand' and a more freely floating
rate for a 'financial rand'" (Ibid:23). This would
require the development of an active spot foreign
exchange market, the cutting of the rand-dollar link, so
allowing the market to determine the exchange rate,
improving the forward exchange system and changing the
V,
securities' rand into a 'financial' rand by extending
its use for both residents and non-residents.
4.1 The analysis on which the proposals are based
How did the Commission motivate their proposals? What
were their main concerns? Firstly, the Commission saw
its recommendations as a step in the 'depoliticisation'
of the exchange rate. Under the financial system in
operation at the time, any change or lack of change in
the rand-dollar rate could be seen as the result of an
-
administrative act for which the Minister of Finance is
ultimately responsible. Under the system envisaged by
the commission the rate would largely be determined by
market conditions subject only to the intervention of
the Reserve Bank. Secondly, the proposed system would
help sustain the gold and other foreign reserves.
Protecting the exchange rate of the rand from
depreciation under the present system requires the
203
unlimited selling of dollars from the reserves, which
reflects immediately on the level of the reserves. With
•
the proposed system, greater flexibility is possible in
either allowing the rand to find its own level on the
market or to prevent or limit the change through
intervention. According to the commission this would
better enable the Reserve Bank to deal with pressure on
the reserves from balance of payments disequilibrium.
Thirdly, the proposed system was designed to counter
speculation in capital movements: "In the existing
political climate of Southern Africa it is only
realistic to expect substantial fluctuations from time
to time in business confidence, as a result of
alternating adverse and favourable developments...Under
the proposed new system...any speculation against the
rand produced by such fluctuations in confidence could
be borne, in part, by the exchange rate rather than by
the reserves, and after a certain point the speculation
should cease to be a serious problem" (Ibid:21).
Fourthly, the commission saw its proposals as a means of
rationalising the exchange control system and
simplifying its procedures. It is acknowledged that, in
the long run, capital outflows cannot be completely
blocked. The intention rather, is to allow the exchange
rate to reach an appropriate level, at any given time,
that would discourage capital outlow. Lastly, the
proposal was seen as allowing greater independence in
the application of monetary and fiscal policies. "This
increased freedom and independence is particularly
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important in an open economy like South Africa which is
often confronted by a so-called 'conflict' situation,
i.e. a situation in which the defence of a fixed rand-
dollar peg requires restrictive monetary and fiscal
policies at a time when the domestic economic situation
calls -for expansionary policies" (Ibid:21).
The commission was clearly aware of the political
consequences of monetary policy decisions and
recommended a restructuring of the system in such a way
that it could respond more immediately and flexibly to
growing pressure from working class struggles.
4.2 State and capital's response to the Interim Report
As a result of the Interim Report, the foreign exchange
market, was suspended from 24th to 29th January 1979 in
order to effect the following restructuring:
(i) The removal of prescribed exchange rates in the spot
and forward markets; and
(ii) Change to 'market oriented' forward dealing rates.
The significance of these measures needs to be put into
perspective. Even though these reforms came at a
favourable time for the SA economy, it was not as
radical a restructuring as suggested by the political
rhetoric of the time. Capital heralded these measures as
a fundamental step in the right direction, but the
details of the actual measures left the foreign exchange
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system relatively unchanged, as confirmed by a
spokesperson of Barclays National Bank Limited: "The
implementation of a few well-chosen concessions to the
'free market' lobby has created an impression of
liberalisation while the fundamentals of exchange
control remain unchanged" (Connor, 1979:2) 4 Although the
prescribed rate had been removed, the Reserve Bank was
still determining the Rand/Dollar rate through pegging
it with the dollar. Connor reiterates the view within
certain sections of capital that the Reserve Bank is
constrained by the political uncertainty in SA. The
political tendency in favour of administrative control
remain a strong tradition within the apparatus of the
state. A reflection of this is the Reserve Bank's active
and constant control of the foreign exchange market
primarily as a result of its role as the provider of
dollars through gold bullion sales. The Reserve Bank is
constrained by the current size and composition of the
gold and foreign exchange reserves to give the banks a
bigger,, share of the turnover in foreign exchange as
recommended by the Interim Report. Because of its
strategic importance, the Reserve Bank is hard-pressed
to relinquish control.
One immediate concern of bankers however, was the
restrictions placed on their participation in the
tA.W. Connor, The South African foreign exchange market
six months after the Interim Report of the De Kock
Commission', supplement to Barclays Business Brief,
August 1979.
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foreign exchange markets because of the domination of
the Reserve Bank. A consequence of this was the
intensification of competition and inter-bank rivalry in
order to maximize their profits on foreign exchange
dealings: "Probably one of the reasons why this over-
competition takes place is because the volume of foreign
exchange handled by the private banking sector is
restricted. Too large an amount bypasses the the market
by going straight to the central bank which does not yet
participate on a continuous ongoing basis with the
private market."' The relatively small size of the market
means -that the supply of foreign exchange is
insufficient to service the spot demand of the banking
sector. 6 Connor approaches the De Kock Commission's task
pessimistically, particularly because he is aware of the
political conditions within which the financial
restructuring is taking place: "So far they have only
come half-way through their calculations of the series
of simultaneous equations which constitute the country's
financial maze. If the next step can be taken, South
Africa' parochial monetary system could become a
significant force in the international financial world.
5 P.J. Liebenberg, The exchange rate system from the
vantage point of a private banker' in Lange et al, The
Financial Rand, University of SA, Pretoria, p25.
6 The gold and foreign reserves stood at $3 billion, of
which $570 million is held in currency and the rest in
gold bullion. A spot market would rapidly absorb this
liquidity forcing the Reserve Bank to sell more bullion
for dollars, a situation that would dramatically affect
the gold price and consequently, the rest of the
economy.
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Whether that would be beneficial for South Africa and
whether it could be achieved without an improvement in
the country's international respectability would seem
doubtful" (Ibid:5).
This was by no means the only response from capital. On
the whole capital welcomed the report as heralding a
strategic adjustment that they regarded as necessary for
the long-term survival of the capitalist system in SA.
But despite the Commission's cautiousness in
implementing their long-term proposals, the government
did not support the implementation of the full interim
package as was envisaged. Indeed it became clear that
the divisions within state and capital over strategic
perspectives had not been fully resolved. Through its
public rhetoric the state committed itself to
liberalisation. Yet it diluted the proposals in practice
by selectively implementing parts of the package. The
banks for example, saw their profits on foreign exchange
dealings (in the period immediately following the
implementation of free markets policy) plummeting
because their margins were reduced from 0.5% (the
spread previously allowed by the government) to 0.1%, in
one of the most lucrative parts of the banking
operation. Barclays MD, Bob Aldworth, is quoted as
remarking: "Our level of profit on foreign exchange will
never be what it was before" (FM: 2.2.1979:301).
The Interim Report had proposed allowing the banks to
handle the Krugerrand and diamond export earnings which
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would have compensated for the drop in profits from
foreign exchange. But, as the Financial Mail points out,
allowing the banks to do this would simply increase the
dominance of the two big banks, Barclays and Standard,
as both the Chamber of Mines and De Beers do their
business with these two banks.
To De Kock the success of political reform is
conditional on "the attainment in South Africa of a
well-functioning monetary system with efficient
financial markets and effective monetary and fiscal
policies. We must have an appropriate degree of internal
and external economic stability and a strong rand"
(RDM:04.12.79). While the Interim Report attempted to
respond to all the pressures on the financial system in
SA strategic differences continued to plague state and
capital, limiting and conditioning the steps that were
seen tb be necessary to overcome the crisis. The
intensification of working class struggles in the 1980's
made this process even more difficult.
4.3 A triumph for monetarism?
Acknowledging the necessity for a new class project did
not come easy to the SA ruling class. It required the
mass action of 1976 to force a strategic re-alignment.
Until then, the ruling class, united in their
committment to the capitalist process of valorisation,
remained divided over the political form of the state
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and how best to ensure the continued reproduction of
surplus-value. These divisions, arising from the
conditions of accumulation: inter-sectoral competition,
a shrinking internal market, low labour productivity and
the lack of international competitivity, had
implications for both the political form of the state
and SA's strategic location within the world economy as
the continuation of a policy of apartheid was
threatening the flow of foreign investment.	 But such
inter:sectoral rivalries can only be understood as part
of the overall process of capital accumulation in which
the contradiction between capital and labour is
fundamental. A new class project is not only the product
of inter-capitalist struggles and consensus, but arises
from a moment of the capital-labour relation. A moment
in the SA class struggle during which the black working
class has achieved a level of combativity and
organisation that could no longer be contained by the
mere application of state force.
It was the rising power of the working class in the
seventies that increasingly circumscribed the ability of
capital and the state to overcome the crisis it was
facing politically and economically.. In addition,
restructuring of the global economy was exposing and
heightening the undeveloped nature of SA's integration
in the world economy, subjecting the rand's exchange
rate, financial and trade relations and the
administration of the financial sector to major strain.
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In this sense the battles at the workplace and in the
-
townships had its counterpoint in the struggles of the
ruling class, internally (and externally with the
centres of world capitalism) to formulate a viable
strategy for the continuation of capital accumulation in
South Africa.
The initiatives that were taken to restructure the
financial system was an important step towards reforms
in the political sphere at the level of the state. By
restructuring the financial system and introducing
monetary reforms, it was hoped that the pressure on the
domestic economy and the foreign exchanges could be
reduced. Such structural reform was intended to
facilitate and deepen the economy's integration in world
markets. At the same time, financial reform was aimed at
curbing state expenditure. The need for these reforms
arose from the failure of the apartheid system of
administration and regulation to continue capitalist
accumulation without limits. That the working class can
impose limits on this process was forcefully
demonstrated by the events of 1976. The appointment of
the Commission was the state's attempt to overcome the
crisis as a result of the limits imposed by working
class struggles. While the reforms did not, in
themselves, solve the problem, they did set a new
framework for accumulation. The politicisation of
economic relationships under apartheid became a serious
impediment to capital. The state after 1976 acknowledged
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the need to depoliticise economic relationships. It was
the task of the Commission to formulate a strategy for
financial reform that would facilitate this process.
Monetarism was the ideological framework within which
this transformation was placed.
The De Kock Commission's Interim report was seen as
further confirmation of a movement towards monetarism,
in which interventionist economic and financial policies
would be replaced by the rule of the market. To capital,
the Interim Report was further confirmation of its
struggle to reduce state intervention in the economy. To
the financial sector the Report was important in the
drive to modernise the financial system in South Africa,
necessary for the successful integration of the economy
to international financial and trading markets and
opening up the domestic economy to foreign investment.
Conrad Strauss, MD of Standard Bank, for example, saw
the De Kock changes as a "removal of current deterrents
towards non-resident investment in SA. ...Foreign
investors should feel easier about committing their
money to SA. They will be increasingly convinced of SA's
investment merits by the fact that the Reserve Bank will
have to spend less on supporting the rand and can now
concentrate efforts on stimulating the economy"
(FM:26.01.79). On the other hand, international
capital's response was muted by its assessment of
internal political conditions:"The overall view of
bankers, stockbrokers and industrialists in London and
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the continent is that the most significant part of the
De Kock package is that the broadening of the
securities' rands market will enable foreign investors
to invest in South Africa at a substantial discount.
They cautioned however, that the political situation
remained the most important factor and no technical
changes in the exchange rate nor even large discounts
would encourage the large scale long- term situation
unless there is a turn for the better." (Cape
times:26.11.79) This position underscored the necessity
for a long-term solution that goes beyond responding to
immediate pressures and which embraces both economic and
political aspects of the crisis.
Whatever the subsequent fate of the De Kock Commission,
its interim report went a long way towards raising the
expectation of the monetarists that their framework will
be embodied in future state policy on the economy and
that the spectre of state intervention in the economy is
fading away: "When the business history of 1979 comes to
be written, this year, which is sliding to a close, will
probably go into the records as the year in which South
Africa re-discovered the private enterprise
system...Psuedo-socialism was thrown on the ash-heap as
South Africa lined itself on the right with capitalism,
free enterprise and a market-related economy. At least
this is what our political lords and masters have been
preaching ever since the de Kock Commission's interim
report, brought a breath of fresh air into what had been
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a suffocating hot-house atmosphere" (Harold
Fridjhon,RDM: 31.12.79).
Presenting the development in this way however, gives
undue credence to the rhetoric of the monetarists, keen
to exagerate the shift in their favour. This also served
to paint a picture to foreign investors, that, at this
stage at least, went beyond the bounds of the possible
in terms of immediate state policy. This is true both in
relation to the extent of financial restructuring as
well as the steps taken to combat political instability.
Notwithstanding its monetarist rhetoric, the financial
strategies of the state remained largely pragmatic. But,
what is important, however, is that the Interim Report
strongly resonates with the urgency of the need for a
ruling class response to working class struggles. The
hesitant move towards monetarism is the first step in a
process of restructuring the relations between capital,
the working class and the state. This restructuring is
an attempt by capital and the state to overcome the
economic and political crisis by seeking to reassert the
power of capital over labour. The extent to which this
project becomes successful as it unfolded in the
eighties and nineties will be investigated in later
chapters.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Financial regulation, restructuring
and the state 1980 - 1985
,
1. Introduction
This chapter examines the tendencies and counter-
tendencies which shaped the restructuring of the
financial sector from the implementation of the first
set of recommendations of the De Kock Commission, to the
Final Report of the commission in 1985.
What the actual course of this process of restructuring
demonstrated was that once formal moves were set in
motion to embark upon a process of restructuring, the
nature of the process itself could not be pre-determined
but had to be fought for against conflicting class
forces and the limits imposed by the money form. The
struggle to impose new strategies of financial
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regulation itself was a site of contestation between
state, labour and capital.
Monetary reforms and the restructuring of the financial
sector following the First Interim Report of the De Kock
Commission was a central part of the process in which
the state and capital responded to the crisis of
accumulation. Restructuring the financial system was
necessary to regulate accumulation in a situation in
which the mechanism of accumulation itself was changing
in response to both growing working class struggles
internally and the global crisis of capitalism.
Financial restructuring is not separated from the
process of capitalist restructuring of accumulation. In
this sense, the De Kock reforms of the financial system
and monetary policy is not about financial restructuring
separated from accumulation, but rather, a process for
enabling the continuation of accumulation in changed
(and changing) circumstances.
The hesitant and piecemeal way in which the De Kock
recommendations were implemented did not satisfy the
pressure for financial and monetary reform, it simply
raised the stakes, particularly after the public
endorsement of 'free enterprise'by the Prime Minister in
his address to business in November 1979'. To follow
through this commitment insofar as it concerns the
1 See Financial Mail 8 February 1980, p455.
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financial sector meant far-reaching transformations in
the regulation and administration of monetary policy and
•
the financial system.
The significance of the financial restructuring process
lay in the attempt to provide a new framework for
accumulation in South Africa that would serve to de-
politicise economic relations by further subjecting the
state to the 'logic' of capital. The questions of
concern are two-fold: (i) What does financial
restructuring between 1980 and 1985 reveal of the nature
of accumulation in SA in this period? and (ii) How has
the changing form and function of the apartheid state
been shaped by the changing requirements of capitalist
accumulation?
The efficient administration and regulation of financial
flows within the economy is essential for the smooth
functioning of capitalist production and distribution.
It sets the institutional parameters within which money-
capital is designed to function to ensure the efficient
accumulation of surplus value. Financial regulation is
intimately part of the institutional function of the
capitalist state to assert the command of capital and
capitalist social relation within society. Institutional
forms of financial regulation and administration within
South Africa are a function of
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(i) the historical specificity of the development of the
South African state form, particularly its legal and
administrative forms;
(ii) the particularity of capitalist accumulation in
SA, particularly the dominance of the extractive
industry and the dependent nature of domestic
manufacturing.
(iii) SA's relation to the global economy, particularly
the regulation and administration of global financial
flows.
The institutional forms of financial regulation and
administration are important, not in themselves as
institutions, but rather as expressions of the power of
money, the most abstract form of capital. The forms of
regulation and administration institutionalise this
power.- Changes in institutional forms are the external
features of deeper processes created by the dynamic of
capitalist production and the capitalist state form.
Historically, the role of regulating economic relations
under capitalism is seen as the responsibility of the
state. The state is invested with the power to ensure
the constant pursuit of capitalist economic objectives
by imposing the command of capital over labour. But this
objective is constantly undermined by the limits imposed
by class struggles, particularly the resistance of the
working class to the command of capital. The period
after the Natal strikes in 1973 and the Soweto rebellion
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in 1976 was one in which the inherent fragility of the
ruling class's hold on power was once again demonstrated
by working class militancy and organisation. Capital and
the state, in the interest of their own survival,
urgently sought new perspectives and reappraisals of the
existing framework of political rule and capital
accumulation. If there were indications of divisions
within the ruling class in the past, the signs of an
emergent united and militant working class movement
underlined the urgency of a collective strategic
reassessment. Hitherto warring fractions of the
capitalist class reasserted, once again, their common
interest in ensuring the maintenance of capitalist
relations of production on the one hand, and keeping in
check the development of the working class struggle, on
the other. In the words of an Economic Consultant of the
Anglo-American Corporation, "If the free enterprise
system is to survive in this difficult era, it must be
allowed the utmost degree of flexibility to adjust to
changing conditions" (Dickman, 1974:291).
This was the framework within which the overhauling of
financial policy and the financial system took place. A
process set in motion with the appointment of the De
Kock Commission in 1978 and the subsequent dismantling
of the legislative framework of the 1965 Banks Act in
the eighties and early nineties.
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2. Forms of financial regulation and administration:
1980-1985
The SA Reserve Bank
The state's responsibility for coordinating the
administration and regulation of the movement of capital
in all its forms is traditionally the task of the
central bank. In the relationship between the state and
the central bank is institutionalised the state's
responsibility for the regulation of the monetary
system. Whether the bank is legally 'independent' or not
does not fundamentally change the essence of its role as
an apparatus granted the necessary powers by the state
to serve a central role in the administration and
regulation of the economy as a whole. In this respect,
the SA Reserve Bank carries out all the customary
central bank functions, which include:
i. The issuing of banknotes - It has the sole
right to issue bank-notes in SA in accordance with the
Reserve Bank Act of 1944;
ii. Acting as government banker - The bank
administers the accounts of the central government, the
'
Provincial Administrators and other statutory public and
semi-public bodies, institutions and organisations;
iii. Custodian of other banks' cash reserves;
iv. Providing facilities for the clearing and
settlement of inter-bank claims;
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v. Custodian of gold and other foreign reserves2;
vi. Acting as bank of rediscount and lender of
last resort;
vii. Engaging in open market operations. In order
to regulate the money supply or the level and pattern of
interest rates, the Reserve Bank has the discretionary
power to buy and sell government securities in the open
market;
viii.Supervision of the foreign activities of SA
banks3 ; and,
ix. Formulating and implementing monetary policy
in cooperation with the Minister of Finance.
The Corporation for Public Deposits
II.
2 The bank markets almost the whole gold output of the
mining industry on the world markets. From the early
seventies, Krugerrand gold coins have been marketed
internationally by the International Gold Corporation
Ltd.,a subidiary of the Chamber of Mines of SA. Since
March 1979, the foreign exchange proceeds of Krugerrand
sales have been channeled to authorised dealers instead
of the Reserve Bank. As a means of expanding the foreign
exchange market, it was announced in September 1983 that
the gold mines would be paid in dollars instead of rands
for gold purchased from them by the Reserve Bank.
However, due to downward pressure on the rand exchange
rate, this arrangement was revised temporarily to a 50%
payment in US dollars and 50% in rands.
' The Governor of the Reserve Bank is the SA
representative on the Board of Governors of the
Interriational Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
The Bank administers SA's accounts with the IMF. In 1971
the bank became a Member of the Bank for International
Settlements.
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The CPD was establised in 1984 for the purpose of
rationalising and controlling the short-term surplus
funds of the public sector. It is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the Reserve Bank. The most important
depositors are provincial administrations, SA Transport
Services (SATS), Dept of Post and Telecommunications and
the fuel funds administered by the government.
Discount Houses
Discount Houses provide an outlet for the short term
funds of the banking system and invest these in risk-
free, mainly short-term negotiable securities. The
liquidity of the discount houses is guaranteed by the
Reserve Bank. They serve the following functions:
i. Custodians of the ultimate liquidity of the
banking system. The discount houses make possible the
smooth day-to-day flow of funds among the banks,
enabling the banks to work to minimum cash ratios,
knowing that their second line of reserves, call money,
can be mobilised immediately, and that their third line,
bills of exchange, can be held in a portfolio that is
appropriately structured to their expectations;
ii. Provision of short-term finance;
iii. Marketing financial assets;
iv. Assisting in the execution of monetary policy;
The discount houses hold the ultimate liquidity of the
banking system. Any factor causing an outflow of funds
from the banking sector will result in call loans being
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drawn down or assets being sold to the houses, forcing
them to approach the Reserve Bank for accommodation.
Developments in the discount market serve as a barometer
for the state of the financial markets. The discount
houses report to the Reserve Bank on a daily basis. The
market-creating capacity of the discount houses allows
the Reserve Bank to operate in the market place through
the purchase and sale of financial assets (mainly
government securities) with a view to influencing money
and credit conditions.
•
Commercial, General and Merchant Banks
All banks and discount houses are regulated by the Banks
Act of 1965. This act stipulates certain
prudential (capital and liquid asset) and monetary policy
requirements. At the end of 1984 the total assets of
commercial banks amounted to R39 767 million or 68% of
the total assets of the monetary banking sector. The
1985 amendments to the Banks Act, which incorporated
recommendations from the De Kock Commission, made
provision for a new system whereby monetary control over
banks is switched from liquid asset requirements to cash
reserve requirements, while capital requirements will be
based on the risk profile of banks' assets, their
contingent liabilities and repurchase agreements, rather
than being set at some percentage of banks' liabilities
to the public. The Financial Institutions Amendment Act,
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no.106 of 1985, repealed the distinction between
commercial, general and merchant banks.
The Land and Agricultural Bank of SA
The Land and Agricultural Bank was established in 1912
to provide cheap, long-term loans to full-time farmers
and agricultural cooperatives. The Land Bank provides 3
types of loans viz, mortgage loans, charge loans and
advances to defray farming costs.
6. The Development Bank of Southern Africa
The Development Bank was established by the SA
government, in collaboration with the bantustans, in
1983 with its main function being financing developments
in the bantustans.
Finance companies
Finance companies are credit institutions obtaining
their funds from the corporate sector, debentures and
note issues and from their own capital and reserves.
These funds are re-lent in the form of short and long-
term loans, advances, mortgage loans, factoring and
hire-purchasing finance. Finance companies are not bound
by the restrictions in the Banks Act and therefore have
a competitive advantage over banks. The restrictions
imposed on banks by the Banks Act of 1965 (credit
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ceilings and deposit rate control), encouraged the
growth of finance companies, particularly in the 1980's.
At the end of 1980 their total assets amounted to R1 022
million, but doubled to R2 105 million by the end of
1984.
-
Mining Houses
The main functions of mining houses are to develop new
mining projects and to provide managerial, technical,
administrative, and financial services to existing
mines. The most significant development has been the
change in the means of payment for gold by the Reserve
Bank. Until the end of August 1983, mining houses were
paid in rand for gold. On the 5th September 1983, the
Reserve Bank started paying the mining houses in US
dollars. Overnight the mining houses became one of the
..
largest suppliers of dollars on the local foreign
exchange market.
The Industrial Development Corporation of SA
The IDC is a public corporation authorised to finance,
establish and conduct industral undertakings. The IDC
supports the establishment of new industries through
medium-term loans and lease finance for plant and
equipment. The IDC provides credit facilities for
capital goods and services exported from SA and may
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provide guarantees on the importation of capital goods
on medium to long-term credit.
The Small business Development Corporation
The SBDC, established in 1980 by government and private
capital, assists small business by providing finance,
advice, making available business premises and promoting
their .interests.
3. Immediate pressures and the struggle to impose the
rule of money
3.1 The banking system
The crisis in the banking sector in the seventies,
prompted by the collapse of the property market, was one
of the early signs of the economic and political crisis
expressing itself within the financial system. It
provided one of the justifications for the need to
restructure the financial system itself. The banking
crisis provided a focus for all the contradictions of a
capitalism in crisis. The financial reforms introduced
after the First Interim Report which initiated moves
towards 'market' rather than state regulation and
introduced the 'managed' floating of the rand on the
foreign -exchange market, while rationalising and
modernising the structural links with the international
capital and financial markets, were not able to contain
the instability in the banking sector. Instead, it
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intensified competition resulting in further take-overs
and mergers.
In a move towards adopting open market operations as
forms of credit control, the Reserve Bank, from March
1980, introduced stricter requirements on cash reserves,
while changes were made to the liquid asset
requirements. Credit ceilings were raised, and later,
from September 1980, were abolished altogether
(OGM,1980:10). What the Reserve Bank was hoping to see
was for bank credit to be directed towards production
and export rather than consumption. Given the intensity
of competition, the effect of these reforms led to
further 'grey market' operations with banks by-passing
regulatory controls by using other forms of negotiable
paper such as promissary notes and trade bills in an
effort to increase competitive advantage by cutting
rates. These forms of paper were treated as 'contingent
liabilities', and therefore not subject to reserve
requirements.
The growth in 'grey market' activities was also
encouraged by the reductions in the margins allowed for
foreign exchange dealings, one of the more profitable
parts of banking operations. But, ultimately, in a
market that is regarded as 'over-banked', the intensity
of competition threatened banking profits. New
amendments to the Bank's Act which were implemented in
January 1982, made these papers subject to reserve
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requirements, and at the same time, reduced liquid
assets and capital reserves requirements on bankers'
acceptances. The banks, seeing their interests
threatened, formed a cartel to set minimum commission
rates on endorsing paper.
The beginning of 1982 also saw the abolition of the link
between the bank rate and the commercial bank prime
overdraft rate, leaving the banks free to determine
their own prime overdraft rate in the market, subject to
certain legal restrictions on maximum rates of interest
(Natal Mercury, 17.02.82). These adjustments to banking
regulations and operations, were essentially short-term
responses by the state (in the form of Reserve Bank
interventions) to impose its monetary policy on the
banks, in a situation where long-term policy guidelines
for the banks were still being awaited from the De Kock
Commission. Stanbic's Chairman, in his annual report in
1982, gave vent to the frustrations experienced by the
banking sector: "It is a pity that the final report of
the De Kock Commission has not yet been issued. The
financial institutions have to operate in a climate of
continuing change with little in the way of firm policy
guidelines to assist planning, in particular of the
structuring and funding of the exceptionally high liquid
and prescribed reserves demanded of banks in this
country" (Rand Daily Mail, 10.3.82). Indeed, since the
First Interim Report of the De Kock Commission, in 1978,
evidence of significant structural changes in the
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banking sector became more pronounced as shown in
changes in the market capitalisation of the five major
banks (Sunday Times, 1.08.82):
Table 4:
Tienking groups' market capitalisation (R-m): 
1978 1982 kchange
Nedbank 452 530 +17
Barclays 354 500 +41
Standard 334 288 -14
Volkskas 116 198 +71
Bankorp 76 75 -1
Source: Sunday Times: 1.8.82.
As banks respond to increasing competition they are
forced to confront the question of profitability and the
conditions which would give rise to increased returns.
The calls for rationalisation and mergers were getting
stronger:
"A merger between two or more of the major banking
groups would make a good deal of sense because:
Duplication of branches could be eliminated...The return
on assets of South Africa banks - the only true measure
of banking efficiency - is extremely low by world
standards. Rationalisation would help towards raising
the return to higher levels" (Sunday Times, 1.8.82).
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But, in the absence of an overall strategy from the
state,. it was the reality of take-overs and mergers in
the banking sector that set the pace for re-organisation
and rationalisation. Barclays and Standard Banks,
together controlling 54% of hire-purchase and leasing
business, remained locked in a competitive battle in
which high interest rates were narrowing margins (Sunday
Times, 1.8.82). The dispute between Sanlam and Rembrandt
over control of Federale Mynbou and thereby of Gencor,
escalated into a conflict between Sanlam and Volkskas.4
Nedbank became the first domestically-controlled bank to
acquire a US banking license. Barclays and other
commercial banks started entering the home loans market.
Volkskas launched its London subsidiary, Volkskas
International. One of the most significant developments
for SA banking in 1982 was its entry into the
1
international on-line network operated by the Society
for Worldwide Interbank Financial Communication (SWIFT)
(Star, 8.9.82). This made possible instantaneous
computer-to-computer link-up with the international
banking system.
4 "Sanlam and Volkskas were closely allied until 1977
when Volkskas refused to help rescue the ailing Trust
Bank, forcing Sanlam into the banking field. And when
Volkskas launched into the insurance field with the
takeover of Legal and General, it again trod on Sanlam's
toes. Banking sources say Sanlam is now determined to
make its banking operations pay, even if it means
continuing conflict with Volkskas"
(Sunday Express:82.08.15).
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3.2 Adjusting the financial system for social reform:
building societies and housing finance.
One of the crucial areas of monetary policy and
financial regulation that is directly affected by both
inflation and rising interest rates and the
intensification of competition, take-overs and mergers
in the banking sector, and which has a direct social
impact on living standards, is that of housing finance.
In this respect the building societies play a crucial
role. But during this period, "Mortgage bonds are not
only becoming increasingly expensive, they are virtually
unobtainable. Many borrowers are now in a position where
bonds are granted to them only if they provide matching
finance" (Financial Mail:82.08.13).
The response of building societies to this situation has
been to regard themselves as competing for the same
funds as the banks. It is therefore not surprising that
the De Kock Commission had to turn its attention to the
role of building societies. The transformation in the
banking sector also had its parallels in the building
society movement. The distinction between banks
(deposit-taking institutions) and building societies
(non-deposit-taking institutions) was becoming
increasingly blurred, with building societies using more
and more money-creating instruments. In so doing they
were influencing directly the money supply and interest
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rates, consequently subverting the effectiveness of
monetary policy.
Furthermore, the objective of monetary reform was
concerned with the de-politicisation of economic
activity by re-asserting the 'logic' of capital and the
power of money over the state. Among financial
institutions, building societies were still operating
under traditional regulations that were directly
political in the sense that the legal framework within
which they operate allows them to vary mortgage interest
rates directly. In so doing, they are able to influence
the flow of loanable funds to coincide with their
particular interest rather than to that of the economy
in general or to the social consequences of the
particular nature of the housing stock flowing from the
way in which building societies allocate their
resources. The rapidly increasing black population in
the urban centres and the limited and deteriorating
-housing stock in the townships have been identified by
state and capital, particularly after 1976 when capital
took the initiative with the establishment of the Urban
Foundation, to be a major source of social unrest. If
the objective of the financial reform programme is to
de-politicise economic relations, then it follows that
building society reform is crucial. The second Interim
Report of the De Kock Commission, therefore, responded
to important political pressures which were confronting
capital and the state in the early 1980's.
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4. Developing state policies on the monetary
and financial system
4.1 The Second Interim Report of the De Rock Commission:
The building societies, the financial markets and
monetary policy°
The Interim Report set the basis for adjustments to
three aspects of SA political economy during the
apartheid period:
1. Further extension of the new monetary policy and its
regulation to building societies;
2. Reform of financial institutions to accord with the
new monetary policies; and
3. De-politicising the provision of housing finance,
which has been a pillar of apartheid, providing
resources which made highly visible the gross
inequalities between black and white in South Africa.
The structural changes that have occured over the years
have transformed the operations and functions of
building societies. "In view of the Commission, these
5 published by Government Printer on 7 December 1982, RP
93/1982. In the Budget Speech of 30 March 1983, the
Minister of Finance announced the government's
acceptance of the main recommendations of the
Commission. Consequently a new Building Societies Act
was drafted for submission to Parliament.
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changes have unquestionably altered the role of building
societies in the financial markets and have created
certain problems for the monetary authorities for which
solutions must be found if the relevant financial
-
markets are to function properly and if monetary policy
is to be effective."(De Kock 2:57) They are no longer
simply savings institutions but are increasingly
operating as banking institutions. Their profits are not
derived only from personal savings. They actively
compete with banks for the deposits of private and
public corporations and other business enterprises. 6
Secondly, building societies deal with deposits and
shares in such a way that they are treated more as
'close money substitutes' withdrawable on demand or at
short notice, rather than, more traditionally, as
illiquid -  financial assets. Consequently, building
societies have become more sensitive to money market
interest rates, displaying greater fluctuations than
that of capital market interest rates. "The tendency
towards shorter average maturities, increased rates of
turnover, and enhanced de facto moneyness of the
building societies' liabilities would appear to be
explained by two basic forces. Firstly, for many years
now both inflation rates and interest rates have been
substantially higher, more volatile and less predictable
than formerly. (...)A second factor in shortening the
6 At the end of 1980, funds from these organisations
comprised 18.5% of the total deposits and shares of
building societies (Ibid:61).
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average maturity of the building societies' liabilities
has been that the societies have from time to time been
discouraged by the authorities from adjusting their
mortgage lending rates to the extent they might have
wished to in the light of changes in market
conditions"(Ibid:62).
The existing legal and institutional distinction between
building societies and banking institutions in financial
legislation and monetary policy has reduced the
effectiveness of monetary policy by influencing monetary
aggregates and interest rates: "the moneyness of
building society deposits and shares make it a
prerequisite for effective monetary policy that they be
included in at least some of these aggregates, and that
they be subjected to the same broad policy treatment as
similar liquid funds held with banking
institutions"(Ibid:63). The legal conditions within
which building societies operate allows them variable
mortgage interest rates. This flexibility can be
politically problematic: "the perfectly justifiable need
for building societies to increase their mortgage rates
in certain circumstances.. .is not adequately appreciated
by the general public and at times creates socio-
political problems for the authorities"(Ibid:64).
Fluctuations in borrowing rates have deleterious
political consequences because they lead to increases in
home mortgage rates:" This prospect might have the
effects of inhibiting the monetary authorities in their
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policy actions and thereby undermining the
effectiveness of monetary stabilisation policy. It is
therefore important that this dilemma be
resolved."(Ibid:64) Note that the emphasis is not over
concern for providing political alternatives but rather
the need to free monetary policy formulation from
political considerations - as if this is possible!
The distinction between building societies and banks has
produced unequal competition between the two and caused
..
resources to be misallocated. The commission, wholly
swallowing monetarist ideology, asserts that, "the basic
reason why financial markets function best in the
national interest if they are reasonably free,
competitive, active and broad, and if they produce
realistic market related interest rates, is that they
are then conducive to the optimal allocation of
available funds among competing uses. This in turn
promotes sound and rapid economic growth and ensures the
production of goods and services most fully in
accordance with the people's wants, needs and
priorities" (Ibid:65).
The legislative, fiscal and monetary differences between
banks and building societies give building societies a
greater advantage in the competition for funds enabling
them to provide relatively lower housing mortgage
interest rates. This imbalance, according to the
Commission, could create a situation whereby "the
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limited supply of loanable funds in South Africa might
be channelled into the construction or purchase of
relatively luxurious middle-income houses and flats and
an unduly small proportion into real investment in
manufacturing, mining, commerce and agriculture, with
harmful effects in the long run on real economic growth.
Furthermore, within the field of housing itself,
resources might be encouraged, in spite of the current
differential mortgage rates, to flow into luxury housing
at the expense of more modest lower-income
housing."(Ibid:65) The Commission is essentially
addressing here the concerns of the mainly white lower-
middle-class aspirant home-owner hard hit by the
•
economic recession, the main recipient of building
society loans for private housing. In this period very
little funding for black urban housing came from the
building societies, a situation ackowledged by the
Commission: "the main reasons why the supply of lower-
income housing, particularly Black urban housing, has
lagged in the past, clearly lie outside the sphere of
building society activities and largely in the social
and political field."(Ibid:65) But the restructuring is
designed to enable financial institutions, given the
necessary legal and political reforms, to increase the
market forprivate home-ownership among blacks.
The Commission's recommendations, which were
incorporated in the Final Report published in 1985
without any alteration, advocated a gradual
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restructuring leaving the separation of building
societies and banks intact but making building societies
comply with the same cash and liquid asset requirements
as banking institutions. The Commission advocated the
abolition of the prescribed investment requirements for
building societies and relaxation of the restrictions on
deposit-taking activities and mortgage loan
requirements. Capital and reserve fund requirements
should be introduced and built up gradually but not
subject to the requirements of the Banks' Act, retaining
their status as mutual organisations without equity
share capital. To encourage stability in the provision
of housing finance, the Commission recommends that part
of building society finance be raised in the capital
market through marketable debentures with a minimum
maturity of three years. The principal objective of the
suggested restructuring was to accord building societies
"the same freedom as banks and other financial
institutions to quote realistic and market-related
borrowing and lending interest rates, and to vary these
rates freely in response to changes in supply and demand
resulting from the combined operation of natural
economic forces and official monetary policy" (Ibid:73).
To make this possible, "every effort be made to
depoliticise building society mortgage rates and to make
it clear that...all building society interest rates are
basically determined by market forces and not by the
Minisfer of Finance" (Ibid:74). Mindful of the social
consequences of the strict application of this
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recommendation, the Commission allows for a safety
valve, by recommending that "State assistance to ...keep
the cost of housing finance below free-market levels
should be provided in moderation and only when
considered essential for socio-political reasons."
4.2. The Final Report of the De Rock Commission
"The Commission has reached the firm conclusion that, in
the sophisticated financial system that has developed in
South Africa, a market-oriented monetary strategy will
serve the national interest better that any set of non-
market-oriented or 'direct' monetary controls" (De Kock
F: A46). The ultimate objective being "relative
stability of the price level (the primary objective),
balance of payments equilibrium, optimal and relatively
stable economic growth, and a high and relatively stable
level of employment" (Ibid:A46). An intermediate measure
recommended is in the form of target rates of growth for
selected money supply aggregates. A rigid money rule is
however rejected as undesirable given the specific
conditions in South Africa where flexibility is
necessary. If, under certain circumstances interest
rates need to rise to relatively high levels in
sensitive areas' such as housing and agriculture,
"relief should be granted by way of open subsidisation
by the Government of the relevant interest rates
generally or by direct controls on certain deposit or
lending rates"(Ibid:47).
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The market-oriented instruments of monetary policy
recommended are:
1. Public debt management, including public borrowing
policy;
2. Reserve Bank open-market operations;
3. Reserve Bank discount and general accommodation
policy; and
4. Reserve Bank 'intervention' in the spot and forward
exchange markets.
For controlling bank credit, the Commission recommended
the replacement of the liquid asset system by a cash
reserve system and the extension of this instrument to
building societies.
"Monetary policy is in itself no panacea but inevitably
forms part of a more comprehensive economic policy
strategy and has a close interrelationship with many
other types of economic policy, such as fiscal policy,
agricultural policy, commercial and industrial policy,
mining policy, labour policy, energy policy and
transport policy." (Ibid:240) Monetary stability is seen
as a pre-condition for the effective implementation of
these policies.
To sustain the fiscal and monetary strategies introduced
following the recommendations by the De Kock Commission,
amendments to the Banks Act were promulgated. To
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continue the process of change-over to a cash-reserve
system of monetary control, the banks' liquid asset
requirements were re-determined at 20, 15 and 5 percent
of their short-term, medium term and long-term
liabilities to the public respectively. Banks' capital
requirements are now to be based 'differentially on the
nature and risk of their various assets and other risk
exposes rather than on the volume of their liabilities
to the public'. New powers were granted to the
supervisory authorities to regulate the overseas
operations of banks. "The latest amendments to the
Banks' Act represent part of the present comprehensive
international effort to maintain sound national banking
systems on which a stable and efficient international
monetary system can be based"(0GM1985:11).
-
Inflation and unemployment
Responding to the argument that a high rate of inflation
is the price to be paid for reducing unemployment, the
commission emphasises the complementary relation between
inflation and unemployment in South Africa.
"In South Africa, however, the problem of unemployment
is to a large extent a function of structural
characteristics of the economy, in particular the low
level of skills commanded by most unemployed people in
this c,ountry, the relatively low mobility of labour, the
tendency of producers to substitute capital for labour
in the productive processes of the economy, and recently
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the declining growth potential of the economy due to the
decline in its propensity to save. None of these
structural factors militating against the employment of
manpower can be neutralised by easy monetary policies"
(De Kock F:241).
Inflation and wage increases
M.
Combatting inflation by curbing the increase of workers'
wages was specifically rejected by the commission.
Direct intervention in the labour market, the Commission
argued, "could have unfortunate economic and social
consequences. This is particularly so at the present
juncture of the evolution of industrial relations in
this country, when many trade unions that were formally
excluded from the industrial conciliation system are now
on the threshold of representing the interests of their
members in the process of bargaining for better labour
conditions. These unions will, without doubt, resist the
introduction of direct controls on wages" (Ibid:246).
Furthermore, "Inflation 'suppressed' by direct controls
is still inflation, and if the real causes are not
removed, the upward pressures on the price level will
eventually prove impossible to contain" (Ibid:247).
Monetary and fiscal policies to control the demand and
supply of money is seen by the commission as the basis
of its anti-inflationary strategy. "It finds that the
inflation in South Africa during the past twenty years
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was caused mainly by monetary and fiscal factors. These
included excessive increases in the monetary aggregates
and in government spending; control measures which led
to abnormal disintermediation, reintermediation and
other developments producing fluctuations in the
velocity of circulation of the monetary aggregates;
interest rates that were often too low and not always
consistent with appropriate control over the money
supply and monetary demand; and inappropriate spot and
forward exchange rates that were not always allowed to
adjust to levels that would have been reconciliable
with, or would have contributed to, the appropriate
level of monetary demand"(Ibid:250).
The relationship between the Reserve Bank and the
Treasury
"In the field of monetary policy, . . .the responsibility
for broad monetary policy should rest jointly with the
Reserve Bank and the Treasury acting together as the
monetary authorities' in close coordination" (Ibid:251).
This is the only way for effective coordination of
monetary policy, especially regarding the management of
public debt, open-market operations and in exchange rate
and exchange control policy. The Commission believes
that it is 'natural and desirable' for the Treasury and
the Reserve Bank to be separate institutional entities,
as a result of their separate functions. The
institutional independence enjoyed by the Reserve Bank
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since its inception in 1920 should be continued. The
Bank should be granted 'independence in initiating,
formulating and implementing monetary policy', while the
Treasury "must necessarily be entrusted with a variety
of functions and responsibilities in carrying out
official economic policy. The Reserve Bank, on the other
hand, should primarily be charged with the
responsibility for maintaining monetary stability and
protecting the internal and external value of the
currency." For this purpose the Commission recommended
amendment to the Reserve Bank Act to "specifically
charge and authorise the Bank to regulate the supply of
money and the availibility of credit with a view to
influencing total monetary demand in the economy"
(Ibid:253-4). The case for 'independence' also has a
specifically political dimension:
1."it is in the national interest to have the Central
Bank somewhat removed from the usual political
pressures, as this facilitates a more detached and
objective stance and enables a longer-term view of
policy and to transcend the preoccupations of the
government of the day" (Ibid:254).
2. With the employment of market-oriented policy
instruments, influencing interest rates and exchange
rates, for example, will only be deemed 'non-political'
if the Bank operates with considerable independence.
3. De-politicising the functions of the Reserve Bank
will enable the Bank to play a role both in the 'process
244
of evolutionary constitutional reform' and in the
development of economic cooperation in Southern Africa.
5. The limits to the restructuring of the financial
system: an assessment of the Final Report of the
De Kock Commission.
The Final report, submitted in May 1985, 8 years after
its appointment, contained many recommendations that had
already been implemented during the time of its
deliberations following the two interim reports. These
include measures to broaden and increase the size of
domestic credit, capital and foreign exchange markets
through freeing the movement of interest and exchange
rates in these markets. The objectives of these reforms
were two-fold: (1) to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of the financial markets in allocating their
resources in line with the appropriate economic
objectives; and (2) to improve the effectiveness and
efficiency of monetary policy which, the Commission
believes, ultimately operates through interest rates to
influence total demand and total expenditure in the
economy.
The Final Report confirmed the Commission's support for
a 'market-orientated' monetary policy. The allocative
function of the financial markets, the Commission
believed, "function best in the national interest if
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they are reasonably free, competitive, active and broad,
and produce realistic market-related interest and
exchange rates" (Ibid:A9). Such an approach, the
Commision argued, is necessary to effectively influence
overall monetary demand in the economy by overcoming the
problems of disintermediation, stabilising the growth of
monetary aggregates and maintaining market-related
interest and exchange rates. The overall concern of
monetaly policy is the maintenance of a stable domestic
price level. This should be the ultimate objective of
monetary policy, working in tandem with a "more
comprehensive economic policy strategy that
includes...fiscal policy, agricultural policy,
industrial policy and labour policy" (Ibid: A10). But
intermediate objectives should be aimed at targetting
rates of growth of specific money supply aggregates.
However, behind its monetarist rhetoric the Commission
created not only a new set of instruments for the
control of the monetary and financial system, but also a
framework within which 'monetarist' panaceas could be
tempered by political considerations. The framework
allows for discretionary policies and decision-making
linking the Bank to capital directly. The Commission
distanced itself from the adoption of a "rigid and
overriding 'money rule' that implies leaving interest
rates and exchange rates completely free to find their
own levels at all times" (Ibid:A10). Instead, the
commission suggested, the Reserve Bank should exercise
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its discretion - within the recommended policy framework
- as to the specific monetary targets to aim at at any
given time. To achieve these objectives the Commission
recommends the use of 'market-oriented' rather than
'direct' monetary policy instruments. These should
include, public debt management (including public
borrowing), Reserve Bank open-market operations, Reserve
bank discount and general accomodation policy and
Reserve bank intervention in the spot and forward
exchange markets. But under exceptional circumstances,
direct methods are not ruled out.
The recommendations suggest the strengthening of the
functions of the Reserve Bank in safeguarding the
external and internal value of the currency by
regulating the supply of money and the availability of
credit for the purpose of influencing overall monetary
demand in the economy. Rationalising the administration
and regulation of monetary policy in this way is
consistent with transformations in the state as it
responds to changing political conditions determined by
class struggle. Thus the recommendation that: "The
composition of the Board of Directors of the reserve
Bank should over time be adapted to reflect the
evolutionary process of constitutional reform currently
underway in South Africa", and, furthermore that "Every
effort should be made to entrench the tradition that the
reserve bank serves as the main channel through which
...financial institutions make representations or convey
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views to the Minister of Finance, and ultimately to the
State President and the Cabinet. The Commission believes
that, under the special and evolving political
conditions prevailing in South Africa, the existence of
such an objective, non-political channel will prove
increasingly useful to both the Government and the
private financial sector" (Ibid:A27, emphasis added).
Barclays Bank, in a response to the Final Report,
welcomed the recommendation to apply specific money
supply targets as it will serve to focus coordination of
economic objectives in the desired direction. "By having
to decide simultaneously on targets for growth,
inflation, the money supply and changes in the
Government's deficit before borrowing, monetary and
fiscal policy, as well as the government's policy with
regard to wage and price increass under its
administration, will become much more systematic and
better integrated than in the past, something which have
often been lacking" (Barclay Business Brief,July
1985:5). But the bank regarded as inconsistent and
inappropriate the description of Reserve Bank
interventions as 'market-related'. Rather, the Reserve
bank should acknowledge the importance of their
interventionist role. "The fact of the matter is that it
is the assignedtask of the central bank to intervene in
the private money and capital markets, on the implicit
assumption that it is in a better position than the
various individual operators in the private markets to
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determine the best interest of the economy as a whole in
the long run" (Ibid:6). The markets, through the price
mechanism, will take too long, they argue, to remove
imbalances in the economy. It is rather a question of
which measure will be most effective in removing an
imbalance as soon as possible and with the least cost.
This should be acknowledged by the reserve bank: "there
is no need to try and make its role more acceptable to
businessmen and the public by propagating the notion
that because it operates through the markets the
interest rates it produces are market related" (Ibid:6).
Rather, Barclay's Bank argues, instead of a market
orientated policy, by accepting that the recommended
policy instruments operate through changes in interest
rates to influence monetary expenditure in the economy,
the De Kock Commission recommendations are essentially
Keynesian in its approach to monetary policy. The
implications of this for Barclays Bank is that, because
-
- they believe - changes in interest rates do not
readily remove imbalances in the economy resulting from
income and expenditure flows, "fiscal policies which
have a direct impact on the total income and expenditure
flow in the economy...will have to continue to be an
important (if not the important) part of any appropriate
monetary/fiscal policy 'mix' applied in the South Africa
economy" (Ibid:7).
It was clear that priority be given to political
considerations if the policies are to work. "The
importance of achieving and maintaining a high average
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rate of real economic growth in South Africa cannot be
emphasised strongly enough. More than ever before, this
country now needs economic and political policies that
encourage investment, output and employment. The Reserve
Bank remains firmly of the opinion that monetary
stability is a pre-condition for optimal growth....But
the basic long-term objective remains economic growth
with rising standards of living for all sections of the
population" (OGM,1985:13).
"An important question at present, of course, is to what
extent economic expansion in the period ahead will be
adversely affected by the abnormal socio-political
conditions prevailing in South Africa at present,
including the township unrest, the state of emergency
proclaimed in certain magisterial districts and the
intensified threats of economic sanctions against the
country. Clearly these political developments have
tended to neutralise the sound economic 'fundamentals'
in South Africa and have adversely affected overseas
perceptions of the domestic economic situation. The
result has been a net outflow of capital, a sharp
depreciation of the rand and diminished growth prospects
for 1986" (OGM,1985:14).
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The new policy in practice
•
The monetary and fiscal measures that were introduced in
1985 were essentially in response to immediate
pressures, aimed at improving the balance of payments
situation, reducing overspending and inflation and
developing conditions for economic recovery. The
inability of the policy to deliver its objectives became
increasingly clear as it responded to class struggle.
Despite a drought which was affecting agricultural
output and a declining gold price, total spending in the
economy was at a level which, according to the Reserve
Bank, could not be sustained by current output and
export earnings. Excess demand was heightening
inflationary pressures and threatening to depreciate the
value of the rand.
The Reserve Bank strategy was to focus on restrictions
in the money supply. The Bank sought to reduce the rates
of increase in the monetary aggregates, "after taking
into account the persistent decline since 1980 in the
velocity of circulation of these aggregates"
(OGM,1985:6). From August 1984 to November 1984 (when
the refinancing rates were lowered by 1 percentage
point) the Reserve Bank kept its restrictive measures
broadly unchanged until the unexpected rise of the US
Dollar, the resultant sharp fall in the dollar price of
gold and the net outflow of short-term capital combined
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to threaten a depreciation of the rand. The Bank
subsequently restored its refinancing rates to the level
of two months earlier and the banks' prime overdraft
rate reverted to 25% and remained so until early May
1985. -
Other monetary policy instruments employed by the Bank
included public debt management and open-market
operations. The 1985 Budget provided for a rate of
increase of government expediture to only 11,4%, below
the prevailing rate of inflation of around 16%. The
'deficit before borrowing' was limited to R2 570 million
(2.2% of GDP) To make this possible, a number of taxes
were increased, including the general sales tax from 10%
to 12%.
Alb
According to the Reserve Bank, "the restrictive monetary
policy applied since August 1984 and the fiscal measures
introduced in the March 1985 Budget have fully achieved
their initial objective of curbing total private and
public sector spending...excess demand or overspending
has now been eliminated from the economy" (Ibid:8).
Measures were also introduced to attempt to transform
the deficit of the current account of the balance of
payments into a surplus. The current account changed
from a deficit of R2,5 billion during the first quarter
of 1984 to a surplus of R0,6 billion during the 4th
quarter of 1984, R4,3 billion during the 1st quarter of
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1985 and R5,4 billion during the 2nd quarter. "This
turnaround.., helped the economy to cope with the
stresses and strains that developed on the capital
account of the balance of payments during 1984 and the
first half of 1985" (Ibid:9). According to the Bank,
problems arose primarily as a result of an outflow of
short-term capital primarily during the 4th quarter of
1984 (R1,8 billion) and the 1st quarter of 1985 (R2,8
billion). The cause of this was identified primarily as
'leads and lags in foreign payments and receipts caused
by the rise in the value of the US Dollar, the decline
in the dollar price of gold and the expectation that in
such circumstances the rand would depreciate further'.
Despite a declining net outward flow of short-term
capital - R113 million in the 2nd quarter of 1985 - net
security purchases by non-residents (1984: R1,2 billion,
April 1985: R60 million) transformed into net sales of
R108 million, R188 million and R200 million
respectively!) The Reserve Bank attributed this partly
to "disappointment at the failure of the gold price to
rise strongly as the United States dollar began to
depreciate against the other major currencies, and
partly to unfavourable political developments" (Ibid:9)
The sudden decline in the exchange rate of the rand from
over 0.53 American cents on 18th July 1985 to a low of
38,85 cents on 22 August was also seen by the Bank as
"the direct result of new pressure exerted on the
capital account by political developments" (Ibid:10).
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To lay the basis for economic recovery and a higher
growth rate, the Bank reduced its basic rediscount and
related accommodation rates on 6th May 1985 with further
subsequent reductions to a total of 5,75 percentage
points. These reductions contributed to similar declines
in the commercial banks' prime overdraft rates and in
most other short-term interest rates.
The struggle to defend the rand
Perhap.s the most eloquent response to the financial
reforms came not from the public statements of
politicians and bankers, but from the fate which befell
the South African rand. The political and economic
crisis which the state was attempting to overcome by
introducing financial reforms deeply eroded the value of
the currency. This development struck at the very root
of the authority of the apartheid state. It was an
immediate and concrete expression of the subversive
consequences of heightening class struggle on the
legitimacy of the state and its political and economic
authority. In the collapse of the value of the rand in
1985, the same year in which the state had to consider
the De Kock Commissions final recommendations on
financial reform, was concentrated all forms of domestic
and global class opposition to the apartheid state and
the adjustments, both domestic and global, capital had
to make in the face of this opposition.
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In January 1985, the gold price dropped to below the
$300 level for the first time in 2 1/2 years. At the
same time, the value of the rand stood at $0.4895. The
,I
rise in the value of the dollar and the decline in the
dollar price of gold set the conditions in which SA's
location in the world economy required re-assessment and
where the intensification of domestic political and
economic crisis was reflected in a crisis of the
monetary basis of the SA state. The extent of the
decline in the value of the rand can be discerned in
terms of its relation to the US dollar:
Table 5:
Value of the rand in terms of the
US dollar on 23rd January 1985:
-
1979 1.1500
1980 1.2232
1981 1.3347
1982 1.0306
1983 0.9445
1984 0.7965
1985 0.4356
Source: Minister of Finance, Hansard 11 February 1985.
The anticipated consequences of this sharp decline in
the value of the rand for capital were accurately
captured by Raymond Parsons, Chief executive of Assocom:
"Given the unfolding economic scenario both externally
and internally, decision-makers in the private and
public- sectors are possibly facing the most serious year
of stagflation (no growth combined with high inflation)
in 20 years. The policy options are limited and the
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Reserve Bank cannot be expected to support the rand
indefinitely. The rand will remain volatile and the
overall situation also suggests that the margin of error
in 1985 is now small" (Cape Times,4.1.85) The strategic
options all pointed towards the long-term rather than
short-term tinkering with the financial system. The
campaign for disinvestment, particularly in the United
States, was focussing the attention of the international
capital markets. New York City introduced disinvestment
legislation in February aimed at forcing banks and firms
to stop commercial transactions with South Africa.
The political consequences of the scenario sketched by
Raymond Parsons were clear to the banking sector. The
Barclays Bank Annual Review for 1985 was quite explicit
as to the political imperatives of this critical moment
for state and capital: "We would, in particular, wish to
see expedited the elimination of restrictive and
discriminating laws as well as the design and
development of an appropriate constitutional framework
through which participation of all South Africans in our
political process can be secured."'
In New York the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company announced
it would make no new loans to the SA government "until
real progress has been made towards improvement of
political, economic and social conditions for blacks and
other non-whites in South Africa" (Cape Times, 1.4.85).
7 Barclays Bank Annual review statement by Basil Hersov,
Chairman and Chris Ball, MD.Financial Mail 1.3.85.
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Similar moves followed with other U.S. banks and in
Europe.
While these moves were clearly a consequence of trade
union and political pressure, there were prudent
economic concerns as the Chief Economist of Morgan
Guaranty, Rimmer de Vries confirmed: "It has been
building for some time. The current troubles started at
least six months ago when a number of banks, American
and European, began to stop lending or cut back in one
way or another. It was very clear at that time that
South Africa was becoming a credit problem....There is a
lot of uncertainty on the part of international lenders
as to the political and economic future of South Africa
and that is what led to the crisis. Where is South
Africa going from here? It is far from clear where the
country will be politically and economically even a few
years from now. Contrary to popular belief, there was a
lot more economics than politics involved in the
American banks' actions" (Financial Mail, 13.9.85).
As a result there occurred a drop in the amount of risk
capital foreign investors were prepared to invest in
South Africa. Comparing interest payments to foreigners
to the total dividend inflow, the Old Mutual reveals,
"This ratio has increased from an average of 17 percent
between 1965 and 1969 to 81 percent for the period 1980-
1983. From a debt servicing point of view it is better
to attract dividend-yielding investments instead of
interest-bearing liabilities. Short-term liabilities
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comprised on average 18.3 percent of total outstanding
liabilities between 1956-1969. The corresponding figure
.0
rose to 21.1 percent for the period 1970-1979 and
increased even further to 27.7 percent in the 1980s. At
the end of 1984 roughly 40 percent of the outstanding
foreign debt was.. .of a short-term nature." At the end
of June 1984, 66% of SA's international bank borrowing
were of a short-term nature compared to the average of
44% for a comparable economy (Cape Times 22.7.85).
The drop in the value of the rand, restrictive monetary
policies and the high unemployment and inflation rates
sharply reduced the living standards of workers and
contributed to trade union militancy and organisation.
This year was not only the year in which the biggest
independent trade union was launched, it was also the
year in which thousands more workers took strike action:
Table 6:
Strikes 1983-85i
no. workers workdays lost
1983 336 64 469 124 596
1984 469 181 942 379 712
1985 389 239 816 678 273
Source:  Race Relations Survey 1987/88
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In August 1985, the Reserve Bank announced a cut in
central bank lending rates, direct response to high
unemployment and rising worker militancy. As De Kock
confirms, "In the present recessionary conditions the
situation calls for monetary measures to prevent the
recent political developments from bringing about an
undue contraction of money and credit accompanied by
rising interest rates" (Cape Times, 20.8.85).
On the 1st September 1985, the Finance Minister, Barend
du Plessis announced measures to protect a sharply
depreciating Rand in the wake of decisions by certain
foreign banks not to renew credit facilities to South
African Banks. According to the Minister, "The large
amounts involved in the subsequent withdrawal of funds
placed severe additional strains on the capital account
of the South African balance of payments and caused the
•
rand to depreciate sharply against the most important
international currencies." In order to reduce the effect
of this on the foreign exchange market, the foreign
exchange market and the stock exchange were closed
between 28 August and 1 September. A package of measures
was announced to come into effect on the 2nd September.
"On the one hand, it will ensure the orderly management
of a gradual reduction in the foreign debt of the
country as a whole, at a rate more in line with what can
be afforded in terms of the surplus on the rest of the
of the balance of payments. On the other hand, this
strategy will create the much needed scope for an easing
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in the restrictive monetary and fiscal policies
currently in force." The measures included, among
others:
1. a 4-month standstill period for the payment of
foreign debt; and
2. the re-introduction of the Financial Rand system
abolished in 1983 to avoid the stock exchange being used
as a conduit for evading controls.
" The objective of the comprehensive strategy are to -
••••
(a) create a stand-still period during which South
Africa can negotiate in a responsible way with all
parties concerned regarding the orderly payment of the
foreign debt of the country;
(b) ensure that the surplus on the current account of
the country's balance of payments will be used largely
to meet the foreign obligations of all South African
debtors in an equitable and orderly manner;
(c) discourage disinvestment by non-residents at the
cost of the available foreign exchange reserves;
(d) facilitate an early resumption of domestic economic
growth:; and
(e) normalise South Africa's foreign financial relations
as soon as circumstances permit."'
In December further exchange control measures were
introduced to stop currency speculation. From December
8 Text of the announcement made by the Finance Minister
in Pretoria on 1 September and published in the Business
day, 2 September 1985.
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9, the Reserve Bank would pay mining companies for all
gold bullion in rand on the day of purchase. Up to now
the mines have received half their proceeds in rand and
the other half in dollars. The half paid in dollars has
allowed the mines to speculate on the foreign currency
markets.
The new measures also make it mandatory for exporters
who do not sell spot, to take out forward cover over
their total export proceeds within 7 days of shipment
thus closing the loophole which allowed exporters to
speculate against the rand.
To thee Reserve Bank these measures were necessary to
protect the domestic economy and promote growth in the
face of foreign perceptions of internal political
problems: "...the post July capital flight and the
resultant depreciation of the rand were not caused by
unsound economic 'fundamentals', and not by 'over-
borrowing', but by a marked deterioration in overseas
perceptions of the nature, extent and possible
consequences of SA's domestic political problems."
we have chosen to let the rand depreciate rather
than to raise interest rates in an attempt to defend the
exchange rate. The depreciation of the rand does, of
course, put upward pressure on the consumer price index.
This is most unfortunate, as it prevents us from reaping
the full benefits of the elimination of demand
inflation. But it does protect the gold and foreign
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exchange reserves and does stimulate domestic economic
activity by raising the rand value of exports and
protecting domestic industries against overseas
competition. It therefore fits well into the present
policyr of promoting economic recovery and growth"
(Business Day, 27.12.85).
These responses to monetary pressure by the Reserve Bank
demonstrate the flexible and discretionary approach to
the application of monetary policies that the De Kock
framework sought to secure. Yet this framework was
unable to secure the objectives of monetary stability
and economic growth. Amidst the deepening political and
economic crisis, the quest for economic and monetary
stability was subverted by the very acts that aim to
achieve them.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
Crisis, class struggle and the restructuring of the
apartheid state: 1986-1992
Adjusting to the crisis in the short-term has
long-term implications
The restructuring of the financial system was part of
the strategic agenda of the state to respond to
economic pressure in the long term. The programme of
legislative reform followed the De Kock Commission's
recommendations to deregulate the financial system.
However, the state's reform agenda remained constrained
by immediate economic and political pressures. The
intensification of the political and economic crisis
which faced the apartheid state in the latter half of
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the 1980's put severe pressure on the financial system.'
While the commitment to monetarist strategies was not
wholly rhetorical, the financial measures employed were
essentially of a short-term nature to respond to
immediate crises which the state could not afford to
avoid in the interest of longer term measures. Yet every
short-term measure simply underlined the need for
longer-term strategies including a restructuring of the
political basis of the apartheid state. Both capital and
labour pursued strategies in the second half of the
1980's, on the assumption that the apartheid state is
not able to respond effectively to the crisis. Apart
from lobbying government, capital continued its own
independent political actions in favour of political
liberalisation. Labour became increasing confident as
the apartheid state appeared unable of maintaining it
political dominance in the face of mass resistance The
resources invested by the state to restructure its
financial and monetary basis with the expectation that
this would serve to de-politicise the economy and
' The measures designed to de-politicise economic
activity simply intensified the political and economic
aspects of the crisis by extending regulation into areas
not regulated before. The rhetoric of 'economic
liberalisation'- the purported intention of the
financial restructuring - essentially amounts to closer
and more systematic regulation of the economy.
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therefore limit the politicisation of the organised
labour movement came to nought. The collapse of the rand
in 1985 was an important turning point. On the one hand
it demonstrated the limitations of responding mainly to
immediate pressures. On the other hand, and following on
from this, the collapse of the rand put pressure on the
state to broaden its restructuring programme to
encompass further political reform.
Working class pressure on the state was sustained and
increasing after 1985. The formation of COSATU in
November 1985 strengthened militant opposition to
apartheid rule. The combined organisational strength of
COSATU and NACTU provided a national power base for an
increasingly confident and combative working class which
rendered ineffective many of the strategies of state and
capital. The failure of the Wiehahn-Riekert reform
strategies to impose limits on workers' struggles by
attempting to confine their struggles within the limits
of a formal industrial relations system also served to
expose the failure of the political and constitutional
reforms introduced in response to the crisis.
The failure of this attempt to address the crisis in a
more strategic manner was of immediate significance to
the future of capitalist accumulation in South Africa.
It served to mobilise capital politically as never
before in the search for a long-term resolution of the
crisis that would safeguard the continuation of
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capitalist forms of accumulation while containing the
political aspirations of the disenfranchised population
within manageable limits As a conse
	
atter
half of the eighties was not only marked by the
s—
intensification of working class struggles, but also by
the intensification of the struggle by capital to find a
long-term political solution.
---------
COSATU and NACTU's support of economic sanctions
-
deepened SA's isolation and prolonged the pressure on
the rand. The monetary and fiscal strategy had to
confront directly the immediate problems which arose
with the intensification of political struggle. The
Governor of the Reserve Bank described the situation
confronting the South Africa state and capital in the
following terms:
"The economic situation in South Africa during the past
twelve months has been greatly influenced by socio-
political developments. Events such as the social
unrest, the state of emergency and the intensified
threat's of disinvestment and economic sanctions, have
brought about a deterioration in overseas perceptions of
the domestic political and economic outlook. Misguided
and distorted as these perceptions might be, they have
resulted in a withdrawal by foreign banks of credits to
South African banks and other business enterprises, a
net outflow of foreign capital in other forms, a
depreciation of the rand, the imposition on 1 September
1985 of a 'standstill' on the repayments due on the part
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of the, country's foreign debt, and the reintroduction of
exchange control over non-resident equity investments in
the form of the financial rand system. By exerting an
adverse impact on domestic business and consumer
confidence they have also contributed to the sluggish
conditions that have prevailed in the economy throughout
this period."(OGM,1986:6) This description of the crisis
identifies certain pertinent elements contributing to
the conditions of crisis but fails to analyse their
relationship to one another. In so doing, the Governor
fails to identify more specifically the limitations
placed on capitalist production and accumulation by
working class struggles on the one hand and the
structural imbalance in the domestic economy the basis
of the chronic deficits in the balance of payments, on
the other. What this reveals is a presupposition that
politics' as distinct from 'economics' has intervened
in the economy in such a way as to create 'economic'
problems. The state's response to crisis recreates the
fetishished forms through which the crisis is perceived.
What lies at the root of the politicisation of economic
relations, however, are the forms of domination of the
apartheid state. Any strategy to de-politicise economic
relations would have to confront the question of the
restructuring of the form and function of the state
itself.
'Total Stategy': the apartheid state's response to
crisis
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The latter half of the 1980's witnesssed increasing
efforts by the apartheid state to respond to crisis by
introducing political reforms. With the accession of
P.W. Botha to the leadership of the National Party and
Prime Minister of South Africa in September 1978, the
reformist wing of the party was able to consolidate
itself. Botha initiated a wide-ranging counter-
insurgency strategy which incorporated reformist
elements new to National Party strategy. The origins of
these measures can be traced to a White Paper issued by
the Department of Defence in 1977 in which a call was
made to formulate and coordinate a "comprehensive plan
to utilize all the means available to a state according
to an integrated pattern in order to achieve the
national aims with the framework of the specified
policies. A total strategy is, therefore, not confined
to a particular sphere, but is applicable to all levels
and to all functions of the state structure" (cited in
Murray, 1987:15).
The distinctiveness of this new total strategy was the
incorporation of direct, repressive measures with
counter-revolutionary strategies of an economic and
political nature requiring the coordination of military,
economic and political functions of the state. "The sine
qua non underlying the Total Strategy doctrine was the
historical convergence of the common material interests
of South African capital, the leadership of the ruling
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National Party, and the upper echelons of the military
establishment" (Murray, 1987:15). Reforms in monetary
policy and the financial system in the 1980's should be
seen in the light of this overall objective of the SA
state.
Yet, as I have shown, the barriers to capital
accumulation and production cannot be removed simply by
financial restructuring, for money relations and the
political order expressing such relations are
inextricably linked. Increasingly, capital and the state
sought to set the agenda for the struggle for political
reform on their own terms. This was increasingly made
possible by a new consensus' within the ruling class as
a result of a political transformation within the ruling
Nationalist Party itself. Murray describes this process
as a consequence of the transformation of class
relations in SA: "The underlying cause for the shifting
focus in white politics can be traced to the class
transformation of South Africa and the class realignment
of the white political parties. The National Party had
evolved into a political vehicle that increasingly
expressed the political vision of an emergent Afrikaner
bourgeoisie gradually abandoning the specific alliance
of class forces that supported its entry into poliltical
power in 1948, the National Party leadership sought a
modus vivendi with English-speaking professional and
propertied classes and tentatively sought the political
allegiance of a carefully nurtured black petty-bourgeois
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stratum in the Homelands and urban townships. This new
constellation of class forces that came to dominate the
National Party furnished a revitalised social formula
designed to restore economic prosperity through market-
propelled growth" (Murray,1987:61). Economic
liberalisation and de-regulation, as core elements of a
monetarist reform project, were accompanied by new,
tentative, forms of political representation and the
removal of certain racial discriminatory practices.
These reform initiatives sought to achieve 5 main
objectives:	 1,16
1. removing the barriers to social mobility of the
emergent black petty bourgeoisie;
2. encouraging the development of skilled black labour
by relaxing restrictions of the geographical and
occupational mobility of black labour;
3. improving the conditions of the urban black residents
including the establishment of 'Community Councils'
aimed at providing conditional political rights on a
local level to township residents;
4. restructuring the central political apparatus to
allow for the participation of 'coloured' and 'indian'
political representatives; and
5. eliminating those racially-discriminatory measures
seen as responsible for tarnishing SA's image abroad.
Subsequent developments, however, demonstrated that
these political measures were not far-reaching enough to
constrain and channel the popular struggle for political
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transformation into one where the state set the agenda
for political change, because "the economic well-being
of the Afrikaner bourgeoisie and its petty-bourgeois
political allies depended to a large measure upon
extensive state regulation, subsidies and patronage,
thereby ruling out any wholesale elimination of the core
structures of apartheid rule" (Murray,1978:61). The
well-oiled machinery of the apartheid state remained
intact in its essentials, its reform project ham-strung
and the popular movement unconvinced by its reform
endeavours.
However, these reforms set in motion new social forces,
making possible wider and more intensive self-
organisation and political mobilisation of the dominated
classes.
The Botha reform strategy provoked widespread mass
resistance, which culminated in the formation in 1983 of
the National Forum and later in the same year, the
United Democratic Front. These two organisations
mobilised opposition to the new constitutional
dispensation and the 'Koornhoff Bills', which provided
the framework for legislative reform of the influx
control laws. These two organisations marked an
important moment in the mass opposition to the apartheid
state. Unlike the earlier waves of political opposition,
the early 1980's saw a more open, protracted and
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determined mass mobilisation sustained by greater
coordination of worker, youth and civic struggles.
Capital flight and the continuing crisis of the rand
Total strategy sought to strike at the root of popular
resistance by coordinating the power of capital and the
state against the activities of the trade union movement
and other popular organisations. The intensity of the
repression and the resistance to it created a state of
seige which had a direct impact on the economy.
Political instability encouraged capital flight, the
continuing decline in the value of the rand and gave a
boost to the sanctions campaign. Total Strategy was
aimed primarily at tackling the immediate crisis facing
the apartheid state. The reformist elements of the
strategy were not as yet fully developed. The same
short-termism predominated in the strategy to overcome
the financial crisis.
The monetary and fiscal measures applied by the Reserve
Bank and the Treasury in the financial year ending March
1985 were based on two broad strategies: firstly, to
limit inflationary overspending and reduce the balance
of payments deficit; and secondly, to initiate
legislative reforms in the way the banking system was
regulated. The legislative reforms largely followed the
recommendations of the De Kock Commission. Amendments
made to the Banks Act were intended to facilitate
272
movement towards a cash-reserve system of monetary
control. The capital requirements of banks would not be
based on the volume of their liabilities to the public,
but rather on a differentiated formula based on the
nature and risk of their various assets. This is in line
with international banking reform and was aimed at
making SA banks more compatible with the international
banking system. These measures also extended the powers
of the Reserve Bank to regulate the international
operations of banks.
New building society legislation in 1986, following
changes to the asset requirements of banks, allowed for
greater flexibility in the composition of their assets
and liabilities. This brought the legal regulation of
building societies up to date with what was happening in
practice where competitive pressure resulted in their
activities increasingly overlapping with the banks. The
fact that building societies were also now required to
conform to the same cash reserve and liquid asset
requirements as banks, rationalised the legislation
regulating deposit-taking institutions as a whole.
These regulative reforms reflected the transformations
taking place in the financial sector, particularly in
the area of financial services. Banks were now operating
in the money and capital markets trading in securities
and other related financial instruments. The range of
their services were extended to include home mortgage
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loans. On the other hand, building societies were
providing banking services and non-deposit-taking
institutions (eg. insurers) were beginning to provide
credit to corporate borrowers. Monetarist reform
reflected and responded to the intensification of
competition within the financial sector and the
tendencies breaking down traditional institutional
barriers. This fragmentation of financial institutions
paralleled similar tendencies in the international
banking system. These tendencies clearly threatened to
make obsolete existing state regulation of the
operations of the financial sector. Legislative reform
therefore was aimed at re-imposing state regulation by
rationalising and modernising the legislative framework
in line with international banking practices. To
facilitate regulation, the Reserve Bank formally assumed
responsibility for bank and building society supervision
in April 1987.
The critical position of the rand remained a major
feature of the crisis confronting the South African
state. The restrictions on outward capital movements -
the standstill in the repayment of foreign debt and the
re-introduction of the financial rand system - had
important implications for growth in the domestic
economy. Following the recommendations of the De Kock
Commission, the setting of specific target rates of
growth for one or more of the money supply aggregates
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was accepted by the government. The target rate,
announced on 17 March 1986, was set in the form of a
tolerance range for the rate of increase in the broad
money supply, M3, of between 16 and 20 per cent between
the 4th quarter of 1985 and the 4th quarter of 1986. The
target range chosen "was considered high enough to
accommodate a projected acceleration in the real
economic growth rate during 1986 and into 1987, but low
enough to ensure that the expected decline in the rate
of inflation would not be frustrated by the emergence of
new demand inflationary pressure"(0GM1986 8).
Accordingly, the Reserve Bank reduced its Bank rate
eleven times, with reductions ranging from from 21,75 to
10,5 per cent. The short-termism implicit in these
measures follows from a perception of the SA crisis as
the result of international rather than domestic
pressure. The perception was that the domestic situation
_......n.
was only important to the extent that it was creating
anxiety among foreign investors.
The imposition by the SA government of a partial debt
standstill and the reintroduction of exchange control
over non-residents in September 1985 was the result,
according to the Reserve Bank, not of a debt problem
from 'overborrowing' but rather a 'liquidity' problem
arising from "a sudden deterioration in overseas
perceptions of the South African socio-political and
therefore economic situation" (OGM1986:10).
Consequently, the depreciation of the rand "has greatly
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assisted the South African economy in adjusting to the
exogenous economic and political shocks to which it has
been exposed...It has served to maintain the rand value
of the gold output and of many other South African
exports at a high level, thereby also boosting tax
revenues. At the same time, it has provided additional
protection to many domestic manufacturing firms
competing with imports. It has also served to strengthen
the balance of payments on both the current and capital
accounts and to protect the official gold and foreign
exchange reserves"(0GM1986 :12).
The Reserve Bank believed that "in many important
respects the scope now exists for a renewed cyclical
upswing in the short term and a considerably higher real
average rate of growth in the medium and long term", but
recognised a significant problem: "And yet the scope for
more rapid economic expansion is not being utilised to
anything like its full potential. In a situation in
which economics and politics are inextricably entwined,
the required spark of business and consumer confidence
is still missing "(0GM1986 p.13,14).
Domestic and international support for a campaign of
disinvestment and economic sanctions struck at the root
of state and capital's effort to overcome the economic
consequences of SA's changing relationship to the world
economy and the struggle for growth in the domestic
economy. Financial sanctions in particular was
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especially deleterious to the South African economy, as the
Governor of the Reserve Bank confirms: "What is, however,
having an adverse impact on the South African economy is the
de facto existence for more than a year now of financial
sanctions'...This politically induced pressure on the
capital account of the balance of payments is affecting the
South African economy more adversely than trade sanctions
are likely to do. It implies some combination of a weaker
exchange rate, a higher level of interest rates, a higher
inflation rate and a lower rate of economic growth than
would otherwise have prevailed." As a result SA was obliged
to run a large current account surplus as long as the
capital outflow continued. This in itself inevitably
restricted the prospects for longer-term economic growth. As
the political crisis escalated throughout the 1980's capital
flight continued to plague the South African economy. The
financial constraints exercised by foreign financial
institutions, as a result of the intensification of social
unrest and the consequent deterioration of confidence in
South Africa's political and economic prospects, resulted
eventually in the imposition by foreign governments of
financial and trade sanctions. SA was denied normal access
to loans and credits from international financial
institutions and central banks and was also required to
repay credits previously obtained from the IMF. The single
most significant consequence to the economy was the massive
net capital outflow of R15,5 billion (6% of GDP)
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during the two years 1985 and 1986. The net outflow of
non-reserve-related capital in 1985 and 1986 amounted to
R15,3 billion. The outflow declined in 1987 and the
first quarter of 1988 but then increased to R2 billion
in the second quarter of 1988 with the sudden
appreciation of the US Dollar and the decline of the
dollar-price of gold.
The international sanctions campaign also had important
consequences for domestic fixed investment. In
responding to the crisis domestic capital, despite high
liquidity, was reluctant to invest in plant, equipment
and construction because there was no clear strategy
shared by the state and capital. The real decline in
domestic fixed investment reflected a growing
uncertainty of the long term profitability of investing
in fixed capital. Consequently excess liquidity was
employed rather in speculative investments in the
financial markets.
The lack of expansion of fixed investment had important
social consequences. Rising unemployment was
contributing to political and labour instability. But
the ability to implement job creation schemes was
hampered by the lack of expansion in manufacturing
short of applying pressure on capital to expand the rate
of fixed investment by introducing new legislation. The
state's strategy to reduce unemployment was hampered not
only by the reluctance of capital to invest in
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industrial expansion but also by the state's reluctance
to undermine capital's profitibility in the light of
growing pessimism of the state's ability to overcome the
political and economic crisis. The Reserve Bank followed
a cautious approach: "While certain adjustments to
taxation and financial legislation affecting those
institutions might well be desirable for other reasons,
,I•
attempts to force them to invest in low-earning high-
risk directions could undermine their financial
soundness and inflict harm on the economy"(0GM1986 15).
The state employed a twin-track policy of applying
short-term expansionary monetary and fiscal strategies
on the one hand and longer-term economic strategies
comprising inward industrialisation, export promotion,
import substitution and rural development on the other.
But the Reserve Bank acknowledged the inadequacy of
these measures. As the Governor ackowledged, "By
themselves, however, they cannot provide an adequate
solution to the present difficulties. Unless accompanied
by actions on other fronts, it is doubtful whether they
can overcome the harmful effects of the existing
financial 'sanctions' and prevent the irrational and
emotional forces behind the present sanctions and
disinvestments campaigns from transforming South Africa
into some form of 'seige economy'(OGM1986:15).
As the Bank concurs, a continuous capital outflow
accompanied by a seige economy is nothing but a
condition likely to intensify the economic crisis: "A
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seige economy would inevitably tend to become a tightly
regimented one subject to a maze of direct bureaucratic
controls. This would limit the scope for private
enterprise and effective competition to promote economic
development and to raise standards of living. In the
final analysis, the combination of continuous capital
outflow and a seige economy would be bound to have
adverse effects on economic growth and
stability"(0GM1986:15-16).
In considering these options, the Bank concludes that
"in addition to the appropriate short and long-term
economic strategies, any formula for the restoration of
confidence and prosperity in South and Southern Africa
must include the continuation of the Government's
programmes for maintaining law and order and for
comprehensive further political and constitutional
reform" (0GM1986 :16).
The Reserve Bank's strategies for adjustments to the SA
economy comprised a combination of exchange-rate
depreciation, an increase in inflation, a slower growth
rate and maintaining a lower average standard of living.
As result of these measures a balance of payments
situation improved and the reserves were strengthened.
The rise in the gold price from an average of USD 317
per ounce in 1985 to USD 368 per ounce in 1986
contributed towards the improvement in the economic
situation.
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But it was the "successful maintenance of law and
order", according to the Reserve Bank, which enabled the
economic adjustment measures to be applied more
effectively. In a situation of increasing instability it
gave overseas investors confidence in the SA state's
capacity to maintain a stable political order in SA.
It soon became clear however, that maintaining a stable
political order by force without political reform would
not sustain overseas investor confidence in SA. This
applied equally to domestic capital, aware of the
political instability that repression produces. While
the potential for economic growth emerged in 1986-7, the
recovery remained sluggish.
The Reserve Bank Governor expressed the frustration of
the state's inability to induce domesticn_d-.1-51-eign and
foreign investment for industrial expansion: "Why has
the upswing been so sluggish? Why has it lost momentum
on at least two occasions during the past two years? The
balance of payments on current account continues to show
a large surplus; the gold and foreign exchange reserves
have doubled over the past year; the foreign debt
situation is under control; the money supply is not
rising too rapidly; interest rates are not only low but,
in most cases, negative in real terms; with the support
of the Reserve Bank the banks and building societies are
ready, able and willing to expand their credit; share
prices and stock exchange turnover have set one record
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after another during recent months; fiscal policy is
expansionary; surplus capacity exists in many sectors of the
economy; unemployment is relatively high; and the population
is rising at over 2 per cent per year in total and at a much
higher rate in urban areas. and yet the inducement to invest
and the propensity to consume are not strong enough to lend
real momentum to the economic upswing. Money is chasing
paper in the financial markets instead of bricks, mortar and
steel. Why? (OGM,1987:13)
The frustration of state reform strategies - propelled
towards a strategic restructuring by mass mobilisation
against its authority and widespread workplace instability -
has its roots in the propensity of capital to seek the
highest returns in as short a time as possible. In a
situation where the future of capital is uncertain, excess
liquidity moved towards short-term speculative investments
in the financial markets rather than investment in
industrial expansion. As a consequence manufacturing
production stagnated, stoking further the flames of
political instability, industrial unrest and unemployment.
The Economic Advisory Council, a body appointed by the
state, recommended a package of measures including labour
reforms, export promotion, industrial protection, inward
industrialisation, rural development', deregulation and
privatisation. The Reserve Bank, in
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broad agreement with the Council, emphasised in
addition, the importance of tax reforms. Above all
however, the Reserve Bank remained concerned with the
threat posed to the domestic economy by political
conditions: "There is little that monetary and fiscal
policies can do to extricate economic decisions from the
political considerations with which they are currently
entwined in South Africa. That is the reality that has
to be "recognised"(0GM1987:16).
The combined effect of the sanctions campaign, trade
union struggles and the political campaign against the
apartheid state, exposed the limitations of the Botha
reforms and the inability of monetary and fiscal policy
to extricate South Africa from crisis.
Inevitably, domestic economic conditions remained
relatively stagnant. The decreased dollar price of gold,
the drought, weak commodity markets and the accelerating
outflow of capital resulted in the depreciation of the
exchange rate and an increase in the rate of price
inflation between 1985 and 1986. To overcome weakening
economic conditions, the state opted for financial
measures that would promote export rather than protect
weakening living conditions. The Governor explains the
decision to take this course of action as following
directly from the political conditions threatening the
state. Its response to political instability was to
maintain conditions favourable to capital even if this
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meant a decline in the average standard of living:
"The economy might conceivably have adjusted to the changed
circumstances with less of an increase in the general level
of prices. But this would have required quite severe
deflationary fiscal and monetary measures, which would have
exacerbated the existing recessionary conditions and further
undermined business confidence. A policy of adjusting mainly
via deflation would therefore have been unsuitable in the
prevailing abnormal socio-political circumstances"
(OGM,1988:8). This policy was also aimed at increasing long-
term domestic investment particularly in industrial
expansion.
The SA state's solution to improve adverse economic
conditions included:
1. Short-term expansionary monetary and fiscal strategy; and
2. Long-term economic strategies: inward industrialisation,
export promotion, import substitution, manpower issues,
rural development and the role of government in a market
system in which private initiative and effective competition
have important roles to play'. State economic policy was
still largely operating within an interventionist framework.
It was unable to employ monetarist deflationary strategies.
All these measures depend on the extent of political reform
- as the Bank itself acknowledged: "in addition
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to the appropriate short and long-term economic
strategies, any formula for the restoration of
confidence and prosperity in South and Southern Africa
must include the continuation of the Government's
programmes for maintaining law and order and for
comprehensive further political and constitutional
reform"(OGM1986:16).
It is this inextricable link between economics and
politics, and therefore the intensification of class
struggle in a situation of economic crisis that also
placed presure on the state to adjust its fiscal policy.
New fiscal measures included (on the revenue side) the
early repayment of loan levies, reduction in income tax
rates and in the import surcharge, and adjustments to
the taxation of fringe benefits and (on the expenditure
side) provision for increased outlays "including
employment creation, labour training, the promotion of
small business enterprises, drought relief, alleviation
of social distress, the maintenance of order and
stability, and constitutional, economic and social
development"(0GM1986:9).
These fiscal measures highlight the 'carrot and stick'
approach that has been the feature of the reform process
hitherto. As the independent trade union movement gain
in confidence and organisation, the rising aspirations
of workers needed to be channelled into a direction that
remained consonant with the collective bargaining
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machinery put in place by the Wiehahn reforms. This
strategy did not succeed in containing workers,
struggles within the economic sphere. Rather, the
independent trade union movement gave further impetus to
the political forms of the class struggle. While the
state attempted to alleviate immediate pressures arising
from the economic crisis through taking steps to reduce
unemployment and increase social welfare, it became
increasingly apparent that longer-term economic and
political strategies were required.
Throughout the 1980's we witnessed the intensification
of the struggle for reform. As we have seen through the
largely unsuccesful efforts of the Reserve bank to
effect long-term strategic adjustments to the domestic
economy and its relation to the international economy,
the state's ability to restructure is severely curtailed
by the limits imposed by working class struggles. The
Wiehahn and Riekert reforms of the early 1980's, as we
have shown earlier, failed to contain working class
struggles and continued to limit the ability of the
apartheid state to restructure the political and
economic conditions threatening capital accumulation.
But the collapse of the rand in 1985, the application of
financial sanctions and continuing political and
industrial instability, forced capital and the state
towards even bolder moves in their effort to restructure
the political basis of capital accumulation in South
Africa, Pressure intensified on the state to move
286
towards more radical political strategies, not as an
alternative to monetarist strategy but as a
complementary condition for its success.
3. Class struggle and the defeat of 'Total Strategy'
Taking the reforms further however meant moving away
from the 'Total Strategy' doctrine. Working class
resistance to it was critical in its defeat. The
-
organisation of mass struggles in this period was
closely tied to the burgeoning independent trade union
movement which added to the populist political
traditions a new element of worker unity and democratic
accountability. With the formation of the Congress of SA
Trade Unions in November 1985, the trade union movement
played an increasingly central role in the mobilisation
of political opposition. This had important strategic
consequences for labour, capital and the apartheid
state.
The political profile of SA labour gave added impetus to
its economic struggles at a time when the economic
crisis was at its worst. Labour sustained the link
between politics and economics at precisely the time
when capital and the state were devising strategies to
separate them. Labour put on the agenda of the anti-
apartheid struggle more forcefully the possibility of
socialist solutions to the South African struggle and
heightened the anxieties of the ruling class of the
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impending threat to the capitalist social order. Labour
also imposed limits on the implementation of monetarist
strategies to the economic crisis, particularly the de-
regulation and privatisation measures. The increasing
international profile achieved by the independent labour
movement intensified the international sanctions
campaign.
The latter half of the 1980's was characterised by an
unparalleled escalation of industrial conflict. The
number and intensity of strikes increased dramatically
between 1985 and 1987:
Strikes. 1985-1987 
Year	 Strikes	 Workers	 Workdays lost 
1985
1986
1987	 . 1
389
793
148
239
424
591
816
340
421
1
5
678
308
825
273
958
231
So rce: Race Relations Survey 1987/88:667
Capital's response to labour militancy took the form of
defending the legitimate rights of collective bargaining
in the face of government attempts to suppress trade
union militancy. Capital was concerned with the threat
to their long-term interests of industrial turbulence
and SA's deteriorating relationship to the international
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economy and sought to distance themselves from the
repressive actions of government while campaigning for
the urgent application of the government's stated
objective of liberalising the domestic economy.
According to the Standard Bank, "The strategy to be
implemented has to contain political and economic
elements. It is first necessary to reduce the level of
domestic unrest and to respond flexibly to international
pressure. With this accomplished, attention can turn to
the economy...great opportunities exist for
restructuring via particularly deregulation,
privatisation and finding a new export
orientation...Responding to the threat of sanctions by
moving towards a siege economy would merely exacerbate
current problems" (Standard Bank Review, August 1986:1).
In responding to the crisis, Standard Bank emphasised
the political importance of implementing political and
economic restructuring in order to widen the access of
black people to the economy: "The nature of political
adaptation required demands a thoroughgoing programme of
job creation and a significant improvement in the
economic position of the black section of the
population. If this is to succeed the economy's
structure will have to change significantly in order to
take account of new circumstances in the international
marketplace and domestically, of a new and different set
of priorities...merely stimulating growth within the
present structure of the economy would not meet with the
country's longer term requirements" (Ibid:2). What
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emerged from this position is a stronger commitment to
more far-reaching political reforms and the
implementation of measures to de-regulate the economy
and remove the restrictions hampering the involvement of
black entrepeneurs in the domestic economy.
The commitment towards deregulation was accompanied by
calls for greater privatisation of state assets.
Privatisation and deregulation were essential strategies
in responding to the long-term threat facing capital in
South Africa: "Privatisation has two advantages - first,
it opens up to private enterprise areas of activity that
were previously preserves of government. In that way it
would allow for greater efficiency and a redistribution
of economic control and earning power. Second, it would
provide government with funds to pursue other aims - in
housing, law and order, education, training, defence,
where the needs are great" (Ibid:3) and thirdly, it
would 'remove from state control i.e. de-politicise
certain aspects of the state's activities. Capital
agitated for the urgent implementation of these
strategies. Its concerns were graphically expressed by
Dr Zach de Beer, an executive director of the Anglo-
American Corporation:
"There is a very real danger that they [black South
Africans] may wish to throw out the baby of free
enterprise with the bathwater of apartheid. It behoves
every committed supporter of free enterprise to start
now, working to bring the benefits of the system more
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and more within the reach of our black citizens, so that
they too may become believers in it" (quoted in Race
Relations Survey 1987/88:387). In July 1987,
representatives of the reforming wing of capital,
including Dr Zach de Beer, took a calculated step and
met representatives of the African National Congress in
Dakar, Senegal.
The pressure labour exerted on capital at the workplace
was paralleled at the level of the state in the daily
street battles in the townships. Instead of stability
and economic growth, the Botha reforms provoked renewed
unrest despite the continued imposition of a state of
emergency, declared in June 1986. In February 1988,
restrictions were placed on the political activities of
COSATU along with the effective banning of the
activities of 17 other extra-parliamentary
organisations. These restrictions on labour through the
coercive powers of the state was accompanied by
legislative efforts first initiated in 1986 to devise a
new Labour Relations Act to cut back on the gains made
by orgAnised labour since the Wiehahn reforms. While
these efforts to restrict the class power of labour
continued, the Botha government's reform initiatives
appeared to be in tatters with the continuing escalation
of political instability and the emergence of a
leadership crisis within the ruling National Party. At
the 1987 general election the NP lost significant
support in the Cape to the Independent Movement, a
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breakaway left faction of the NP. In the Transvaal the
Conservative Party routed the NP in many areas. The NP
did even worse in the municipal election in 1988. The
continuing threat of the sanctions campaign and the arms
embargo, which contributed to the military debacle of
Cuito Cuanavale, in Southern Angola, contributed to the
looming crisis in the ruling party. In February 1989,
F.W. De Klerk took over the leadership of the National
Party. A month later the NP Federal Council agreed to a
resolution uniting the posts of State President and
leader of the National Party against the wishes of P.W.
Botha who retired soon after, calling an election in
September and thus opening the way for De Klerk to
succeed him as State President.
The way was cleared to move away from the 'Total
Strategy' doctrine and take the reform process a step
further. In October 1989, eight long-term political
prisoners, senior members of the ANC and the PAC were
released. On the 2nd February 1990, De Klerk announced
the unbanning of the ANC, PAC, SACP and the lifting of
the restrictions on 33 organisations in terms of the
state of emergency. A week later, Nelson Mandela was
released. In this way conditions were established for a
new phase of political reform.
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The limits of the apartheid state's reform strategy
Immediate pressure on the domestic economy conditioned
the state's efforts at long-term restructuring of the
financial system. The short and medium term strategies
applied, in response to immediate pressures, remained
inadequate because of continuing structural deficiencies
in the South African economy. This had immediate
consequences for the ability of the state to respond to
working class pressure by extending social reform.
In the period 1984-5, the state's strategy to overcome
crisis had been to combine loose monetary policy with
fiscal expansion resulting in an increase in private
expenditure. As a result recessionary conditions in
1985-6 were followed by expanding real GDP in 1987 and
1988, -from 0.3% in 1986 to 2.1% and 3.2% in 1987 and
1988 respectively (see Ovenden and Cole,1989:43). In
principle, medium term objectives have been to reduce
the rate of inflation and to keep the fiscal deficit
low. However, as Ovenden and Cole show, in practice
attempts were made to maintain employment growth through
fiscal expansion and monetary policy was used to
influence the rate of growth in the short term by
keeping interest rates low. Consequently, this
application of policy "mainly served to highlight major
areas of persistent economic vulnerability. The two most
import,ant of these are the fragility of the current
account surplus.. .and the level of domestic savings and
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investment...The weaknesses in these two areas of the
economy are what cripples South Africa's capacity for
sustained economic growth" (Ibid:45-6). A rapid rise in
domestic growth puts pressure on the balance of payments
by producing a rise in imports putting the current
account into deficit until such time as domestic demand
is curtailed. "The lesson was reasonably clear: the
government had employed expansionary demand management
policies to stimulate economic activity in the wake of
the economic and political events of 1984 and 1985.
However, these policies proved insufficient on their own
to create sustainable GDP growth in excess of about 2.0%
without exerting pressure on the current account of the
balance of payments...Normally any reasonably healthy
economy would make up the difference through its capital
account...South Africa, however, could not follow this
path because it had been forced to become a net exporter
of capital" (Ibid:51). As a result, South Africa's low
growth rate is a function of its inability to maintain a
current account deficit because it still had to service
its debt repayments despite limited capital-inflows.
This had immediate implications for the ability of the
South African state to finance social reforms and keep
its expanding population employed.
The economy had been unable to stem rising unemployment
rates. Between 1981 and 1987, unemployment among the
urban black population rose from 7.7% to 15.9%. The
historical legacy of the apartheid state's restrictions
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on labour mobility of black workers, lack of training
facilities for black workers, investment in capital-
intenAve production because of the scarcity of skilled-
labour, all contributed to a situation inhibiting the
creation of employment and the ability to combat
unemployment at a time of rapid population growth.
Negative real interest rates remained a damper on
savings and therefore on domestic investment. Regulation
had ensured that domestic saving was largely directed to
investing in public sector debt. The tax system ensured
that the larger proportion of domestic saving was done
through insurance companies and pension funds, both
required by law to invest in public sector debt.
Restrictions remained on access by black entrepeneurs to
commercial loans in order to establish their own
businesses.
Despite the relatively low interest rates, all these
conditions contributed to the decline of real gross
domestic investment from 1982 to 1987. Political
instability had increased the risk for domestic
investment. The absence of a long-term political
strategy acceptable to domestic capital inhibited
investment. This refusal to invest was "becoming a
progressively more binding constraint as the stock of
295
capital wears out and becomes obsolete, and as the
numbers of the unemployed grow ever larger" (Ovenden and
Cole,1989: 57) On the other hand, public sector
expenditure continued to rise as a threatened state
sought to counteract the economic consequences of its
own policies and, in so doing, ran large budget
deficits. The burden of this fell on the tax system and
the public sector borrowing requirement. Taxes rose
throughout the eighties. The double-digit inflation rate
over the decade was a further constraint on domestic
investment.
It was not surprising that short-term efforts to boost
export revenue had been unsuccesful given the economic
conditions outlined above. The ability of the South
African state to overcome economic and political crisis
through social reform measures remained limited. Other
measures would have to be sought to encourage growth in
the economy. Only strategic medium and long-term
measures aimed at a restructuring of the economic and
political system could begin the process whereby the
apartheid state and the class relations of which this
state is an expression, can begin to reconstitute
itself in an attempt to overcome the contradictory
relations on which it is based. A major part of this
restructuring is the restructuring of the financial
system itself.
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Restructuring the financial system
The pressure for restructuring the financial system grew
stronger after 1985. The monetary and financial policy
was still not working. The changing relationship with
the international economy after the debt standstill
resulted in a new set of conditions constraining the
financial system and which had a direct impact on the
domestic economy. The withdrawal of foreign loan finance
meant that the current account of the balance of
payments had to remain in surplus at all times even
during an expansionary phase of the business cycle. This
meant allowing for a growth rate lower than normal. At a
time when the economy required a net inflow of capital
for its developmental needs, the economy was forced to
export capital instead.
There is an important interrelationship between the
domestic economic developments and the balance of
payments that arises from the structural features of the
domestic economy. The Governor of the Reserve Bank,
argued that "In the case of South Africa during the past
year, there can be no doubt that the substantial rise in
imports and, to a lesser extent, also the disappointing
performance of exports, were the direct result of the
inordinate increase in total consumption and investment
spending, financed in large measure by excessive
increases in bank credit and the money supply. These
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domestic excesses constitute the real problem - the
'
decline in the current account surplus was largely a
consequence or symptom of the underlying domestic
situation." But, he argues further, "This in no way
detracts from the fact that in South Africa's special
circumstances the continued net outflow of capital does
constitute an independent 'balance of payments
constraint', as it is principally the result of the
country's strained international relationship and not of
domestic economic policies or developments, Given this
constraint, however, it is still true that the condition
of the rest of the balance of payments remains closely
related to domestic economic developments and policies"
(0GM1988:10-11).
The domestic economy showed an improvement in 1988. A
rise in consumer and investment spending increased gross
domestic expenditure Real GNP increased at an average
annual rate of 5% from the 2nd quarter of 1986 to the
2nd quarter of 1988. To the Governor of the SARB, this
was a consequence of expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies which had stimulated the domestic economy. To
him the renewed confidence displayed by domestic
capital could partly be attributed to "combining the
maintenance of law and order with political reform"
(0GM1988:7).
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The period also saw a substantial rise in bank credit
and money supply reflecting an increase in credit
extended by banks and building societies to the private
sector and a further decline in the rate of inflation.
The Reserve Bank saw this as a vindication of its
-
monetary policies over the previous years, arguing that
" In retrospect it is clear that the exchange rate
depreciation and the accompanying temporary acceleration
in the rate of price inflation during 1985 and part of
1986 formed a vital part of the unavoidable adjustment
which the South African economy had to make during that
period in response to (a) the lower dollar price of
gold, weak commodity markets and the drought, and (b)
the heavy outflow of capital caused largely by socio-
political developments. To effect this adjustment, which
inevitably entailed some decline in real income per head
of the  population, South Africa had to export more and
import less, and the depreciation of the rand helped to
bring about the changes in relative prices that were
necessary to this end" (OGM,1988:9). The decline in real
income however was at the expense of the working class
who suffered the worst effects of the high inflation
rates. To the state, this was a necessary price to pay
to 'get the economy right'.
However, the improvements in the economy were short-
lived, as the effects of the structural imbalances in
the economy began to re-emerge. The adjustments made by
the Reserve Bank proved inadequate for the maintenance
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of long-term economic stability. The dependence on
imported capital goods and the consumption patterns of
the rich put great pressure on the capital account of
the balance of payments. " In the present international
political climate the capital account remains the
achilles heel of South Africa's balance of payments. The
net outflow of non-reserve-related capital in 1985 and
1986 amounted to R15,3 billion in total. It then
declined to R3,1 billion during 1987 and to a mere R0,7
billion during the first quarter of 1988. During the
second quarter of 1988, however, the net capital outflow
increased to about R2 billion, most of which occured
during the last three weeks of June" as a result of the
sudden appreciation of the US$ and the decline in the
dollar price of gold (OGM,1988:9).
The surplus on the current account declined in 1988 and
the first half of 1989 from R6,2 billion(3,7% of GDP) in
1987 to only R2,9 billion (1,5% of GDP) in 1988, and to
the annualised level of R2,3 billion (1,1% of G2DP) in
the first half of 1989 due, essentially to the rising
level of the rand value of merchandise imports.
The favourable position of the capital account of the
balance of payments during 1987 and the first quarter of
1988 was not sustained. The total outflow of non-
reserve-related capital rose from R3,1 billion in 1987
to R6,5 billion in 1988 and amounted to R2,9 billion in
the first 6 months of 1989. The year 1988 was the first
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year since 1985 in which the capital outflow exceeded
the current account surplus.
The effective exchange rate declined from the beginning
of 1988 to 24 August 1989 by 20,4%. The decline of the
rand in terms of the dollar during the same period,
amounted to 30,311. South Africa's total gross gold and
foreign reserves declined, on balance, from R8,7 billion
(US$4,2 billion) at the end of August 1987 to R8,2
billion (US$3,9 billion) at the end of March 1988 and
further to R7,4 billion (US$2,7 billion) at the end of
June 1989.
The deterioration in South Africa's terms of trade and
higher real net factor payments to the rest of the world
caused a substantial reduction in the real gross
national product.
Institutional reform and changes in
legal regulation of the financial sector
Overcoming the structural deficiencies of the financial
system requires institutional and regulative reform of
the financial system. State strategies for the
restructuring of the financial system had been under
consideration since the De Kock Commission's inquiry
started in 1978. As a result of the Commission's work,
regulation of the financial system had been under
constant review. The Final Report of the Commission,
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released in the year the rand collapsed on the foreign
exchanges, provided the framework within which the state
was able to respond to the monetary crisis by
institututing legal and administrative reforms of the
•
financial sector
In April 1987 the Reserve Bank began assuming
responsibility for bank and building society
supervision. This step became necessary as a result of
the changes that took place in the financial services
sector. Competition within the industry had propelled
banks into the money and capital markets as active
traders in securities and other related instruments.
Many banks had extended the range of their products and
techniques including home mortgage loans. Building
societies in turn had increasingly moved into
traditional banking business. Non-deposit-taking
institutions (eg insurers) had developed quasi-deposit
products and were engaging in the provision of credit to
corporate and other borrowers.
These developments had important implications for
financial regulation and administration. They provided
the immediate justification for the restructuring of the
financial sector. Firstly, the Reserve Bank was
concerned that the new risks accompanying these
developments do not threaten the financial integrity of
deposit-taking institutions.The Reserve Bank made
adjustments to the prudential requirements. From the end
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of 1986, banks had to comply with new asset-based
capital requirements. Secondly, in a situation of
intensifying competitive pressure, mergers and
cartelisation, blurring forms and overlapping functions
of institutions active in the financial services sector
posed a direct threat to the smaller banks. In its role
as lender of last resort and as overall coordinator of
financial institutions, the Reserve Bank was concerned
to maintain a 'level playing field' for the different
classes of financial institutions. Lastly, the market in
new instruments, such as options and futures, requires
appropriate administrative and regulatory measures.
In February 1988 the government announced new economic
initiatives in response to the threat posed by the
monetary crisis on the apartheid state. The government
announced a new commitment to reduce government
expenditure, to scale down the share of the public
sector in the economy, to reduce the budget 'deficit
before borrowing' as a percentage of gross domestic
product, to proceed with privatisation and deregulation
and to proceed with the tax reform proposals of the
Margo Commission. From early March 1988, the Reserve
Bank gradually tightened its monetary policy in view of
a sharp increase in bank credit and the money supply.
The Bank attempted to moderate increases in interest
rates by expanding its own net domestic credit by
rediscounting liquid assets or extending overnight loans
and by providing forward exchange cover.
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The South African Reserve Bank Act of 1989 consolidated
and rationalised the legislative framework defining its
role and powers. The primary objective of the Bank was
aimed at pursuing "monetary stability and balanced
economic growth in the Republic". To achieve this, the
Bank planned to influence total monetary demand through
control over the money supply and over the availability
of credit (OGM,1989). The Act enshrines the full scope
of the Reserve Bank's powers in one piece of
legislation, incorporating for the first time the
functions of the Mint. The Act also empowers the SARB to
investigate companies not registered in terms of the
Banks Act, but which are carrying on the business of a
banking institution. This power was extended to the SARB
initially in an amendment to the Banks Act in 1988 when
it was found that companies were circumventing the
exchange control regulations through over-invoicing of
imports and other ways of avoiding exchange control.
On 1st February 1991, The Deposit-taking Institutions
Act came into effect complementing the new legislation
rationalising the powers of the Reserve bank. The Act
creates a uniform legal framework within which the state
could regulate all deposit-taking institutions based on
an equity-financed structure (banking institutions,
building societies and discount houses). The strategic
significance of these legislative reforms lies in
facili	 n e ration with the world economy:
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"With the implementation of this Act, South Africa has
placed itself ahead of most other countries in the world
with its approach towards banking supervision. It also
laid the necessary foundations for the creation of a
sound banking system that will be able to play its
important financial role in future developments, both
locally and abroad. In line with the easing of the
political situation, South African banks are already
beginning to show interest in establishing their own
representation in some of the major international
financial centres, and in extending their activities
into other African countries" (OGM,1991:16).
With this Act, legislative restructuring of all
deposit-taking institutions was largely completed. The
Act rationalised the relationship of all private
financial institutions and brought them into line with
banking operations internationally. This facilitated the
expansion of SA banking operations regionally and
internationally. In this way the restructuring of the
financial sector enabled the domestic economy to take a
further step in its integration with global capitalism.
The institutional and regulatory reforms introduced, the
financial measures taken to overcome immediate economic
pressures and the effect of working class struggles, all
combined to set the conditions for capital accumulation
in South Africa in the 1990's. These changing conditions
for accumulation are accompanied by and parallel the
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changes in the social relations of production. The
state's efforts to overcome crisis through financial
restructuring is met at every turn by the constraints
imposed by existing social relations of production.
However, working class struggles in the seventies and
eighties have changed the balance of class forces. The
-
social tendencies of class fragmentation and
recomposition put pressure on the state to respond to
these social changes if it is to reproduce its rule and
maintain stability in the production and reproduction of
capital. The struggle to overcome the barriers imposed
by workers' struggle on the accumulation process had
immediate implications for the form of the South African
state. The struggle of the state to reintegrate the
domestic economy with the world economy, to overcome the
crisis in the balance of payments, to limit inflationary
pressure and to reduce unemployment, could not be
pursued in isolation of restructuring the relations of
power and domination embodied in the apartheid state.
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CHAPTER NINE
Class struggle and the rule of money
beyond apartheid
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to assess the
policies and strategies of the post-apartheid state on
money and banking and its future prospects in the light
of the changing nature of global capitalist relations in
the 1990's and the place of a restructured South African
state within it.
The process of financial reform and restructuring after
the collapse of the rand in 1985 was dominated by
continued efforts to implement the regulatory framework
proposed by the Final Report of the De Kock Commission.
But, as I have shown earlier, South Africa after 1985
was characterised by the intensification of workers'
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struggles as the economic crisis deepened and living
standards were threatened by high inflation and
increasing unemployment. The crisis of capital
accumulation and the intensification of class struggle
increased the pressures on the apartheid state to take
more fundamental steps to resolve the crisis. The
ability of the apartheid state to safeguard the
production and reproduction of capital was being
subverted by the exercise of class power of an
increasingly united and militant workers movement. In
responding to this development, capital and the state
were forced to take increasingly bolder moves. What
became apparent was that the form of the apartheid state
began to fragment as capital and the working class
increasingly saw the apartheid state as a barrier to
their own reproduction. "We cannot allow the free
enterprise system to be honoured more in the breach than
the observance in so vital a matter as the freedom of
movement of South Africans, of whatever colour", argued
Gavin Relly in an address to the Free Market Foundation.'
To capital, it was the political and economic strategies
of the apartheid state that had brought about the
crisis. The state's reform strategies were not
succeeding in dealing effectively with the crisis. The
slow pace of reform had only served to escalate
political instability and radicalise the black
Gavin Relly, Influx control and economic growth,
supplement in Optima, 31(3) 1983 p8.
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population. Political and industrial conflict were
posing a threat to domestic capital and would have had
adverse implications for South Africa's relationship to
the world economy.
To labour, the intensification of the political and
organisational power of the trade union movement (and
the mass struggle as a whole) gave workers a growing
confidence in their capacity to transform the apartheid
state. The capacity of the apartheid state to rule in
the old way deteriorated rapidly.
The pressure on the apartheid state by labour and
capital was an expression of the changing dynamic of
class relations. To the extent that the state is an
institutional manifestation of this relation, the social
pressure to restructure the state intensified. Clarke
(1988:16) informs us that the specific way in which this
process takes place is generally conditioned by the
actual outcome of class struggles and is never
completely resolved at any one time: rather, its
"development is the outcome of a history of class
struggle in and against the institutional forms of the
capitalist mode of production, whose historical
resolution is always provisional" (Clarke,1988:16). The
provisional nature of the outcome of class struggles
implies that the balance of class forces can condition
the pace, content and implementation of the restructing
process. Financial reform was an important pillar of the
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struggle of the apartheid state to overcome crisis. Yet
financial reforms in themselves proved unable to rescue
the South African economy from crisis. During the course
of the period of financial restructuring from the late
seventies, working class struggles in its various forms,
propelled the state to take the reform process further
from what was originally intended. As the political and
economic crisis intensified, so the apartheid state
sought new ways to reassert its rule and ensure the
continuation of capital accumulation. The state
responded to the fragmentation and recomposition of
changing class relations by changing its form. While the
consequences of this recomposition are still being
determined, what has become apparent is that the
calculated decision by the Botha and later the De Klerk
government to dismantle the constitutional basis of the
apartheid state has made possible a new political order
by extending the franchise. In this way it has become
possible for the political leadership of the black
working class, to be incorporated into the state
apparatus. The government of national unity formed
after the April 1994 elections, is now directly involved
in the process of finding ways to overcome the legacy of
crisis through seeking accord with capital and labour.
The new ruling class in South Africa has confined the
process of restructuring to within the limits set by the
valorisation of capital. It is in this sense therefore
that there is continuity between the 'post-apartheid'
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state and the process of restructuring started by the
apartheid state. The post- apartheid state differs from
its predecessor in creating a new constitutional
framework of regulation and administration that made
possible the extension and deepening of capitalist
social relations unshackled by the barriers imposed by
the apartheid state.
This has important implications for social relations and
the form of the post-apartheid state. It poses inherent
limitations on the struggle to overcome crisis and the
ability of the working class to secure a future free
from class domination. The immediate question for the
working class at present concerns the fact that the
post-apartheid state is imposing the rule of capital on
the state. State strategies for labour are not concerned
with strategies for the socialisation of production but
instead are confined within a form of the state that is
inconsistent even with the social democratic strategy of
growth through redistribution.'
This democratisation of the South African state is
however a two-edged sword. On the one hand, through the
extension of the franchise and the development of new
constitutional principles in which the capitalist state
is re-constituted on a non-racial and democratic basis
the right of the masses to participate in the political
process has been won in principle. This is an important
victory. Yet, on the other hand, its full realisation in
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practice is only possible with the transformation of
capitalist social relations to the socialisation of
production relations. Such a transformation is only
possible to the extent that the social relations of
production and distribution itself are transformed from
their basis in the alienated form of production for
value to production for social need. But the
restructuring process in South Africa has not gone so
far. While it is an advance for the working class to
achieve access to the state, the state has been
institutionally restructured in its relation with
capital. The pre-reform period was characterised by the
struggle by state and capital to achieve the imposition
of capital within the existing state form. The form of
institutional restructuring achieved after apartheid is
reimposing the rule of capital on the state.
State form
The development of the class struggle in South Africa
has never been confined solely within the institutional
-
forms within which the apartheid state attempted to
confine it. The same would be true of the reconstituted
state. The contradictory tendencies of capital
accumulation constantly create new obstacles to the
efforts by workers to satisfy their aspirations, and
imposes new constraints on the ability of capital and
the state to respond to workers' aspirations within its
institutional forms. For this reason, the development of
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the capitalist state form parallels the development of
the class struggle, which itself "is a struggle over the
form of the state, conducted in and against the
differentiated institutional forms of capitalist
domination."(Clarke,1988:142) The South African state
after apartheid will be subject to the same conditions
precisely because the institutional forms of social
relations remain premised on the formal separation of
the state from civil society and the reproduction of the
capital relation.
The formal separation of the state from civil society, a
feature of the liberal form of the state, embodies the
abstract power of the state in the rule of money and the
law: "The formal freedom and equality of the citizen
before the law is merely the other side of the formal
freedom and equality of the individual in the face of
money. The state secures the reproduction of civil
society by enforcing the rule of money and the law,
which are at the same time its own presupposition. Thus
the liberal form of the state secures the mutual
subordination of civil society and the state to the
anonymous rule of money and the law"
Clarke, 1988:127).
The subordination of the state and civil society to the
abstract rule of money and law enables the capitalist
class to assert its domination over both civil society
and the state. "However the substance of state power, as
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the power of a particular class, contradicts its form,
as expression of the general interest" (Clarke,
1988:128).
In the historical development of the capitalist state
form Clarke (1988) has shown that the restructuring of
the state's administrative, legal,fiscal, monetary and
financial apparatuses were of greater importance to the
ascendency of bourgeois class rule than the apparently
revolutionary transformation in the system of political
representation: "The reconstitution of the state was
ultimately determined not by the political triumph of
the bourgeoisie but by the transformation of the social
relations of production." (Clarke,1988:131) The power of
capital was embodied in the liberal form of the state
and not in the access to the institutions of state
power. The extension of the franchise therefore did not
threaten its power. Rather, the liberalisation of the
state form was a condition for political reform, the
kind of political reform that would provide a means to
draw the working class closer to the constitution of the
capitalist state and establish the basis for its
political fragmentation.
With its first constitutional act, the new state has
redefined its relationship to the newly enfranchised
population including the black working class. It has set
in motion new forms of differentiation within the
working class: workers as workers, consumers and
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citizens. This comes at a time also when trade union
membership is showing signs of levelling of f. 2 The steady
erosion of working class unity that is increasingly
likely in the reconstructed state, will open the way for
the progressive imposition of the power of money i.e.,
capital in its most abstract form, on the state and the
working class.
The internationalisation of capital will undermine and
circumscribe the capacity of the state to intervene in
the economy in pursuit of redistributive strategies (See
'
Radice,1984 and Clarke,1988). This has important
implications for the South African domestic economy in
the 1990's and for the ability to develop autonomous
economic strategies: "South Africa in the 1990's.. .is
likely to find that its decision-taking elites are
exposed to far greater demands than ever before from
outside constituencies. They may witness as well a
fragmentation of their authority....The result could be
a decline in government autonomy" (Mann,1991:30). The
declining authority of the state is a function of the
subordination of civil society and the state to the
power "of capital in its abstract forms, viz money and
the law. Consequently it is the contradictory tendencies
of capital accumulation on a world scale that impose
limits on the form of the (nation) state. The process of
state restructuring on a national scale in South Africa
2 See Ian Macun, South African unions still growing?
SALB, 17(4) July/August 1993.
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cannot be separated from the imperatives of the global
power of money.
_
Restructuring the financial system: The RDP and the MERG
report
With the establishment of a 'government of national
unity' under the political leadership of Nelson Mandela
in 1994, the ANC is now centrally placed to play a key
role in the process of restructuring the state. The ANC
published a wide-ranging policy document which set out
their objectives in the reconstruction and development
of South Africa after apartheid. This Reconstruction and
Development Programme has now become the principal
policy document adopted as a framework for the new
government.
Rejecting both 'commandist central planning' and
unfettered free market' systems, the RDP calls for the
state to play a 'leading and enabling role in guiding
the economy and the market toward reconstruction and
development'(RDP:80).'The democratic government, the
trade union movement, business associations and the
relevant organisations of civil society must cooperate
in formulating economic policy'(Ibid:81).
The RDP appears as a laudatory attempt at formulating a
comprehensive policy framework for the reconstruction of
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state and civil society. It places priority on the
'basic needs' of the population and the broadest
participation in the planning and coordination of the
programme. Its weakness is that it is written in the
language of consensus. It treats the state, capital and
labour equally and assumes that the programme can be
implemented by appealing to this consensus; a pertinent
illustration of this is the statement that "the
democfatic government must enter into discussions with
holders of wealth in an effort to persuade them of the
harmful effects their actions are having on our economy"
(Ibid:112-3)! The RDP ignores or underplays real
inequalities in resources, power and interests. In doing
so it lays open the programme to differing
interpretations arising from vested class interests.
But, more fundamentally, the programme takes further the
process of capitalist restructuring that began with de
Kock-Wiehahn-Riekert reforms of the early eighties and
seeks •to mobilise the broadest possible support within
the newly enfranchised population behind such
restructuring. The fact that it is the ANC taking the
lead in this process has given it a legitimacy that the
apartheid reforms had no hope of attaining. From the
perspective of capital, the RDP legitimises,defends and
extends capitalist relations of production and
accumulation in SA and facilitates the fuller
integration of the domestic economy to the international
economy. The RDP takes further the efforts by the
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apartheid state to de-politicise economic relations. It
extends and deepens the command of capital over labour.
From the perspective of the labour movement, the RDP
reflects the growing support for corporatist strategies
as an alternative to large-scale nationalisation. In
supporting a 'social market economy', the SACTWU
Congress in July 1994 expressed support for the view
that, "Through our struggles we can create a system of
co-determination, where capital or government is unable
to act in a unilateral manner. Through co-determination
we can have a joint say over economic policy at
national, sectoral and company level. Decisions on
macro-economic policy would need to be resolved through
tri-partite institutions. Wage policies for all
factories in one sector would be settled through
centralised collective bargaining. The flow of
investments will be influenced through industry-wide
restructuring policies, negotiated with unions...In
short, the ability of the owners of capital to exercise
their power would be limited through requirements in law
that they negotiate with trade unions."(SACTWU,1993:27-
27) The role of the state, in this view, would be
directed at facilitating self-regulation between capital
and labour based on a system of collective bargaining
rather than state-regulation (ibid:29).
What is significant about the Reconstruction and
Development Programme of the ANC and the report of the
Macro-Economic Research Group, is that both policy
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documents make a commitment to regulate the SA economy
indirecti;--ough the financial system rather than
directly, through the nationalisation of _private assets.
In so doing, the RDP and the MERG fundamentally continue
the process of financial reform that commenced with the
De Kock Commmission. As with De Kock, so with the MERG
and RDP, ways are sought to regulate and restructure SA
capital through its fetishised forms - although capital
could not achieve this against working class opposition
during the apartheid era. This is paralleled in the
labour movement by the call to combine the financial
resources of the trade union movement in order to
influence capital: "By concentrating to build an
independent financial base for workers, we can influence
investment decisions over our money, rather than
enriching the share-holders of private banks, building
societies and insurance companies. There are major gains
for labour in such a programme."(Ibid.:28)
It is clear from the above illustrations, that
significant sections of the labour movement and the ANC
are committed to a 'partnership' with capital which
leaves the central tenets of capital's strategies
intact. The political strategies of labour (as
represented by the SACTWU policy document) and the ANC
amount fundamentally to a demobilisation of the workers'
struggle by seeking to limit class struggle within the
fetishised forms of capitalist social relations, viz.
'collective bargaining system', tri-partite fora and the
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rule of money. For the workers' struggle, the RDP
represents an era of class collaboration in which the
aspirations of workers will be increasingly
marginalised, directed and subordinated to the interests
of capital. For workers, the RDP raises more questions
than it provides answers. As one commentator wrote: "The
RDP reads like a well-meaning wish-list. No decent
person could possibly object to it. But where will the
money come from? Will there be a serious attempt to
reallocate resources and power away from the rich and
the whites or not? What will be the mechanism and
institutions to do this? What about democratic and
public control of state enterprises? Any issue which
might suggest a serious conflict with the interests of
the rich and powerful has been smoothed over. This is a
document that is as important for its silence as for
what it says." (van Holt,1993:23,25)
1. The Reconstruction and Development Programme on
restructuring of the financial system
The Reconstruction and Development Programme, devised by
the ANC, is an attempt at an integrated policy framework
for socio-economic development. Reform of the financial
sector is seen as important because the legacy of
apartheid has concentrated resources in "A handful of
large financial institutions, all linked closely to the
dominant conglomerates" (RDP:1994:110), without serving
the needs of the black population. The RDP appeals to
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the new government to : "modify regulations and support
innovative financial institutions and instruments which
mobilise private domestic savings to help fund the RDP,
while not reducing incentives for personal savings. The
democratic government must enhance accountability,
access and transparency in the financial sector. In
cooperation with other stakeholders, it must review both
regulations and regulatory systems to determine which
aspects prove an unnecessary impediment to the RDP, and
more generally to greater efficiency in the mobilisation
and subsequent allocation of savings." (Ibid:110) The
RDP is committed to the extension of financial services
to the population hitherto marginalised by the banking
system through 'prudent non-descriminatory lending',
community banking', restructuring of pension and
provident funds and a more accountable Reserve Bank.
The RDP is seen as a programme that "has been developed
with and can be implemented together with, mass
organisations in civil society." "It seeks to forge a
functional relationship between the state and its
institutions, and various organisations that have
vitalised civil society." (Alec Erwin, in SALB Vol.18(1)
1994:39,40) Harnessing these resources are necessary
because, any attempt by the state to assume full
responsibility for our future would be foolhardy'.
Similarly, we cannot rely solely on the market, which
is incapable of effecting major structural reform'.
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Bobby Godsell, a Director of the Anglo-American
Corporation welcomed the RDP programme, was enamoured by
its pragmatism and its call for the participation of
business in its implementation but was cautious of the
targets set:"Some of the targets set do not suggest that
there has been a serious examination of the achievable.
Can the promise be funded? Are there constraints beyond
money? Does the target make sense ?" (Ibid;46)
What is significant about the proposals on financial
restructuring in the RDP is that they leave intact the
monetary and financial framework set up by the De Kock
reforms. What the RDP seeks to do is divert more
resources towards productive investments from the
financial sector and from people's savings. The crisis,
however, is not about the unwillingness to invest,
rather it concerns the unprofitability of investment.
Consequently, diverting funds towards productive
investment, will only exacerbate the crisis. This crisis
is unavoidable so long as South Africa is integrated
into the world economy. The RDP establishes a framework
for a new phase of struggle in which the state will be
subjected to capital by the financial crisis and will
face growing popular resistance. This raises the
question, which way will the struggle turn?
Report from the Macro-economic Research Group
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-
The MERG report, provided the detailed policy framework
for the RDP. It provided specific policy recommendations
that follow from the key tenets of ANC economic policy.
It raises the same general questions that arise with the
RDP.
The objectives of the MERG proposals for restructuring
of the financial system, are:
1. To extend banking services to the black population by
creating a low-cost and easy accessible system of money
transfer;
2. To increase personal savings;
3. to facilitate conditions for investment in growth
sectors of the economy and in black'enterprises;
4. To establish a stable source of funds for the state
5. To improve the ability of financial institutions to
supervise industrial and commercial enterprises;
6. To restructure the Reserve Bank and the Johannesburg
Stock Exchange.
These objectives, MERG argues, "would make the benefits
of banking and finance available to the whole
population, and would actively involve the financial
Institutions in financing the new social infrastructure
and industrial development" (MERG,1993:243).
The point of departure for the MERG recommendations is
that the present financial system is 'unsuited to the
task of transforming the South African
economy'(Ibid:244).
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The financial infrastructure of the apartheid state has
been based on the the predominance of commercial banking
for short-term finance, the Johannesburg Stock Exchange
for raising long-term equity capital, the mining finance
houses and the savings institutions (life assurance and
pension funds). These have been the institutional
pillars
of the apartheid state. The need for restructuring arose
from the failure to overcome continuing crisis. The
first major attempt at restructuring, as a consequence
of the recommendations of the De Kock Commission, has
been a long drawn out process that is yet to be
completed, despite the publication of its Final Report
in 1985. To MERG, the De Kock Commission shifted the
focus too much away from restructuring and developing
the appropriate financial institutions 'towards
unregulated operations on competitive financial markets'
in the hope that this would facilitate the flow of funds
to the productive sectors of the economy. MERG believes
that this policy of financial liberalisation has been a
failure:"The system has become increasingly dominated by
a few large savings institutions and banks...While new
markets in futures and derivatives have grown, they do
not deal directly with capital for industry or the
state, and the capital market itself...remains
uncompetitive and non-innovative...The financial system
is neither adequate for financing economic growth and
restructuring, nor a successful international market
with financial services companies whose international
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profits contribute to the balance of payments"
(Ibid:244-5). MERG identifies the following features
contributing to the failure of the financial system:
1. The recommendation of the De Kock Commission to
liberalise the foreign exchange market was unrealistic
and could not be implemented;
2. The move towards market-related policies has not
improved investment in competitive industry nor has it
facilitated investment in economic and social
infrastructure; and
3. The market-oriented approach has left the financial
institutions largely intact allowing them to channel
their resources into 'soft options' in the financial and
real estate markets rather than into investing in
economic development. MERG opts for a restructuring
programme directed at the institutions rather than the
markets. A restructuring programme should develop the
appropriate institutions best able to facilitate the
programme.
MERG proposes the establishment of a 'People Bank'
similar to the giro banks in Europe and Japan. The
objective being the creation of a banking institution
that would be best able to extend the range of banking
services to the majority of the population. The
consequence of present banking services which de facto
exclude the majority of people is that "A national mass
market cannot be developed fully (as it should be, if
domest-ically oriented manufacturing is to grow), as
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transactions are costly and difficult if they always
involve the handling of cash"(MERG,1993:246).
The MERG proposal is for the People's Bank to be
operated through the post office, an institution more
familiar and accessible to black people, with an
established national branch network and electronic links
to facilitate low-cost banking transactions.
Developing financial policies directed at increasing
personal savings is a key element of the MERG proposals.
"the scale of the transformation required in South
Africa is such that the new strategy will aim for a
large increase in private and public sector investment.
If this is not to be accompanied by a substantial
worsening of the current account of balance of payments,
it will require an increase in domestic saving to
accommodate it, and increased personal saving should
have a central role in this" (Ibid:249)3
Another objective of institutional restructuring for
MERG i.e to ensure the financing of productive
investment. Savings on their own is not sufficient for
this purpose. "Financial development requires policies
to develop appropriate institutions in which the
relations between finance and production are not purely
market transactions" (Ibid:253). Financial policies
3 MERG: "The principles Keynes successfully applied to
financing the huge investment required for war, apply to
the huge investment that will be required in South
Africa"(Ibid:249).
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directing funds to productive investment can be made
possible, suggests MERG, by developing the necessary
institutions promoting new investments and by
influencing the price and terms of finance for this
purpose. Following upon this, MERG proposes 4 ways in
which the Johannesburg Stock Exchange could be
restructured.
1. Establishing compulsory funds able to purchase stakes
in quoted companies at market prices.
2. Strengthening low-cost, entry-level sub markets such
as the Development Board and the Venture Capital Board.
3. Enabling foreign companies to raise capital on the
JSE.
4. Maintaining stability in the capital markets by
establishing a Capital Issues Commission under the
Ministry of Finance in order to consider and authorise
company plans for new issues. The Commission would also
channel funds into priority areas and ensure that
companies raising capital do so in accordance with
national policy on employment and other practices.
To increase public sector funds, MERG proposes that the
long term capital fund institutions, pension funds and
life assurance, be subject to prescribed asset
requirements under which a proportion of their assets
can be invested in public sector capital projects. This
will effectively reduce the public sector borrowing
requirement that has to be financed by bank credit,
reduce overseas borrowing by the public sector and
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enable the government to raise funds through domestic
bond issues at relatively low interest rates.
Commercial bank lending should move away from the
British model based on short-term loans, a division
between commercial and investment banking and non-
particlpation in the management of the borrower's
business in favour of the German model of corporate
financing and the representation of banks on supervisory
boards of companies. This would ensure long-term
involvement of banks in a company's development. In
order to do this and
still maintain bank profitibility, far-reaching changes
are required in company law, capital requirements of
banks and in taxation. In the specific circumstances in
South Africa as it undergoes transition, financing
public sector investment is dependent on radical
overhauling of existing public authorities including
that of the bantustan structures: "To enable the
financial system to finance public authority investment,
it is necessary to improve their revenue base and
restructure their debt...It is also necessary to adopt
proper standards for calculating and disclosing the
contingent liabilities of the public bodies that have
guaranteed the debts of other authorities" (Ibid:258).
Money and banking in the new South Africa
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To MERG, forms of regulation should go together with the
coordination and distribution of financial resources in
order to channel excess output towards productive
investment.
Since 1992, the banking system is being regulated by the
Deposit-Taking Institution's Act. The Act serves to
protect the bank shareholders' capital from risk,
restricting bank exposure and setting minimum liquid-
assets and cash ratios. MERG wants the Reserve Bank to
play a greater role in protecting the deposits in banks
from risk by introducing a system of deposit insurance.
This, MERG argues, is important in encouraging financial
flows in the desired direction by risk-weighting
different types of lending.
In a situation of regulation failure, the customary
central bank function of 'lender of last resort' has
been institutionalised to defend the monetary system.
MERG recommends that in the event of a banking crisis,
state policy should be rather towards the
nationalisation of large commercial banks requiring
lender of last resort support rather than using Reserve
Bank assets to bail out such banks.
Rather than imposing ceilings on interest rates, "it is
desirable to monitor the allocation of bank credit to
different sectors and to impose sectoral targets for
credit allocation" (Ibid:260).
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A broader framework for banking regulation is necessary
in an economy undergoing transformation. Regulatory
functions exercised by the Reserve Bank should be placed
under political control: "MERG recommends that instead
of becoming increasingly independent, the Reserve Bank
should be placed more firmly under political control.
Its conduct of monetary policy, supervision and other
functions should be made subordinate to the Minister of
Finance. (This would ensure) that monetary policy is
determined by and accountable to the democratic
government "(Ibid:261). MERG rejects the argument for a
fully .independent Reserve Bank because "It prevents the
Reserve Bank from being accountable to democratic
institutions, or being directly controlled by them. It
assumes that inflation is controllable by monetary
policy, whereas during a transition period, it will have
structural characteristics. It subordinates to control
of inflation the Reserve Bank's responsibility of lender
of last resort"(Ibid:261-2).
While the actual forms of regulation of the banking
system remains under review at the time of writing, the
indications are that the deregulation process will
continue apace and monetarist policies will not be
challenged significantly within the current
administration although it may be tempered by popular
demands around the RDP.
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Conclusion: Corporatism, state form and the power of
money
Both the RDP and the MERG study invoke the idea of a
partnership between state, labour and capital in the
reconstruction process. The shift in ANC policy towards
corporatism has been evident in the evolution of its
economic policies since the publication in 1990 of its
'Discussion Document on Economic Policy'. In 1991 COSATU
called for the establishment of a National Economic
Forum composed of representatives of labour, capital and
the state. The intention at the time was primarily to
assert COSATU's agenda on the reconstruction process at
a time when the apartheid state was pursuing its own
reform strategies and when strains were appearing in the
alliance between COSATU, ANC and the SACP. The NEF, set
up in 1992, and a restructured National Manpower
Commission which included representatives from the
independent labour movement, placed COSATU, it was
thought, in a strategic position to influence the
restructuring process. Nevertheless, as the ANC sought
to broaden its appeal, its economic policies became
decidedly 'business-friendly', flexible and pragmatic
(see Natrass,1994). As capital, labour and the apartheid
state each sought to assert their own strategic
interests in the restructuring process, so they
increasingly got locked in to a partnership which they
collectively had to justify politically to their
constituencies. Thus, the RDP and the MERG study both
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published in 1993, reflected strong tendencies within
the ANC towards corporatist strategies. 4 While the RDP
has more popular concerns: "it has been developed with
and can be implemented together with, mass organisations
in civil society" (Erwin,1994:39); it nevertheless
"seeks to forge a functional relationship between the
state and its institutions, and various organisations
that have vitalised civil society." (ibid:40)
In an analysis of the process of transition in SA,
Laurence Harris (Harris,1993:95) comes to the conclusion
that "the reality of economic and social reform in South
Africa consists of a progress measured by increased tri-
partism - forums for discussion or negotiation between
the state, business, and trade unions (or civic
associations) - but it is a collaboration that involves
no challenge to the agenda of business." "Since the
agendas to be pursued in tripartite bodies are,
therefore, no different from a rational capitalist
'
agenda, the structural reform idea that the greater
voice of trade unions at the negotiating table
represents a dynamic of progress, leading from popular
democratic victories to gains which are more socialist,
has no basis in reality."(Ibid:96) In the long term,
this strategy can only strengthen those tendencies which
serve to disarm the power of labour by strengthening the
4 "We are not yet a corporatist society, but we are en
route to becoming one", argues Jeremy Baskin in The
trend towards bargained corporatism , SALB 17(3)
May/June 1993, p65
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institutional forms binding labour to the wage relation,
the industrial relations system and the capitalist state
form. The emergence of corporatist political
institutions within the liberalised state form is not a
sign of emerging socialism as some left-commentators
suggest. There remains a fundamental contradiction
between the acceptance of the liberal state on the one
hand —and the creation of - corporatist' political
institutions. Confined within the limits of the liberal
state form, its significance is primarily ideological,
serving to disempower labour by seeking to confine
workers struggles within the institutional limits of the
liberal state form.
Wider significance of the Reconstruction and Development
Programme
The RDP is more than simply a policy framework for the
coordination of development strategies in the new South
Africa. An analysis of the RDP and the ways its goals
are being implemented reveals more than what is
presented, of the real nature of the transition process
in South Africa.
1. Labour-State relations
The RDP was initiated by COSATU as a way in which the
ANC, and through it the government of national unity,
could be locked into a pact with labour in order to
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safeguard workers' interests in the new government. For
this purpose, COSATU would continue its alliance with
the ANC and support its electoral campaigns: "The RDP is
the brainchild of COSATU. Initially it was conceived of
as a pact that would be signed between the ANC and
COSATU with the objective of binding the ANC to specific
agreements while the federation would undertake to
deliver votes for the ANC" (Buhlungu,1994:8). Continued
discussions, however, conceptualised the RDP as a
unifying programme for a broader political purpose. In
the end, the RDP became the ANC's election manifesto,
and the programme was specifically designed to broaden
the appeal of the ANC beyond its alliance with COSATU
and the Communist Party. In the period immediately
before. the elections, the ANC was concerned to impress
upon domestic and international capital that it is a
party that is friendly to business. Mindful of the
financial costs of reconstruction and the heightened
expectations among the newly enfranchised population of
what the ANC should deliver upon taking power, the ANC
was careful not to alienate potential international
investors. The RDP therefore had incorporated within it
sufficient elements to make sure the ANC is cast in this
light. Not all was simply presentation, however, for the
ANC had indeed moved closer to capital in its economic
strategies - and it was moving COSATU along as well. The
evolution of the ANC's economic and political policies
from its Discussion Document on Economic Policy
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published in 1990 to the RDP of 1994, has indicated a
steady but significant shift to the right.
A similar process was happening in COSATU. Whilst calls
for nationalisation and socialism are still heard, they
are now somewhat muted. In tandem with that of the ANC,
COSATU's policy positions started shifting away from
confrontation with the apartheid state to one in which
negotiation was seen as the only viable option for
reaching a political settlement. Instead of
'insurrectionary' politics, the politics of
reconstruction' gained greater currency. COSATU and its
affilliates started studying the industries in which
they have a presence and developing an overall
industrial policy with the objective of reducing
unemployment, increasing productivity, investment and
trade performance (See Industrial Strategy Project,
1994).
Thus it was that at the moment when the time came for
labour (in this case COSATU) to protect its future
interests by making a pact with the government-in-
waiting (the ANC), the independent voice of labour was
somewhat blunted by the policy shifts it had already
made. Consequently, instead of a clearly defined
agreement in which the ANC commits itself to defending
worker's interests in the new government, we have
instead, a manifesto that presupposes a strategic
consensus between capital and labour.
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To COSATU, the RDP is evident of its influence on the
transition process. It sees the RDP as a means to
achieve the commitment of the Government of National
Unity for its own objectives, of extending workers
rights and gaining access to state resources (See
Collins, 1994)
It is clear however that the RDP as it stands now is far
removed from its original intention. While it will
undoubtedly bring material benefits to many who suffered
under apartheid, the strategic implication of the RDP is
that it will facilitate the imposition of the power of
capital on the emerging state through what is being
presented as a programme for social development. It is
not the basis for a transition to socialism as some on
the left suggest, rather, it clears the way for
capitalist restructuring of the South African state by
promoting consensual solutions among capital, labour and
the GNU through the creation, for example, of tri-
'
partite institutions such as the National Economic
Development and Labour Council. In this way labour is
locked into a strategic planning process which it is not
likely to direct in its own interest. The reason for
this is that the left vision of a post-apartheid state
developing creative and innovative alternatives to both
soviet-style commandism and the uncontrolled free-market
is rapidly fading as the emergent state succumbs to the
global power of capital and organises its own
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institutions along lines of capitalist rationality.
-
Through the RDP, the state will attempt to confine the
independent self-organisation of workers and other
social groups in civil society within the limits of
capital. Financing of the RDP is being linked in the
White Paper with the sale of state assets. Funding for
NGO's is conditional on support for the RDP.
What is becoming clear therefore is that contra its
original intention, the RDP is becoming the means by
which the state is attempting to control labour and
other popular organs of civil society.
2. Labour-Capital relations
The recent spate of strikes across the country came at
an inopportune time for the GNU and the ANC leadership.
It appeared to show that the new government is not able
to maintain industrial stability, a pre-condition for
the return of foreign investors. On the other hand, it
apeared to signal to workers that despite the momentous
political changes, as far as workers were concerned, it
was 'struggle as usual'.
An analysis of the strike wave that hit the country
immediately after the elections showed a renewed
confidence of workers in the wake of the political
changes to take action against what they consider to be
bad labour practices. The strikes were primarily
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concerning conditions at the workplace over pay, working
practices, redundancies, union recognition, racist
practices and disputes around dismissals. One
commentator suggested that "workers are demanding that
the clianges that are happening on the political sphere
must extend to the workplace." (Mtshelwane,1994:10) But
the nature of the causes that sparked particular
workplace disputes also reveal the uneveness of
workplace conditions and the capacity of labour to
transform those conditions, more than two decades since
the Natal strikes! It reveals the extent of the legacy
of the ancien regime that labour still needs to overcome
as it enters a new political period. What is of greater
significance, however, is not the timing of the strike-
wave nor the extent to which it may have embarrased the
ANC leadership, but the fact that the disputes were
essentially of a trade union nature, and expected by the
strikers to be capable of resolution within the existing
industrial relations machinery, despite the highly
charged political moment in which the strikes were
occur ing.
The strikes showed the capacity for independent action
on the part of the working class. It is this capacity
that makes any possible consensus between labour,
capital and the state always of a provisional nature.
While the struggle to depoliticise economic relations
has been given new momentum with the establishment of
the GNU, labour still has the capacity to impose limits
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on this process. But the lack of critical focus by
labour of the strategic restructuring taking place at
the level of the state and in the relationship between
capital and the state, will have important long-term
implications for labour and its capacity to engage with
the power of capital.
3. Capital-state relations
The form of the South African state is a function of
changing class relations. While the death of apartheid
and the establishment of the GNU opens up new
possibilities in class relations, the form of the
emergent state is a consequence of the changing dynamic
of class relations that had its roots in the crisis of
domestic capital in the 1970's and the pressure to
restructure the apartheid state in the 1980's.
To what extent are capital-state relations embodied in
the RDP? I have tried to show in this thesis that the
pressure to restructure the South African state, and the
form it assumes at a particular historical moment, is a
function of the changes in the social relations of
production which fundamentally are a manifestation of
the dynamic of class struggle. State strategies for
reconstruction and development are caught between on the
one hand, the need to respond to working class demands
for real improvements in their lives, and on the other
hand, the pressure to impose the abstract power of money
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and the law on society, for this is the basis of the
fetishised form of rule in capitalist society. This
contradiction is encapsulated by the Reconstruction and
Development Programme. But the power of capital is
manifested also in the way in which the forms of
administration and law conform to and reproduce the
abstract power of capital. Notwithstanding the rhetoric
that the RDP is 'people-driven', it reproduces the
fetishised forms of bourgeois class rule in the liberal
form of the state. It is the liberal form of the state,
_
with its formal separation of the state from civil
society, that makes possible the rule of money and the
law over civil society and the state. As long as this
formal separation continues to be reproduced in the
South African state, the commitment towards 'tri-
partism', 'corporatism' or 'people-driven programmes'
remain rhetorical devices to conceal more than it reveal
of the power of money beyond apartheid.
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